APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Greene County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, William Franklin Robinette, of two counts of soliciting first degree premeditated murder. For each conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with the sentences to be served consecutively to each other and to a previously imposed sentence for a total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the admission of a recording and transcript of the solicitation, the trial court’s failure to dismiss count two because of a violation of the Confrontation Clause, and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s convictions. However, the record reflects that no presentence report was prepared prior to the appellant’s sentencing hearing. Therefore, the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Christopher A. Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus that challenged his 1997 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of felony murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s post-divorce modification of Appellee/Father’s child support obligation, and its finding that Appellant was guilty of various acts of criminal contempt. Appellant/Mother also appeals the trial court’s admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court erred in addressing, sua sponte, the issue of modification of Appellee/Father’s child support obligation in the absence of a petition for modification as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-101(f)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the modification of child support. The order of the trial court is otherwise affirmed. Father’s request for attorney’s fees incurred in defense of this appeal is granted based upon provisions in the parenting plan and marital dissolution agreement. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted Appellant, Dexter Cox, for first degree premeditated murder in September of 2008. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder, for which the trial court sentenced Appellant to life without the possibility of parole. The sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a previously imposed life sentence. Appellant challenges his conviction, claiming that his confession was the product of an illegal arrest and was involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgmens of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Jeffery Demond Miree, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Wolfe, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court Jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Spenser R.S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor son, Jeremiah I.R. (“the Child”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his mother’s custody after a babysitter took the Child and two siblings to the emergency room for injuries to the siblings. Father’s whereabouts were  then unknown and his paternity of the Child had not yet been established. The Child’s mother entered into an agreed order with DCS stipulating that the Child was dependent and neglected in her care. Thereafter, the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. Some 18 months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights. The trial court granted the petition based on its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Joe N. Hill, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his McNairy County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of incest, for which he received a sentence of three years’ probation. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals his jury convictions for first degree murder in perpetration of a felony, a Class A felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-202(a)(1); aggravated arson, a Class A felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302; and theft of property valued over ten thousand dollars, a Class C felony, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. The appellant  received the mandatory minimum sentence for first degree felony murder of life in prison. The trial court additionally sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-five years for his conviction of aggravated arson and three years for his conviction of theft. The latter sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, but consecutively to the life sentence for felony murder, for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal Garner alleges insufficiency of the evidence; trial court error allowing hearsay testimony; trial court error not allowing impeachment of a witness with a prior conviction; and trial court error in allowing the hearsay of a phone call. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lewis Young, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This case involves a claim filed against the Estate of Todd Clendenon. Elite Oncology Medical Group filed the claim seeking payment for medical treatment and services rendered to the decedent. Barbara Jean Clendenon, the decedent’s wife and his Personal Representative, moved the probate court to designate as “exempt funds” the monies paid to the decedent under his health insurance policy. The payments included those pertaining to the treatment and services the decedent received from Elite. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court determined that payments made by the health insurance carrier that were deposited into the Estate’s bank account after the death of the decedent were exempt from the claims of creditors pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-1-110 (2010). Elite appeals. We affirm.

I concur with the majority opinion, except I respectfully disagree with its affirming the imposition of forty-five days’ confinement. I do not believe the trial court justified confinement as opposed to full probation under the circumstances in this case. My view results from the trial court’s findings and the law that guides its determinations.

