APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The mother of Aubree D. appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights—including severe child abuse—and that termination of her rights was in Aubree’s best interest. On appeal, the mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in Aubree’s best interest. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, the Circuit Court for Overton County found that the mother subjected Aubree to severe child abuse, and this court affirmed that finding in In re Aubree D., No. M2021-01229-COA-R3-JV, 2022 WL 4488507 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2022). Thus, the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. We have also determined that DCS proved other grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in Aubree’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Kathryn Wilburn fractured her pelvis during the course and scope of her employment with
Food Lion, Inc. Wilburn and Food Lion entered into a settlement agreement that obligated
Food Lion to provide for future medical treatment related to Wilburn's fractured pelvis.
More than a decade later, Food Lion filed a petition to determine whether Wilburn's
ongoing treatment for pain was causally related to that injury. After considering the report
and testimony of the physician who conducted an independent medical examination
("IME") at Food Lion's request and the C-32 form of Wilburn's authorized treating
physician, the trial court denied the petition. It also denied Wilburn's request for attorney's
fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2). The appeal has been
referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of
findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

A homeowner sued his homeowners’ association in general sessions court. Upon motion of the homeowner’s association, the case was removed to circuit court. After the case was removed to circuit court, the homeowner amended his complaint to add an attorney for the homeowner’s association as a defendant. The homeowner’s association and the attorney sought to dismiss the amended complaint. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss but allowed to the homeowner to file a second amended complaint against the attorney in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the attorney a judgment on the pleadings after concluding that the second amended complaint failed to allege facts satisfying all of the elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The homeowner appealed. Discerning that the circuit court erred in granting the homeowner’s association’s motion to dismiss, we vacate that portion of the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects.

Petitioner, Reginold C. Steed, appeals the error coram nobis court’s summary dismissal of
his petition for error coram nobis relief. Following review of the record and applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court in accordance with Rule 20 of the
Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, asserting his due process rights were
violated as a result of failure to timely appoint counsel in both dependency and neglect
proceedings and termination proceedings. The juvenile court terminated Father’s rights
for abandonment, under several statutory provisions relating to putative fathers, and for
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child, and the court determined
that termination was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that any issue regarding the
appointment of counsel in the dependency and neglect proceedings is not properly before
this court and that Father’s due process rights were not violated in the termination
proceedings. Because the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the
abandonment ground on appeal, we reverse this basis for termination. We also reverse the
trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence established a risk of substantial
physical or psychological harm to the child. Nevertheless, the evidence presented supports
in a clear and convincing manner multiple statutory grounds for termination and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Father’s
parental rights is affirmed.

The Defendant, Carrie Joann Hamlin, was convicted by a McMinn County Circuit Court
jury of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance within 1000′ of a drug-free zone, a Class
C felony, for which she is serving a nine-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(3),
(c)(2)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (sale of a controlled substance), 39-17-432
(2018) (subsequently amended) (Drug-Free Zone Act). On appeal, the Defendant contends
that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, (2) the trial court erred in
declining to resentence her under the 2020 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, and
alternatively, (3) this court should remand her case to the trial court for resentencing under
the 2022 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Defendant, Patsy Hensley, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and received
a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s exclusion of testimony
from her expert witness violated her right to present a defense and that the prosecutor
improperly commented during closing argument on her decision not to testify at trial.
Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

Following convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon and a felony drug offense, the
Defendant, Tavares Tobin, was sentenced to an effective term of eleven years and placed
on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant engaged in new criminal conduct and stopped
reporting for supervision. As a consequence of the violations, the trial court revoked the
suspended sentences and ordered that the Defendant serve the balance of the effective
sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that he violated the conditions of his probation and by fully revoking
his suspended sentences without considering lesser options. We respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Sharrad Sharp, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated sexual battery and child abuse
convictions, for which he is serving a sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request a
limiting jury instruction regarding the victims’ forensic examination interviews. We affirm
the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the ownership of property following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff college.  We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. 

This appeal involves an action filed against a funeral home and a cemetery for alleged
mishandling of a dead human body. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the funeral home as to the claims against the funeral home only. The plaintiff appeals. We
affirm.

Miranda Cheatham, Defendant, was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting
death of her husband on Halloween of 2016. As a result of the conviction, she was
sentenced to 18 years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant
raises a variety of issues on appeal. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the evidence supported Defendant’s claim of selfdefense;
(3) the “crime scene negligence” entitles Defendant to a new trial; (4) the
“investigative negligence” by the State entitles Defendant to a new trial; (5) the State
mislabeled evidence presented to the grand jury; (6) the State failed to disclose evidence
in violation of Brady v. Maryland; (7) the trial court permitted improper testimony from
more than one witness; (8) the State committed a discovery violation for failing to disclose
an audio recording; and (9) cumulative error. After a review, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

