APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Selwyn Forbes George, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he pled guilty to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale in exchange for a twenty-year sentence to be served as a Range I, standard offender. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Christopher D. Seals, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and in determining the amount of restitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a conservatorship modification case. Appellant/Mother sought modification of the trial court’s previous order, naming Appellee/Father as the conservator over the parties’ mentally-disabled, adult son, and mandating that Mother’s visitation with the Ward be supervised. Because Mother had made numerous, unfounded allegations of sexual abuse against the Ward by his older brother, the trial court enjoined Mother from making any future allegations of sexual abuse against the Ward by his older brother, and further enjoined her from discussing, with the Ward, any purported sexual abuse by his older brother. Although the trial court modified its previous order to grant Mother four additional hours of visitation per month, it ordered that her visitation would continue to be supervised. The court further modified the conservatorship by holding that Father, at his discretion, would be allowed to tape record any telephone conversations between the Ward and Mother. On appeal, Mother contends that the injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on her free speech. We adopt the “modern rule,” holding that defamatory speech may be enjoined after a determination that the speech is, in fact, false, and upon the condition that the injunction be narrowly tailored to limit the prohibited speech to that which has been determined to be false. We conclude that the injunction in this case satisfies both of these criteria such that it does not constitute a prior restraint on Mother’s free speech. Mother also appeals the trial court’sorder concerning the amount of visitation, the fact that the visitation is to be supervised, and recording of her telephone conversations with the Ward. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mother eight hours of visitation per month. Furthermore, because of Mother’s behavior during the pendency of this litigation, we further conclude that the imposition of supervised visitation and the recording of her telephone conversation serve two functions. First, these requirements preserve the Ward’s best interest by providing safeguards against future negative impacts from Mother’s actions. Second, because Mother has shown a propensity to disregard the orders of the court, the requirements ensure that the court’s orders will be followed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and there is no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm and remand.

Inmates in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction who are housed at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville, Tennessee, filed various claims related to their “prison jobs,” inter alia, for wages and damages under the Tennessee Wage Regulation Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-2-101 and 50-2-104, and for breach of oral contract,promissory estoppel ,unjust enrichment, and conversion.The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed all of the inmates’ claims upon the defendants’Tenn.R.Civ.P.12.02 (1) and (6) motion to dismiss. We affirm.
 

The Petitioner, William Atrel Townsend aka Abdullah R.S. Ashanti, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his conviction for attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the trial court’s denial of relief to an inmate based upon a writ of certiorari.The inmate raises several issues regarding violations of the Tennessee Department of Correction Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, as well as basic due process. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant, Alan F. Watson, was indicted by the Houston County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the evidence seized after execution of a search warrant at his home. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the aggravated robbery of Crystal’s Check Cashing. As a result, he was sentenced to nine years in incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress; (2) that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court excluded evidence; and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the evidence, we determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where the affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable cause and did not contain false and misleading information. Additionally, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding irrelevant evidence and that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In two indictments, the Defendant, Steven Deshawn Crawley, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of forty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it misapplied enhancement factors, failed to apply applicable mitigating factors, and failed to follow the sentencing guidelines set forth in Tennessee Code annotated sections 40-35-102, -103, and -115. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Keith Whited (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, driving under the influence, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Keith A. Whited, No. M2010-00134-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4684468, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 25, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

Petitioner, Leroy Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding his conviction for being a habitual drug offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417(d). The trial court sentenced petitioner as a Range II offender to a forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. Petitioner argues that the judgment of the trial court was void due to a defective presentment. He also claims that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it erroneously classified him as a habitual drug offender and because it erroneously applied a sentencing enhancement. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, David Lee Hutcherson, pled guilty to one count each of possession of less than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, - 17-433, -17-425. He received an effective sentence of three years on all counts. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant sought to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his question of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).

This is a dependency and neglect case. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor child was dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-102(b)(23)(A)(i) due to Appellant/Father’s knowing use of force upon the child, which force was likely to cause the child serious bodily injury. Father appeals this finding. We conclude that the evidence clearlyand convincingly establishes that Father did knowingly “use . . . force on [the] child that [was] likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.” Affirmed and remanded.

The petitioner, Steven Malone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel pretrial and at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Harold Morris, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402, -13-502, -14-403. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lee C. Palmer (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of felony reckless endangerment and one count of driving under the influence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court afforded her only three peremptory challenges instead of the statutorily required eight. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that she abandoned her son by failing to support him and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm the trial court.

This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries she sustained as a result of a two-vehicle accident. The jury found the parties equally at fault, and the trial court affirmed the jury’s verdict. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in limiting testimony concerning Defendant’s acceptance of fault at the scene of the accident. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jonathon C. Hood, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief from the imposition of ongoing punishment in the form of fines. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of compensatory and punitive damages to the wife for injuries she allegedly sustained at the hands of the husband. We affirm.

Appellant, Ricky Neal Forster, II, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft and received an effective six-year sentence, suspended to probation. A probation violation warrant and an amendment thereto were issued, alleging violations of the terms and conditions of probation by: (1) testing positive for marijuana; (2) using controlled substances; (3) failing to complete a drug rehabilitation program as instructed; (4) failing to make payments toward court costs and restitution; and (5) garnering new criminal convictions. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation, which appellant now claims was an abuse of discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves Employee’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied Employee’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits after finding that she voluntarily quit her job based on her belief that she would soon be terminated. Employee appealed that finding in the trial court, where she also contended that she was denied her due process rights of notice and representation during the agency proceedings. The trial court upheld the denial of benefits, finding substantial and material evidence that Employee voluntarily quit her job, and finding that Employee was not denied due process during the agency proceedings. We affirm.

Appellant, Jonathan Ray Chapman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting his videotaped confession into evidence and (2) failing to admit a statement made by his girlfriend into evidence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Courtney Knowles, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Cedric Earl Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On October 11, 2010, judgments of conviction were entered against Petitioner pursuant to his negotiated guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. Petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On February 27, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition with prejudice because it was filed outside the one-year applicable statute of limitations. On April 11, 2013, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. In its brief, the State moves this court to dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was filed almost two weeks late. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment appealed from). We decline to dismiss the appeal and waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. However, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Land owner applied to the Sumner County Board of Zoning Appeals for a conditional use permit to operate a quarry with accessory asphalt and concrete plants and rock crushing facilities. After a public hearing, the Board denied the application. The land owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.