APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A University of Memphis student fell down an elevator shaft while removing artwork following a required University function at property owned by Donald Estes. The student sued Donald Estes and Estes, LLC, the University, and The University of Memphis Foundation. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Foundation. The jury returned a verdict of $4,103,720.00, and the fault was ultimately allocated as follows: the State 40%; the student 15%; Estes 45%. Based upon an indemnification agreement, the trial court found the State liable for Mr. Estes’ share of the jury verdict, or $1,436,215.20. We find that the trial court erred in concluding that the indemnification agreement indemnified Mr. Estes for his own negligence and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Foundation. However, we affirm the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding $410,000 in medical bills, its exclusion of evidence regarding the student’s alleged drug use, and its capping of the State’s liability at $300,000. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff filed suit against a medical legal examiner alleging the medical legal examiner was negligent in failing to inform her of certain preventative medications. The medical legal examiner contended she was a government employee protected from liability by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion because the medical legal examiner could not prove she was paid by the payroll department of the governmental entity at issue, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20107(a)(2). The medical legal examiner appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Norman G. Page, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision on her petition to modify parenting time. While we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on parenting time, we have concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying mother’s attorney from representing her in future proceedings and in ordering mother to produce bank records.
 

The Defendant, Zachary Carlisle, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years’ confinement for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and to a consecutive fifteen years’ confinement as a violent offender for the firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the indictment for the firearm conviction failed to charge an offense, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and (4) the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that the Defendant’s statements could qualify as a confession. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Memphis police officer’s employment was terminated without a pre-termination hearing because the City of Memphis was of the opinion that she was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer sought review of her termination, and the Memphis Civil Service Commission agreed with the City’s position that the officer was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer filed a petition for review before the chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the Commission, finding that the officer had already completed her probationary period, and as a non-probationary employee, she was entitled to due process protections including a pre-termination hearing. This order was not appealed. On remand to the Commission, the City stipulated that the officer was not given a pre-termination hearing and sought to relitigate the issue of whether she was a probationary employee. The Commission declined to reconsider the issue and determined that the officer was denied procedural due process. The Commission reinstated the officer to her previous position of employment. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Ronnie Joe Stokes, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to twelve years as a persistent offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial because a juror was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Nora Hernandez, was convicted by a jury of two counts of felony failure to appear.  The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced her to two years, suspended after service of twenty-five days.  On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) her action in failing to report to the jail to serve a delayed sentence did not constitute the criminal offense of failure to appear; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial vindictiveness; (3) her conviction should be dismissed because the jury only found her guilty of the elements of misdemeanor failure to appear, an offense for which the statute of limitations had passed; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing.  Following our review, we affirm appellant’s convictions, but we vacate the two failure to appear judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of these convictions

This is an appeal from a summary judgment order awarding the plaintiffs an easement across the defendant’s property. Because the order does not dispose of the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by failure to visit, and upon the determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.
 

The Defendant, Malcolm McKoy, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $500 and burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent four-year and six-year terms, suspended to be served on unsupervised probation. These sentences were to run consecutively to another sentence unrelated to this appeal. After two subsequent probation violations based on new arrests, the Defendant was arrested for aggravated assault. A probation violation warrant was issued based upon this arrest, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Coffee County Chancery Court terminated the parental rights of the father on two grounds: 1) abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 2) abandonment by willful failure to visit the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); and upon the determination that termination of the father’s rights was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Kenneth L. Anderson, was convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that his right to confront one of the State’s witnesses was violated; (2) that his right to present witnesses in his defense was violated; (3) that one of the State’s witnesses, Penny Webber, was not competent to testify at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a recorded phone conversation between himself and Ms. Webber and video recordings of the drug buy; (5) that he was denied his right of access to the courts; (6) that the jury venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (8) that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (9) that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2011, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Marco Blanch, for aggravated rape based upon bodily injury sustained by the victim. A jury convicted Appellant of the lesser included offense of rape. Appellant was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to an eleven-year sentence at 100 percent. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented  by the State at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the victim consented to sexual activity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.

