APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Cayetano Ramirez, of attempted rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police, (2) an alleged Brady violation, (3) the admission of a prior act in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles T. Hartley, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery was illegal because the judgment of conviction reflected that, as a child predator and a violent offender, he must serve one hundred percent of the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, Delevan Beniamin Mohammed, pled guilty to possession of more than three hundred grams of cocaine with intent to sell in a drug free school zone, with an agreed sentence of 25 years as a Range II offender, with the trial court to determine manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, John Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of a single count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received a twelve-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Marks, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to twenty-five years at 100% as a child rapist. He raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses at the close of its casein-chief; (2) whether the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election before the case was submitted to the jury; (3) whether the trial court erred by issuing a supplemental instruction on the election of offenses after the jury had already begun its deliberations; and (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dane Sayles, alias Bradley Harper (“the Defendant”), was convicted by a jury of possession with the intent to sell or deliver three hundred grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years to be served consecutively to previous sentences the Defendant received in Pennsylvania. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the stop and search of his vehicle, as well as the seizure of cell phone text messages. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in “permitting the State to continue adding witnesses in the middle of trial whose names were not provided in discovery.” Finally, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case presents the issue of whether proper service of process was accomplished regarding the defendant, Saeed Etezadi, M.D. Plaintiff, Will J. Milton, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Etezadi on April 14, 2003. The complaint and summons were served upon Dr. Etezadi’s office manager, with a notation appearing on the summons that service was accepted as “agent.” Dr. Etezadi filed an answer which, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Mr. Milton voluntarily dismissed that action and subsequently re-filed within one year of the non-suit. In connection with the second action, the complaint and summons were allegedly served upon Dr. Etezadi at his office. Dr. Etezadi filed an Answer, again raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Dr. Etezadi also asserted that all applicable statutes of limitation and repose had expired. He later filed a motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims against Dr. Etezadi, finding that there was no service of process in either action. Mr. Milton appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Nora Hernandez, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and denying her bid to vacate her convictions and sentences. Because this court lacks jurisdiction of the claim relevant to the defendant’s motion to vacate, that portion of the appeal is dismissed. Because the record supports revocation of her probation, the judgment of the trial court ordering the same is affirmed.

The petitioner, Troy Allen Pruitt, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2007 convictions in that court of aggravated robbery and fraudulent use of a credit card. Because the petitioner failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and because binding law-of-the-case determinations from his direct appeal defeat his claim of prejudice, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling suppressing the out-of-court identification of the defendant via a photograph array and the subsequent in-court identification by the same witness at the suppression hearing. The State contends that the trial court erred by deeming the identification procedure unduly suggestive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to four years, suspended after three months and nineteen days in confinement. In January 2012, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing on the allegation, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court did not err. The trial court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 3, 2012. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on December 28, 2012, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Kelvin Winn, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the identification of him from a photographic array; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a jailhouse informant to testify without limitations; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to lead witnesses over his objection; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of duplicative photographs; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Michael McVay, with rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 25 years for rape of a child, 20 years for aggravated sexual battery, 20 years for rape, and 10 years for sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court ordered all sentences to run consecutively, with a 100% release eligibility for the first three counts - child rape, aggravated sexual battery, and rape, and a 35% release eligibility for count four, sexual battery by an authority figure, for an effective sentence of 75 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant presents the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior complaint of sexual assault; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Additionally, the State contends the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant on two of his four convictions. After thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. However, the trial court’s sentencing order is vacated in part and this case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant, Glenn Lydell McCray, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-102 (2010) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1307 (2010) (felon in possession of a firearm). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty years for especially aggravated kidnapping, eight years for each aggravated assault, and three years for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault convictions, for an effective forty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (3) the court erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault convictions, and (4) the court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Although the jury was not properly instructed regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bruce L. Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Missouri v. Frye , __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), established a new constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his guilty pleas, thereby requiring retroactive application. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition as time-barred.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that aggravated assault involves some form of confinement in this case. In State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012), the supreme court held, 

Larry Scott Reynolds ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court failed to make "sufficient findings of fact to allow meaningful review" and "erred in questioning the Petitioner and in making other comments" at the post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds that Mother was incarcerated under a sentence of more than 10 years and her child was under the age of eight at time of sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that Mother was convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent, see Tenn. Code Ann.  36-1-113(g)(7). Mother appeals. We affirm.

This is the second appeal of a post-divorce decision concerning child support. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to make the required findings to justify an upward deviation in child support, thus we vacated the award of child support and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court set the appropriate amount of child support and determined that Father had overpaid child support. The court did not award Father a judgment or credit in the amount of his overpayment, and Father appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Father a credit or judgment in the amount of his overpayment.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights with respect to the six children at issue in this appeal. She concedes that grounds exist for termination, but she claims that termination is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Purchaser of land brought action to recover damages for shortage in acreage and road frontage of property purchased; sellers contended that sale was in gross rather than by acre. Trial court determined that there was a discrepancy between the amount of land both parties thought was being sold and the amount determined by a survey to have been sold, and that sellers did not own land which would provide access to the property; accordingly, it granted purchaser judgment for the discrepancy in the amount of land conveyed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment.

A law firm filed suit against a former partner and a former paralegal. Both former employees filed motions to compel arbitration. The trial court consolidated the cases and stayed discovery except as to the issue of whether the cases were subject to arbitration. Subsequently, the trial court ordered the parties to engage in mediation and to disclose “all necessary documents to conduct a meaningful attempt at resolution” despite the prior order limiting discovery. After the trial court denied their motion to vacate the order, the former partner and paralegal sought an extraordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which was denied. We granted extraordinary appeal. We hold that the trial court erred in ordering discovery without limiting the scope of discovery to the issue of arbitrability, in contravention of the unambiguous language of the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, and erred in referring the parties to mediation in an effort to resolve all issues. We vacate the order of the trial court, and we remand the case to the trial court for a determination on the motions to compel arbitration.

The Petitioner, Sandra Beavers, pled guilty to sale or delivery of less than .5 gram of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. After her release from jail, the Petitioner violated a condition of her probation that required that she successfully complete the Next Door rehabilitation program, and the trial court revoked her probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney’s failure to communicate with her and failure to request a bond hearing. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Executrix of an estate filed a complaint against the officers of a corporation in an effort to pierce the corporate veil and recover a debt she alleges is due from the corporation to the estate of her late husband. The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment and awarded her a $52,000 judgment. The individuals appealed, asserting genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the trial court’s award. We conclude the trial court erred in awarding damages at the summary judgment stage because material facts are in dispute regarding whether a debt actually exists and regarding the amount of money that is at issue.