APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jimmy Wayne Wilson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury in 1985 of committing a rape in 1984. The jury also determined the Defendant to be an habitual criminal, and the Defendant, accordingly, was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this proceeding, the Defendant is attacking his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Bradford E. Holliday, Michael A. Holliday, and Clayton E. Holliday (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Homer C. Patton and Jeffrey B. Presley (collectively “Defendants”) for breach of contract and specific performance. Plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted after finding and holding, inter alia, that the release provision contained in an amended agreement executed by Defendants “contains broad release language which the Court finds to be adequate to release claims of fraud asserted now by the Defendants in this action.” Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the release was sufficient to waive claims of fraud and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Defendants could not have reasonably relied upon representations made by Bradford E. Holliday. We find and hold that the release language contained in the amended agreement was insufficient to release claims of fraud and that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of reasonable reliance, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment. We,  however, affirm that portion of the Trial Court’s order memorializing Defendants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice of their counterclaims for fraud against Michael A. Holliday and Clayton E. Holliday.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Anthony Foster, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of reckless endangerment and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction with the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced Foster to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Foster argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment showing that Foster was charged with and convicted of aggravated assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), which is a Class C felony.

The Petitioner, Rolly William Whitford, pled guilty to sexual battery and rape, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s sentence on appeal. State v. Rolly William Whitford, No. M2009-02525-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 255310 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 20, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 25, 2011). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, asserting that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was never advised of the lifetime supervision requirement for sex offenders. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Martha Ann Freeman, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction for first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. She contends that trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining process. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Terry Johnson, of one count of second degree murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, and one count of possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the trial court’s refusal to allow the appellant to introduce evidence of the deceased victim’s involvement in an unrelated murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Matthew Jackson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s order denying his requested habeas corpus relief. In his petition, Petitioner attacked his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. He was convicted following his entry of guilty pleas in the Robertson County Circuit Court in 2001. The record shows there were no agreements as to sentencing except the parties agreed all sentences would be served concurrently. In this habeas corpus petition, Petitioner asserts he was sentenced to an illegal sentence because the trial court did not inform him of the following consequences of his guilty pleas: (a) mandatory registration as a sex offender; and (b) mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to incarceration. Petitioner also sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. The trial court denied Petitioner habeas corpus relief to the extent of not setting aside the convictions or the sentences. However, the trial court remanded the cases to the Robertson County Circuit Court for entry of corrected judgments for the aggravated rape convictions regarding registration as a sexual offender and community supervision for life. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lake County.

The Petitioner, Anthony Washington, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition as having been untimely filed and failing to state a cognizable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Deshundric Dennis, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated assault, for which he received a three-year Range I sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this medical malpractice case, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff failed to file, with his complaint, the affidavit of the person who mailed pre-suit notice to the defendants. The trial court, noting that plaintiff complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013) in every respect except for filing the affidavit, and that he filed the affidavit shortly after the complaint, denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff had substantially complied with the statute. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Herlana Brewer, challenges the trial court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence, imposition of full incarceration, and increase to the length of her effective sentence. Specifically, she contends that the trial court did not follow the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210 in revoking her community corrections sentence and improperly increased the length of her sentence on one of the offenses based upon her extensive criminal history and behavior. Upon consideration of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Employee and Employer were preparing to arbitrate Employee’s age discrimination claim when parties began discussing settlement. Employer was responsible for arbitration expenses and made an offer to settle Employee’s claim before incurring bulk of expenses. Employee was aware of Employer’s motivation to avoid paying these fees. Employee attempted to accept offer of settlement three days before arbitration was scheduled, which was after Employer was required to pay $9,000 deposit for arbitration and incurred other necessary expenses preparing for hearing. Employer informed Employee its offer had lapsed and was no longer open. Employee sued for breach of contract. Trial court found Employee did not accept Employer’s offer within reasonable period of time and that there was no settlement contract to enforce. Employee appeals trial court’s judgment. We affirm.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insurance carrier preserved its rights to a jury trial and subrogation interest under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206 (2008). This statute allows an uninsured motorist insurer to “elect to decline binding arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights” under certain prescribed circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(k). The trial court held that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier failed to comply with a local circuit court rule that requires a response to a motion to be filed and served on the movant no later than 30 days after the motion is filed. Pursuant to that local rule, the trial court treated the plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration as “unopposed.” The trial court further held that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier “did not strictly comply with the requirement of T.C.A. § 56-7-1206 objecting to arbitration” and ordered the parties to submit to binding arbitration. We hold that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier complied with the statute, thereby preserving its rights to a jury trial and subrogation, and that the local rule does not operate to abrogate these rights. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