This case involves allegations of medical battery and medical malpractice surrounding an exam performed on a patient while she was admitted to a hospital to give birth. The trial court dismissed any allegations for medical battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that the patient’s complaint failed to include allegations that the exam was performed without the patient’s authorization. The trial court further dismissed any remaining malpractice claims for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act notice requirements. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Darrell Johnson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated burglary, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. We affirm the convictions and sentences. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of aggravated burglary.

In this consolidated appeal, the pro se appellant, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders denying relief from his 2004 convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Prior to this court’s consolidation of the case, the State filed motions to dismiss the appeals or, alternatively, to affirm the trial court’s denials of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In light of the complexities of the issues raised in this appeal, we conclude that the State’s motions should be treated as responsive briefs. Following our review, we affirm the orders of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

The petitioner, Johnie Jefferson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He argues that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because the State suppressed exculpatory evidence that became known to him after the limitations period had expired. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner, Ray Junior Turner, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine.  Each of the offenses is a Class A felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(j).  The trial court sentenced petitioner to sixty years for each conviction as a career offender to be served concurrently. He unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentences.  See State v. Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, No. M2008-02267-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1644969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2010).  Petitioner filed the current petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to properly investigate petitioner’s case and communicate with petitioner; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress wiretap evidence; and (3) failed to properly inspect all discoverable evidence introduced at trial.  Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Andre L. McKinney, pled guilty to criminal simulation, a Class E felony, and received a negotiated sentence of two years. On the same day, he pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine and received a negotiated sentence of eight years, consecutive to the sentence of two years. Ultimately, the effective ten-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. Following the filing of a probation violation warrant, the trial court conducted a hearing where Defendant and his probation officer testified. Defendant admitted that he had used marijuana multiple times while on probation, that he had been charged with and pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana while on probation, and that he knew he was supposed to report any new charges to his probation officer but failed to do so. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the ten-year sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant asserts in his appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jerome Johnson, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder in count 1, aggravated assault in count 2, and solicitation to commit the offense of filing a false police report in count 3. Following a jury trial, Johnson was convicted in count 1 of the lesser included offense of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; in count 2 of the charged offense of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and in count 3 of the charged offense of solicitation to commit the offense of filing a false police report, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Johnson as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment for the reckless endangerment and solicitation to commit the offense of filing a false police report convictions. The court ordered that the sentences for the reckless endangerment and aggravated assault convictions be served concurrently and ordered that the sentence for the solicitation conviction be served consecutively to the other two sentences for an effective sentence of fifteen years plus eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, Johnson argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In suit brought by condominium Homeowner’s Association, former owner of condominium unit which was ordered sold after being determined to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order granting the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award, we affirm the judgment.
 

This is a suit by Terry Mullins seeking a declaration that the Defendants, the Lockes (who are brothers) and the Gillespies (who are husband and wife) – whose properties lie near to, and south of, the Plaintiff’s property – have no right to the use of a driveway across the Plaintiff’s property to Vera Drive in Rhea County. The Defendants claim that they have a prescriptive easement, measuring some 47 feet long and 50 feet wide, enabling them to access Vera Drive over the Plaintiff’s property. This matter was before us at an earlier time. Because the statement of the evidence presented to us on the first appeal was, in our words, “a one-sided argumentative presentation of the evidence favorable to the Plaintiff,” we remanded this case to the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3- 128 (2000). (Emphasis in original.) In our remand, we advised the parties that we were taking this action “so a proper statement of the evidence c[ould] be prepared.” (Footnote in original omitted.) Such a statement has now been filed. Upon consideration of the very thorough statement prepared by the trial court, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s judgment finding and holding that the Defendants have a prescriptive easement over the property of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Donald Smith, contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered because he was not coherent at the hearing due to mental incapacities and that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a mental evaluation. After considering the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.