APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a medical negligence/wrongful death case. Following their mother’s death, Appellants’ filed the instant lawsuit against several doctors who provided treatment to their mother. During discovery, Appellants allegedly learned that the Appellee physician had amended his original consultation report to correct a mis-diagnosis of the Decedent’s condition. Appellants were granted leave to amend their complaint to add the Appellee and his medical practice as defendants to the lawsuit. The amended complaint naming the Appellees was filed some five years after the filing of the original lawsuit. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statutes of limitations and repose barred Appellants’ case. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the Appellants had not shown facts sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment on the part of the Appellee physician so as to toll the applicable one-year statute of limitations and three-year statute of repose under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-116. The trial court also found that Appellants had failed to exercise due diligence in discovering the alleged fraudulent concealment. Appellants appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand.

The petitioner, Ricardo Dale, filed a petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ladarion Pearson, entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated criminal trespassing, two counts of assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of robbery. He received an effective sentence of five years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Jury convicted Defendant, Khaliq Ra-el, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, reckless aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received concurrent sentences of three years each for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reckless aggravated assault to be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to respectfully depart from the majority’s undertaking an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence of passion and provocation. In my view, the reference to passion and provocation in the voluntary manslaughter statue does not denote an essential element of the offense. It describes a dispensation to a defendant who, having intentionally or knowingly killed another, would otherwise be guilty of first degree or second degree murder respectively.

The petitioner, Charles McHaney, filed a petition in the Davidson County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the dismissal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the termination of a State employee.  The employee was late for work on numerous occasions prior to and throughout 2010. She sustained an at-work injury in October 2010. On January 15, 2011, she was tardy for work and a termination proceeding was commenced shortly thereafter. Prior to her receipt of the letter recommending termination, the employee tendered a request for FMLA leave, which leave was approved after termination was recommended, but before termination was confirmed. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the employee’s termination. The Chancery Court affirmed the employee’s termination and it dismissed her interference with FMLA claim. We affirm.

The Defendant, Angela M. Greene, was convicted by a McMinn County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of theft, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2010) (first degree murder), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010, 2011, 2013) (aggravated assault), 39-14-103 (2010) (theft of property); 39-14-105(3) (2010) (amended 2012) (grading of theft). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life as a violent offender for the first degree murder conviction, six years as a Range I, standard offender for aggravated assault, and four years as a Range I, standard offender for theft. The aggravated assault and theft sentences were imposed consecutively to each other but concurrently with the life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s hearsay statements. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice wrongful death action. After the plaintiff filed this lawsuit, he timely filed a certificate of good faith, as required by the medical malpractice statute. The certificate did not include a statement that the executing party had “zero” violations of the statute. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on this omission. The plaintiff in turn filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice. The defendants objected to a dismissal without prejudice. The defendants argued that, if the certificate of good faith does not strictly comply with the statutes, the trial court must dismiss the case with prejudice. The trial court granted the voluntary nonsuit without prejudice, and the defendants now appeal that decision. DIscerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Reginald Fowler, was convicted of aggravated arson following a bench trial, and he was sentenced to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief raising the following issues: (1) whether he was denied a fair trial due to the alleged impairment of the trial judge; (2) whether ineffective assistance of trial counsel rendered his waiver of a jury trial involuntary; and (3) whether trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective by failing to present the testimony of a pharmacologist at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Defendant, James Jones, was charged by indictment with the offense of aggravated robbery. A jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request to be placed on judicial diversion. Instead, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve four years of incarceration. Defendant raises one issue on appeal. He argues that the trial court should have ordered judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jeffery Odom, was convicted and sentenced for two felonies, with his sentences to be served concurrently.  He filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that the concurrent sentences violated a statute that required consecutive sentencing under the circumstances.  The trial court dismissed his petition.  He filed a notice of appeal more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s order, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).  We dismiss this appeal because of the untimely filing.

