APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael Barnes, challenges his jury conviction for possession of contraband in a penal institution, alleging that the following errors were made at his trial: (1) that the chain of custody regarding the contraband was not sufficiently established; (2) that the stun belt he was forced to wear during his trial violated his due process rights; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Xavier Crawford, stands convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant submits that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Larry Jenkins, pled guilty to multiple counts of burglary, theft, and vandalism, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Montez Dewayne Birt, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and received a six-year, suspended sentence. Thereafter, a violation warrant was filed, and following a hearing, the trial court revoked the sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement based upon his failure to report to his probation officer. The Defendant appeals the revocation and order of total incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Carey Faught (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two convictions for especially aggravated robbery and the two convictions for attempted aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also argues that his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates principles of double jeopardy. Finally, the Defendant contends that his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Victor Gonzalez, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court should have found that due process considerations tolled the statute of limitations for filing his petition. Following our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition on the basis that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and the petitioner failed to show any reason for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

I concur in most of the majority opinion, with the exception of its decision to deem waived Mother’s stated issue of whether the trial court erred in holding her in contempt when the order she was accused of violating had no deadline.

Plaintiff filed an action alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the Tennessee Disabilities Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Employer on the basis that the Act does not require employers to make “reasonable accommodations,” as were required by Plaintiff at the time she was discharged. We affirm.

The Defendant, Troy Lynn Fox, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting certain photographs into evidence—one, a photograph of the murder victim that was taken while she was alive and, two, multiple photographs of the crime scene and of the victim’s injuries, taken both at the scene and during the autopsy; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to conduct a jury-out hearing prior to the admission of several photographs of the victim taken at the crime scene and by describing those photographs as “gross” in front of the jury; (4) whether the trial court erred by requiring the Defendant to cross-examine the victim’s mother during the State’s case-in-chief rather than allowing the Defendant to recall her as a defense witness; (5) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from further development of the couple’s social, family, and marital history; (6) whether the trial court committed reversible error in its instruction to the jury on the impeachment of a witness; and (7) whether the trial court demonstrated judicial bias against the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm.

The Defendant, Shawn Christopher Sales, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 163 days in confinement followed by fifteen years to be served in Community Corrections. In March 2013, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed a second affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State presented insufficient evidence to support the revocation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Jonathan Downey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder and then merged the latter two convictions with the felony murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of first degree felony murder. The State asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s merger of the aggravated burglary conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder. We order the trial court to reinstate the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated burglary and remand this matter for sentencing on that conviction.

I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue.

The Defendant, Jackie Wayne Miller, pled guilty to initiation of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentences. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years and three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Kaliyah S. and Jaya P. (“the Children”), the minor children of Kayla S. (“Mother”). In November 2010, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Jaya’s father, Josh P., on November 30, 2010. The petition alleged severe child abuse as the sole ground for termination. DCS filed an amended petition in May 2011, which also named Kaliyah’s father, Rontez L. (“Father”), and alleged that his parental rights should be terminated on the statutory ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. Father was incarcerated at the time the amended petition was filed. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother and Josh P. upon finding that DCS had proven the ground of severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned Kaliyah by engaging in conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for her welfare prior to his incarceration. When making its ruling, the trial court concluded that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to assist Father in reunification because DCS sufficiently proved the statutory ground of abandonment alleged against him. The court also found that termination of the parental rights of all three respondents was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that DCS was relieved of the requirement of making reasonable efforts of reunification with regard to Father and remand for further proceedings.

The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The trial court, applying the principles promulgated in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 1996), held that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration virtually all of his claims, while allowing the defendants access to a judicial forum for some of their potential claims. We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor is controlling and that Taylor mandates a holding that theagreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1,000 or more. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that both issues are without merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I believe the Trial Court committed no reversible error, and I would affirm the decision of the Trial Court. The majority acknowledges that there are two distinct lines of cases from this Court on this issue. The majority discusses these cases in detail and there is nothing to be gained by my discussing them once again in this dissent. I, however, believe that those decisions holding that in a case involving “aggravated circumstances,” DCS is relieved of making an attempt to reunify the parent and the child best give effect to the intent of our General Assembly.

Years after the parties divorced, they agreed to entry of a consent order requiring the mother to cooperate with the father in obtaining passports for the parties’ two minor children. Months later, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had refused to cooperate in executing the necessary documents. The trial court found the mother in contempt for willfully refusing to execute the documents. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order finding her in contempt, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the parties no longer live in Tennessee. She also argues that the trial court erred in holding her in contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A.F.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor children, T.F.H. and P.F.H. (“the Children”). After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. He challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but not the best-interest determination. We affirm the judgment in all respects.

This appeal involves post-divorce parental relocation. The mother notified the father that she intended to relocate outside Tennessee with the parties’ minor daughter. The mother asserted that the relocation was for purposes related to her career as a surgeon. The father filed a petition opposing the relocation on the grounds that the mother’s motive for the relocation was vindictive and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose under Tennessee’s parental relocation statute. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the father had not carried his burden of proving the mother’s motive was vindictive or that the relocation was not for a reasonable purpose, and so permitted the mother to relocate with the parties’ child. The father now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Auqeith Lashawn Byner, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of reckless driving. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. As a result, he was sentenced to a sixteen-year sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell conviction and six months for reckless driving, to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence in another case 2007-D-3157. Petitioner initiated a direct appeal of his convictions but dismissed the appeal voluntarily. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Plaintiffs appeal a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Tennessee Right to Farm Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 43-26-101 et seq. (“the TRFA”). Plaintiffs own an express ingress/egress easement, a gravel road, that passes through Defendants’ farm. In what Plaintiffs titled a “COMPLAINT FOR ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE AND DAMAGES”, they alleged, inter alia, that Defendants substantially destroyed the utility of their ingress/egress easement by driving heavy farming equipment across and allowing cattle to walk upon the easement. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss contending that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted because the nuisance claim was barred by the TRFA. More specifically, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants violated any “generally accepted agricultural practices” or a “statute or regulation” in the use or operation of the farm upon which the easement lies. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the TRFA pertains to nuisances alleged to arise from a farm or farm operations but not to claims of unreasonable interference with the use of an ingress and egress easement. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim, for the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted for a nuisance arising from a farm or farm operation. However, we have determined the complaint states a separate claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress easement, a claim that is not subject to the TRFA. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint for it states a separate and viable claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress/egress easement. Further, this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellee, Donald Lee Reburn, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. At his guilty plea submission hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to ten years, suspended to probation. The State has appealed and argues that the trial court erred by sentencing appellee without a sentencing hearing and without a presentence report. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing.