APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Jason Lee Fisher, stands convicted of four counts of aggravated burglary, three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, one count of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, and three counts of vandalism valued at $500 or less. The trial court sentenced appellant as a career offender to an effective sentence of forty-five years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the effective length of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences but remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

This post-divorce appeal involves the suspension of parenting time. The mother made repeated allegations that the father was abusing their child; the father denied all of the allegations. After numerous proceedings, the father asserted that the mother was coaching the child to make false allegations of abuse and asked the trial court to terminate the mother’s parenting time. The trial court ordered a psychological evaluation of both parties and the child. After considering the evaluations and substantial testimony, the trial court determined that the father had committed no abuse and found that the child would be emotionally harmed by continued contact with the mother. The trial court then suspended the mother’s parenting time and enjoined all contact with the child until the mother obtains mental health counseling and treatment. The mother appeals. Based on our careful review of the record, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Marvin Wendell Kelley, appeals from his jury convictions for first-degree murder, a Class A felony; felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, a Class A felony; and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. In this appeal, he contends as follows: (1) that his indictment should have been dismissed due to lost evidence; (2) that the admission of his codefendant’s statements were hearsay and violated his right to confrontation; (3) that statements from a witness were improperly admitted over a hearsay objection; (4) that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion; and (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough examination of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Participant in protest action which took place at the Tennessee State Capitol brought an action alleging that former Governor and Deputy Governor retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights during the protest. Participant appeals the grant of summary judgment against him and the trial court’s ruling that certain documents created by the Governor’s legal counsel were protected from discovery by the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
 

In this divorce action, Stacy Ramsey (“Wife”) and Phillip Ramsey (“Husband”) stipulated grounds for divorce but proceeded to trial regarding several issues, including classification and division of the parties’ assets, as well as child support, spousal support, and attorney’s fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court valued the parties’ marital assets and divided the marital estate equally. The court awarded Husband both homes owned by the parties upon his payment to Wife of one-half the combined equity. The court found no basis to modify the parties’ mediated co-parenting agreement and set child support accordingly. The court also found that Wife was not entitled to alimony and awarded Husband $450 in attorney’s fees due to Wife’s failure to appear at a previous hearing. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s property division to correct mathematical errors, and we reverse the trial court’s calculation of child support. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

This is an appeal by Darlene H. from an order entered on May 21, 2013, which dismissed her petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that she lacked standing to intervene in the termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings involving her biological grandchild. A final order of adoption terminating the parental rights of Darlene H.’s daughter, Whitney H., to her daughter, Isabella S., was entered on April 24, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed by counsel for Darlene H. until June 21, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the May 21, 2013 order. The adoptive parents, Jason O. and Rachel O., filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss.

Decedent passed away in 1999, and Husband filed a petition for an elective share and a year’s maintenance. Days before the trial was scheduled to begin in 2012 Husband discharged his attorneys and requested a continuance to find replacement counsel. The trial court permitted Husband’s attorneys to withdraw but denied Husband’s motion to continue. The trial court denied Husband’s petition for an elective share because Husband had already received the bequest Decedent left him in her will. The trial court also denied Husband’s request for a year of maintenance because Husband had transferred to himself over $250,000 from Decedent’s accounts shortly before her death, and the amount Husband transferred to himself exceeded the amount Husband sought as maintenance. Husband appealed the trial court’s judgment, and we affirm in all respects

Antwain Green (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to seven years as a Range II offender, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed forty-five year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the majority that the standard of review for questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence is one of abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. See State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). Payment of restitution is part of the alternative sentence meted out in this case. See T.C.A. § 40-35-104(c)(2). The majority clearly and completely sets forth the law related to determining the appropriate amount of and payment of restitution. I will therefore restrict my analysis to the conclusion of the opinion, with which I most respectfully disagree.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment as an incarcerated parent, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more when the child was less than eight years old at the time of sentencing. Mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Mother also argues that none of the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court erred in determining that termination was in the best interests of the Children. We affirm termination of parental rights on the enumerated grounds. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children.

The defendant, Andra L. Taylor, was convicted of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to an effective fourteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence, but only with regard to one of his convictions for reckless endangerment. Following review of the record, we affirm.