This case involves a dispute regarding the use of an abandoned county road.  The road runs through the land of John George, Appellee, who sought to deny his neighbors, Thomas and Bobbye Hager, Appellants, access to the road. The Hagers brought suit claiming they had acquired rights to use the road through adverse possession, a private access easement pursuant to the abandonment of a public road, or a prescriptive easement. The trial court found that the Hagers had established the creation of a prescriptive easement butlimited their right to maintain the easement to emergency conditions only. The Hagers argue that the trial court erred in restricting their ability to reasonably maintain the easement. Mr. George contends that the trial court erred in finding the Hagers had acquired rights in the road through a prescriptive easement. We find that the trial court correctly held that the Hagers acquired a prescriptive easement but that a right to conduct reasonable maintenance is a necessary incident of an easement by prescription. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from an order setting aside a default judgment. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, David Wayne Felts, of six counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of one hundred and fourteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his rape of a child conviction in Count 2; (2) the trial court failed to compel the State to elect specific facts sufficient to distinguish Count 6 from Count 5; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the victim’s statement to a nurse practitioner as a statement made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(4); (4) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the victim’s statement as a prior consistent statement; and (5) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Antwon Cook, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for possession of more than one-half gram of cocaine with the intent to sell and sale of more than one-half gram of cocaine, for which he is serving an effective eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antwan Yumata Hunter, pled guilty to one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony.  On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel that rendered his guilty plea involuntary.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to advise him of a mandatory fine that accompanied his guilty plea; for failing to file pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress; and for failing to fully investigate his case.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Walter George Glenn, of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a Range II sentence of thirty-five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a medical examiner to testify as to the cause of the death in violation of his right to confrontation; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him by improperly applying enhancement factors and failing to apply mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Sherrill, of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance in a drug-free zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eight years as a multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) “Markham Park” is not listed as a “park” by the State of Tennessee, the City of Tiptonville, or the Federal Government; (2) the State committed a Brady violation by not informing defense counsel of its confidential informant’s drug use during the time period of his transactions with the Defendant; (3) the State failed to prove chain of custody; and (4) the trial court, Tiptonville Police Chief England, and the State, engaged in improper conversations with the jury after jury deliberations had begun. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Deon Lamont Cartmell, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received an eighteen-year sentence.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010).  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) in admitting the victim’s statements into evidence, (2) in admitting evidence that the victim’s wedding ring was missing, (3) in admitting evidence that Megan Prisco had a flirtatious relationship with him before the victim’s death, (4) in admitting evidence that he boasted about his treating his wife poorly to Metro Police Field Training Officer Mackovis Peebles, (5) in admitting evidence that he carelessly left weapons around his house and used profanity when Antoya Brandon confronted him about it, (6) in admitting evidence of his conversation with Metro Police Chaplain James Duke, (7) in admitting proof of his relationships with other women after the victim’s death, (8) in allowing the State to question him about his contact with Paige Merriweather, (9) in allowing the State to question him about an incident three years before the victim’s death when he confronted her about having sex with other men, (10) in ordering redaction of a portion of the defense expert’s report, and (11) in enhancing his sentence.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. The petitioner was employed by the defendant bank. When the petitioner employee arrived for work, the employee’s supervisor smelled alcohol on her and asked her to take an alcohol test. The employee refused to take the alcohol test, and as a result her employment was terminated. The employee filed for unemployment benefits.  The defendant commissioner held that the employee was discharged for work-related misconduct and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits,and the denial of benefits was affirmed in the administrative appeals process. The employee then filed the instant lawsuit for judicial review of the administrative decision. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision, and the petitioner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Father appeals the trial court’s order setting aside its prior judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that Father’s failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements rendered the termination judgment void. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a petition for dependency and neglect, child support, and breach of contract arising out of an international adoption.  The respondent adopted the subject child from Russia.  A few months later, after experiencing difficulties with the child, she placed the child on a oneway flight to Russia and sought to annul the adoption. The adoption agency that brokered the adoption filed this lawsuit against the respondent in juvenile court, seeking child support and alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court dismissed the case, and the case was appealed to the circuit court below. On appeal to circuit court, the petition was amended to add the child as a petitioner and to seek child support and damages arising out of the adoption contract. After protracted proceedings, the trial court granted the petitioners’ motion for default judgment against the respondent for failing to file an answer to the petition and failing to cooperate in discovery. The trial court later conducted a hearing on damages, at which the respondent did not appear. The trial court awarded damages to the petitioners and ordered the respondent to pay child support. It later denied the respondent’s motions for post-judgment relief. The respondent now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I concur with Judge Stafford’s thorough opinion. After several discussions and independent research, I believe that my colleagues are correct on the law.

This appeal concerns a dispute over damages in a fraud case. Bradley M. Barkhurst and his wife Judith R. Barkhurst (“the Plaintiffs”), victims of a Ponzi scheme, filed a complaint against Amparo Goyes Jarosh, personal representative of the estate of Charles D. Candler (“Defendant”) , in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). 1 The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs appeal, arguing, among other things, that they should have been granted enhanced damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). We hold that enhanced damages are not available in an action against an estate. We also modify the Trial Court’s judgment to include in the award to Plaintiffs certain taxes and interest that the Plaintiffs incurred in the Ponzi scheme.
We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.