This appeal involves a failure to timely move for substitution of parties after the death of
one of the two plaintiffs. In a previous appeal, this Court directed the trial court, on remand,
to determine whether the plaintiff’s response to a motion to dismiss should be construed as
a motion for enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02, and
if so, to determine whether the plaintiff’s failure to timely move for substitution of the
parties pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 was the result of excusable
neglect. On remand, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s filing should be construed
as a motion for an enlargement of time. However, the trial court also found that the plaintiff
failed to timely move for substitution due to counsel’s misinterpretation of the law, which,
the trial court concluded, did not constitute excusable neglect. As such, the trial court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to timely substitute parties. The
plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Joshua E. Webb, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
which petition challenged his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, arguing that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this delayed appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, Roosevelt Pitts, III, challenges his
Rutherford County jury convictions of robbery, three counts of felony reckless
endangerment, misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and felony vandalism, for
which he received an effective sentence of eighteen years in prison. The Defendant argues
that the trial court erred in rejecting his challenge to two peremptory challenges based on
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and that the State engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments. Upon our review, we affirm.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Mack, of first-degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence for which he received an effective sentence of life plus three years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

As a result of a traffic accident, a Metropolitan police officer issued a driver a Metropolitan traffic citation. The general sessions court found that the driver violated a traffic ordinance, and on appeal, the circuit court also found that the driver violated the ordinance. The driver challenges the jurisdiction of the courts, the legality of reporting the violation to the Tennessee Department of Safety and the severity of the penalty he may receive from California. We affirm.

The issues in this appeal arise from protracted litigation in three courts involving several property owners (“Plaintiffs”) who contend the Town of Morrison, Tennessee, (“the Town”) is estopped, for various reasons, from collecting property taxes on their properties. Although the dispute initially involved a challenge to whether the Town lawfully annexed Plaintiffs’ properties, it is no longer disputed that the Town annexed the properties with the passage of Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02 on second and final reading on November 5, 2001. The genesis of the dispute occurred in 2017 when Plaintiffs were cited to the Municipal Court for violating the Town’s zoning ordinances. During the hearing, the Town was required to establish that Plaintiffs’ properties had been annexed. To prove it had annexed the properties, the Town erroneously relied upon Ordinance 01-03, instead of Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. The Municipal Court found that the Town had not lawfully enacted Ordinance 01-03 to annex Plaintiffs’ properties; therefore, the court dismissed the citations. The Town did not appeal that decision. Two years later, the Town filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court, arguing that it had properly annexed the subject properties. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition concluding that the Town was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue because “the relevant issue was litigated and determined by the Municipal Court . . . , [which] was a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore, this Chancery Court will not disturb that Court’s findings.” The Town appealed the Chancery Court decision; however, it voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Nevertheless, the Town continued to send delinquent tax notices to Plaintiffs. As a consequence, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a declaration that their properties had not been properly annexed by the Town. In its Answer, the Town asserted, for the first time, that it had annexed Plaintiffs’ properties in 2001 pursuant to Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. Although Plaintiffs argued that the Town was collaterally estopped from relying on these ordnances, the chancellor ruled otherwise. Specifically, the chancellor held that Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02 were not at issue in the Municipal Court proceedings and because the issues raised in that proceeding were not identical to those raised in the prior court proceedings, collateral estoppel did not apply. Further, the chancellor ruled that the Town had lawfully annexed the properties in November 2001 pursuant to Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. However, the chancellor also ruled that the Town was equitably estopped from collecting delinquent taxes owed prior to 2022. This appeal followed. We have determined that the Municipal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Town had lawfully annexed Plaintiffs’ properties; therefore, the judgment of the Municipal Court is a null and void judgment that may not constitute a basis for collateral estoppel. For this and other reasons, we affirm the chancellor’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ Petition for Injunctive Relief. However, we reverse the chancellor’s ruling that the Town is equitably estopped from collecting delinquent property taxes from Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff filed a petition to have a New York confession of judgment enrolled as a judgment in Tennessee. Defendant claimed the Tennessee circuit court had no jurisdiction because the confession of judgment was not permitted by Tennessee law, violated Tennessee public policy, and was fraudulent and usurious. The trial court enrolled the judgment. Defendant appealed. We affirm.

The Appellant takes issue with the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself from the litigation assigned to him pursuant to designation by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an amended final decree of divorce entered by the Circuit Court of Hamilton County (“trial court”) on December 20, 2021. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the parties a divorce pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b), divided the parties’ marital assets and liabilities, and awarded transitional alimony to the wife in the amount of $1,200.00 per month for two months. Both parties subsequently filed motions to alter or amend the court’s ruling. The trial court entered an amended final decree, incorporating by reference a memorandum opinion wherein the court altered the percentages awarded to each party of certain items of marital property in its marital property distribution. The wife timely appealed. Following review, we affirm the trial court’s determinations concerning valuation and classification of the parties’ assets. We vacate, however, the portion of the trial court’s amended decree wherein the court altered the percentages awarded to each party, and we remand this issue to the trial court for further findings, explanation, and determination. By reason of this unresolved issue concerning the trial court’s marital property distribution, we likewise vacate and remand the trial court’s determinations regarding alimony and attorney’s fees for reconsideration following the court’s equitable division of marital property. The trial court’s amended final decree is affirmed in all other respects. The parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal are denied.