The parties stipulated that the employee suffered work-related injuries to both arms and that she was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits based on a 40 percent disability to each arm. The trial court found that the employee’s average weekly wage was $463.92 and that her compensation rate was $309.28 per week. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating the employee’s average weekly wage. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for computation of the average weekly wage and for entry of a revised judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Allan Bohanon, entered guilty pleas to three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence to be served on community corrections. In a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court also ordered him to pay a total of $16,575 in restitution at a rate of $200 per month. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred by setting an unreasonable amount in restitution based on the evidence presented at trial and his ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order of restitution and remand the case for a new restitution hearing.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Tracy A. Roberson, of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of theft of property valued under $500.00, one count of theft of property valued over $1,000.00, and one count of theft of property valued over $60,000.00. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained through an invalid search warrant; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, theft of property valued over $1,000.00, and theft of property valued over $60,000.00; (3) the trial court failed to merge his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft; (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on especially aggravated kidnapping; (5) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing; (6) the trial court demonstrated bias against the Defendant; and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued over $60,000.00, and we modify the conviction to theft of property valued over $10,000.00. We further conclude that the theft of property valued under $500.00 should be merged into the aggravated robbery conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Henry Alfred Honea, appeals the Coffee County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, evading arrest, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, and his effective sentence of life without parole plus 153 years. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife filed a petition to hold husband in criminal contempt for breaching provisions of their marital dissolution agreement that required husband to pay alimony, provide medical insurance, and maintain life insurance policies. Following a bench trial, husband was found guilty of criminal contempt for seventy separate violations of the agreement. The trial court awarded wife $157,850.00 for alimony arrearages, $8,075.25 to reimburse medical insurance expenses, and $11,801.19 for attorney’s fees. The trial court also sentenced husband to thirty days of incarceration, but stayed the sentence for ninety days pending husband’s compliance with the judgment. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

A Maury County jury convicted the petitioner, Juan La Sean Perry, of second degree murder in November 2005, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the department of correction. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Juan La Sean Perry, No. M2007-00903-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1875165, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2008), no perm. app. filed. Nearly five years later, petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed as untimely. On appeal, petitioner contends that due process principles should toll the statute of limitations and requests that this court remand for an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the circuit court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal. We hold that section 29-26-121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms and that the failure to comply with the notice requirements does not mandate dismissal under the facts of this case. We vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings

Appellant, Jeffery W. Dean, challenges his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and carjacking, for which he received concurrent sentences of thirteen years. In this appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain either of his convictions. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the granting of an order of protection. Yenny Walker (“Walker”) dated Janek Pawlik (“Pawlik”). Walker broke off the relationship and later filed a petition for an order of protection against Pawlik. The general sessions court entered an order of protection.  Pawlik appealed to the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Walker an order of protection against Pawlik based on a finding of stalking. Pawlik appeals, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s finding that he was stalking Walker.  After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding of stalking. Also, in keeping with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617 and relevant case law, we remand for the Trial Court to determine and award to Walker her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the Trial Court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee alleged that he injured his right shoulder and left hip when he fell while entering a vehicle. His employer accepted the shoulder injury as compensable, but denied the hip claim. The employee had surgery on both the shoulder and hip and eventually returned to his pre-injury job. The trial court found that the hip injury was compensable and awarded permanent disability benefits for both injuries. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding regarding the hip injury. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Wendolyn Walden, pled guilty to the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief almost two years after pleading guilty, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The issues on appeal in this financially catastrophic divorce proceeding include who is liable for the debt of $240,000 that Wife incurred after the complaint for divorce was filed. The trial court held Wife liable for the entire sum and Husband jointly and severally liable for $75,889.59 of that amount upon the finding that $75,889.59 was used to preserve the parties’ principal marital asset, the residence, pending its sale. Husband contends this was error for he expressly refused to be liable for this debt. The court also awarded a judgment against Husband in favor of Wife for $101,714 of expenses she incurred to maintain the marital residence. Wife was awarded one half of Husband’s pension and $75,000 of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, and sixty months of rehabilitative alimony, at $1,250 per month. Husband contends that all of these awards were error. Husband, however, provided no transcript of the evidence or statement of the evidence; therefore, there is no evidence before this court upon which to find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s findings of fact in all respects. Further, we find no error with the trial court’s legal conclusions or judgments by classifying the award as alimony in futuro. All other rulings by the trial court are affirmed.
 

The Petitioner, Jermeil Tarter, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 conviction for sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school and his twenty-year, Range I sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) of the manner in which counsel conducted voir dire regarding the issue of the Petitioner’s race, (2) counsel failed to advise him adequately regarding his right to testify or remain silent and the advantages and disadvantages of testifying, and (3) counsel failed to inform him fully regarding possible sentencing, the strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case, and the benefits and detriments of going to trial or accepting a plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.