APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant appeals the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a voluntary dismissal because a motion for summary judgment was filed prior to the entry of the order on the nonsuit. We hold that a motion for summary judgment filed after a written notice of nonsuit has been filed does not preclude the plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We also conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Affirmed and Remanded.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax.  They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

The plaintiff, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant criminal court clerk. The plaintiff alleges that the court clerk induced a breach of contract by assessing him with court costs he asserts the State agreed to waive in return for his pleading guilty to felony charges. The trial court found that the plaintiff could not use his affidavit to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding an alleged oral promise made by the prosecutor when the criminal judgments and written plea agreement, taken together, unambiguously assessed court costs to the plaintiff. The court therefore found that the plaintiff was unable to prove an essential element of his claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on grounds of: (1) abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and (ii); and (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(2). We conclude that the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that clear and convincing evidence also exists that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Affirmed and remanded.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is the second appeal to this Court involving the instant real property dispute. At issue is a 58-acre portion (“Disputed Property”) of what was an approximately 100-acre tract acquired by N.B. Bailey and his wife, Pearl Bailey, by warranty deed in 1918. The original plaintiffs, Arthur B. and Tia Roberts, were neighboring landowners who 1 brought a boundary dispute action in March 2009 against the original defendants, Robert W. Bailey, Richard Neal Bailey, and Lisa Bailey Dishner (“the Baileys”). During the course of the boundary dispute, N.B. and Pearl Bailey’s descendants and successors in title became aware that their ownership interest in the Disputed Property could be affected by the possibility that N.B. and Pearl Bailey owned the original 100 acres as tenants in common rather than tenants by the entirety. The first appeal arose when the Baileys, proceeding as third-party plaintiffs, filed a motion to quiet title to the Disputed Property against the third-party defendants, Dale Littleton, Alice Littleton, Kimber Littleton, Mark Lee Littleton, and Charlotte Dutton (“The Littletons and Ms. Dutton”). On March 30, 2010, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Littletons and Ms. Dutton, and the court certified its order as a final judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. On appeal, this Court questioned the finality of that March 2010 order but allowed the appeal to proceed on an interlocutory basis. Roberts v. Bailey, 338 S.W.3d 540, 541 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), perm. denied (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011) (“Roberts I”).

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Eric Vislosky, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea to Class B sexual exploitation of a minor was therefore unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The appellant father was incarcerated for the murder of the mother of the children at issue in this case. The foster parents, relatives of the children’s mother, filed this petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and adopt the children. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition and terminated the father’s parental rights. The father now appeals. On appeal, he challenges only the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1102(1)(A)(i); abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113(g)(3).  We reverse in part and we affirm in part; we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1102(1)(A)(i); abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113(g)(3).  We reverse in part and we affirm in part; we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Calvin Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder, for which he received concurrent sentences of 20 years and life imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Additionally, he argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Karen Lakin to testify as an expert witness and erred in admitting autopsy photographs of the victim. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jenkins Bonding Company executed as a surety an appearance bond for the Defendant, Aliscia Caldwell, on several cases as detailed below.  The Defendant failed to appear, and the general sessions court forfeited the bond and issued a scire facias and a capias for the Defendant’s arrest.  The bonding company physically surrendered the Defendant to the trial court and rquested that it be relieved as surety.  The trial court denied the surrender and released the Defendant on the same bond.  Subsequently, the Defendant failed to appear at another court hearing.  The trial court entered a final forfeiture judgment against the bonding company.  The bonding company filed a motion to alter or amend the forfeiture judgment against it, saying that it should be exonerated of the bond because it lawfully surrendered the Defendant.  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, the bonding company argues that the trial court did not have the authority to deny the surrender and release the Defendant over the surety’s objection.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, and we remand the case for entry of an order releasing Jenkins Bonding as surety in this case.

Father in this juvenile court custody dispute has filed a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal de novo as required by Rule 10B, §2.06, we summarily affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.

The federally-incarcerated Petitioner, Marcus Boales, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Henderson County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his two 1996 drug convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

After a work-related accident in August of 2010, the employee filed suit against his employer for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming permanent injury to both knees. The employer agreed that the injury to the employee’s right knee was compensable, but contended that the injury to the left knee was not work related. The trial court found for the employee, awarding benefits for injuries to each knee. The employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The General Sessions Court of Montgomery County entered a final judgment against the garnishees for the full amount of the judgment debtor’s debt, even though the garnishees had filed an answer and informed the court of the amount of their payments made to the judgment debtor. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed this final judgment, and the garnishees timely appealed to this Court. We vacate the final judgment for the full amount of the debt because (1) no conditional judgment was entered, (2) the garnishees were not provided with notice of a conditional judgment, and (3) the garnishees answered and properly informed the court regarding the amount of their payments made to the judgment debtor. We remand this action to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Christopher A. Howard, was convicted of attempted possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and aggravated robbery, for which he was sentenced to six years and twelve years, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that there was insufficient accomplice testimony corroboration to sustain a conviction on either charge. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tiffany Davis, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus.  In the petition, she challenged her Marshall County drug convictions, which had resulted in an effective sentence of 30 years in the Department of Correction.  Because we agree with the habeas corpus court that the petitioner’s claims of double jeopardy violations and ineffective assistance of counsel do not render her convictions void, we affirm that court’s dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Eugene Mark Hogbin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years.  Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel told petitioner that she would win his case at trial.  After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, the Defendant, Demontre Chavez Brown, challenges his conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and subsequent sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. Specifically, he alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the witnesses’ testimonies had material inconsistencies and his co-defendant’s testimony was inadequately corroborated; (2) the trial court improperly allowed his co-defendant to testify because the State did not provide him with sufficient notice of such; and (3) the trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentence was excessive because the Defendant’s record contained mostly petty juvenile offenses. Upon consideration of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David M. Dulaney and Traci L. Dulaney (“Plaintiffs”) sued Don Walker Construction (“Walker Construction”) and Rhonda P. Walker (collectively “Defendants”) with regard to real property and a house constructed and sold by Defendants to Plaintiffs. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to prove negligent construction and had failed to prove misrepresentation and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Cyrus Deville Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis.  The petitioner is currently serving a life sentence following his conviction for first degree murder.  In his petition, the petitioner contended that he was entitled to relief because of recently recanted testimony by an eyewitness to the murder.  The error coram nobis court concluded that the recantation was not credible and denied relief.  On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court erred in denying relief because it improperly assessed the evidence presented and applied an incorrect legal standard.  After a review of the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jessica Kennedy, was convicted by a Monroe County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, facilitation of burning personal property, a Class A misdemeanor, and facilitation of abuse of a corpse, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-402, 39-14-303, 13-17-312, 39-11-402, 39-11-403 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for facilitation of felony murder, five years for facilitation of aggravated robbery, eleven months, twenty-nine days for facilitation of burning personal property, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for facilitation of abuse of a corpse. On appeal, she contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress, (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial related to the testimony of Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Special Agent Barry Brakebill, (5) the trial court erred by permitting the State to call witnesses not listed on the indictment, (6) the trial court erred by making improper statements related to her recorded police interview and by failing to grant a mistrial, (7) the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of a psychologist, (8) the trial court erred by denying her ex parte motion for funds to secure an expert, (9) the trial court erred by overruling her motions to dismiss and to disqualify the prosecutor and the district attorney general’s office, and (10) the trial court erred by misapplying mitigating and enhancement factors during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.