In this divorce case, the trial court granted Mary Ann Layman (“Wife”) an absolute divorce from Thomas Stuart Layman (“Husband”), thereby ending the parties’ twenty-nine year marriage. Subsequently, the court divided the marital property and awarded Wife alimony in futuro and child support in a lump sum amount. Husband appeals. We reverse the trial court’s award of $63,200 in retroactive child support. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

This is a premises liability case. An attendee at an event fell in the defendant’s parking lot and sustained injuries. The attendee and her husband filed suit against the defendant claiming negligence because the parking area had no lighting on the evening of the fall. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting it: had no notice the outdoor lights were burned out; owed no duty to the attendee; and the attendee was more than fifty percent at fault for her injuries. The trial court determined the record contained insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had notice the outside lights were not working. The other issues raised were dismissed as moot. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Wayne Charles Green (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to theft of property of $60,000 or more.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a sentence of ten years. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered this sentence to be served in incarceration and ordered the Defendant to pay restitution of $123,901.22. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying probation or other alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Andre De La Rey Rossouw, pleaded guilty in 2001 to stalking. On July 27, 2012, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis arguing that his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid. Following a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the Petitioner timely appealed. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Fernandez Deon Davenport (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ habeas corpus regarding his conviction of second degree murder. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Gabriel B., Gracie B., and Zachary B., the minor children (“Children”) of Donna B. (“Mother”) and Richard B. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on June 9, 2011, after they had been found in the care of an inappropriate caregiver while Mother was out of state. On April 19, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Father subsequently surrendered his parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this action. Following a bench trial held on November 9, 2012, and January 4, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, (3) the conditions causing the removal of the Children into protective custody persisted, and (4) Mother’s mental condition was impaired to the point of being unable to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Erique Richardson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2010) (amended 2013). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court denied his right to counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal involving liability on personal guaranties securing the debt of a transportation company. On remand after our first opinion, the trial court found that the transportation company and the lender, through the actions of its president, entered into a conspiracy to violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing, relieving the guarantors of their liability under the continuing guaranties. The trial court, however, declined to hold that the lender and transportation company committed fraud or that the sale of the transportation company from the guarantors to its current owner was a sham. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to (1) the actions of the lender’s president being imputed to the lender; (2) that the sale of the transportation company was not a sham; (3) that no fraud was committed; and (4) that the guaranties at issue are continuing. We further hold that the trial court was entitled to consider both the underlying credit agreement and the guaranties in determining whether the duty of good faith was breached. However, we vacate the trial court’s judgment with regard to its findings of conspiracy, a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and breach of the duty of good faith. We further vacate the trial court’s judgment that the guarantors may avoid the obligations under the guaranties. We remand to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law on these issues. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Gabriel B., Gracie B., and Zachary B., the minor children (“Children”) of Donna B. (“Mother”) and Richard B. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on June 9, 2011, after they had been found in the care of an inappropriate caregiver while Mother was out of state. On April 19, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Father subsequently surrendered his parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this action. Following a bench trial held on November 9, 2012, and January 4, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, (3) the conditions causing the removal of the Children into protective custody persisted, and (4) Mother’s mental condition was impaired to the point of being unable to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Antonio Dwayne Johnson, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to Defendants. After voluntarily dismissing the initial complaint, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint pursuant to the saving statute with an attached certificate of good faith and a copy of the original pre-suit notices. Defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.