The issues in this divorce case are whether the trial court correctly ordered husband to pay wife $600 per month in transitional alimony for 36 months, child support in the amount of $253 per month, and $4,000 of the wife's attorneys fees, the latter as alimony in solido. At the time of trial, husband had been unemployed and actively seeking work for about one year. The trial court found that his income was zero. Wife did not argue that husband was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, and the trial court made no such findings. The proof at trial establishes that many of the statutory factors supporting an award of alimony in futuro - including the need of the wife, duration of the marriage, i.e., 20 years, the parties' relative earning capacities, wife's contributions to the marriage as homemaker and parent, and wife's health - were demonstrated. Husband's current ability to pay, however, is quite limited because of his involuntary unemployment and zero income. Consequently, we modify the transitional alimony award to $50 per month, but designate it as alimony in futuro. The difference in husband's income, i.e., $1,191.66 per month, at the time his child support obligation was set and his income, i.e., zero, at time of trial likely supports a finding that there is a significant variance between the current support order of $253 and the amount of the proposed presumptive modified support order. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order refusing to modify his child support obligation and remand for a recalculation of child support. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Michael Hooten, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence.  The trial court imposed a life sentence for the merged murder convictions and concurrent sentences of eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years for the tampering with evidence conviction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded a videotaped confession from a co-defendant; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A professor denied tenure at Vanderbilt University brought suit against the university asserting causes of action for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the university.

The defendant, Reginald Lamont Graham, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of the attempted sale of cocaine, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Tony Eric Pickett, Jr., guilty of evading arrest, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a career offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on misdemeanor evading arrest. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Richard Trehern, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to adequately communicate and meet with him to prepare for the case; (2) by failing to attack the credibility of Petitioner’s wife on cross-examination; (3) by failing to advise him that the crime for which he was charged had no release eligibility date; (4) by failing to adequately advise him of the consequences of Momon; and (5) by failing to obtain an expert witness to rebut the State’s theory of shaken baby syndrome. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Freeman Ray Harrison, Jr., of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years, to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment and one of the counts of aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the victim’s grandmother’s testimony about the victim’s initial “complaint”; (3) Rutherford County was not the appropriate venue; (4) the State’s loss of a GPS device about which there was testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair; and (5) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court.  As such, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

This case involves a man and a woman who formed a limited liability company under the Tennessee Revised Limited Liability Company Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-249-101 et seq, with the ostensible purpose of investing in real estate. The only investment it made, however, was the purchase of a house for the man and his children to live in. The woman supplied all the money to buy the house, as well as all the capital that was invested in the company. After personal differences arose between the parties, the woman petitioned the court to dissolve the company and to distribute its assets. The man asked the court to divide the assets of the company equally between the parties in accordance with the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-305(b). The woman asked the court to order that she be repaid her entire financial contribution to the company. The trial court dissolved the company. After hearing proof and argument, it ordered that the house be sold, with the net proceeds of the sale to be applied first to the return of the woman’s capital contributions, with any profits beyond those contributions to be divided equally between the parties. We affirm the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of first degree (felony) murder as well as one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. Prior to trial, the defendant also pled guilty to one count of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony. The defendant was automatically sentenced to life in prison for the felony murder, and he received concurrent sentences as a Range I, standard offender of eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery and one year for the burglary of the automobile. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could not consider lesser-included offenses until after they reached a unanimous decision with respect to the first degree murder charge. We find these claims to lack merit. In addition, the defendant claims that the trial judge’s ex parte contact with the jury during its deliberations exerted an improper influence on jury’s verdict. Upon review, we conclude that on the unique facts of this case public confidence in jury’s verdict has been so undermined as to necessitate reversal of the defendant’s first degree (felony) murder conviction. We affirm the defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Bledsoe County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ray A. Tullos, of attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, and the sentence imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Tony Eric Pickett, Jr., guilty of evading arrest, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a career offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on misdemeanor evading arrest. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Edgar Ray Bettis, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder; second degree murder; and unauthorized use of an automobile, also known as joyriding.  The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and sentenced the appellant to life.  For the joyriding conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served concurrently with the murder conviction.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he murdered the victim, that the trial court erred by allowing the forensic pathologist to testify outside the contents of the autopsy report, and that the trial court’s error resulted in the jury’s improperly seeing a photograph of the victim’s larynx.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Lance Walker, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, two counts of possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, 39-17-425 (2010).  The trial court merged each possession with the intent to deliver conviction with the corresponding possession with the intent to sell conviction.  The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of nineteen years for each possession with the intent to sell conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction.  On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and (3) the trial judge erred by failing to recuse himself.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.