APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of the mother of a child on the ground of severe abuse; the court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence is not clear and convincing that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a medical malpractice claimant to provide certain notice sixty days prior to filing suit. We conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the courts’ rule-making authority, that it is not preempted by HIPAA, and that it does not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Affirmed and Remanded.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four biological children. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. Finding that at least two of the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the Department of Children’s Services exerted reasonable efforts to reunite the family, we affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael T. Braxton, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Justin Diana, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of attempted solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means and three counts of statutory rape. He received a total effective sentence of four years. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Michael Glen Walsh, appeals from his convictions by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, violating the implied consent law while his driver’s license was revoked for a previous DUI conviction, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving with a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401, 55 10-406, and 55-50-504 (2012). He received an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence with 150 days to serve for each of the DUI and the implied consent violation convictions and received a six-month sentence, suspended except for forty-eight hours, for the revoked license conviction, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI and implied consent violation convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in sentencing him to serve 150 days. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case was remanded by the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration after ordering that the record be supplemented with a statement of evidence regarding a missing portion of the trial transcript. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). A Wayne County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Keeton, of manufacturing marijuana by growing or cultivating not less than 100 nor more than 499 marijuana plants, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that he is being denied an "effective appeal" because the record on appeal does not include an official transcript of his cross-examination of a material prosecution witness; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him by not considering a relevant mitigating factor. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Paul Allen St. Clair, was convicted by a jury of one count of the sale of between 14.175 grams and 4,535 grams of a Schedule VI substance identified as marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of the sale of a Schedule IV drug, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years’ incarceration as a Range II offender on count one and to eight years’ incarceration as a Range II offender on count two, to be served consecutively. The trial court also fined the defendant two thousand dollars for each count and two hundred and fifty dollars to go to the Drug Testing Fund for each count. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court improperly weighed the mitigating factors in assigning a sentence within the range. The defendant also contests the fines, which he argues are unconstitutional because they were determined by the trial court rather than the jury. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the length of the defendant’s sentences. However, because the fines were assessed in violation of the Tennessee Constitution, we vacate the fines and remand for further proceedings.

I concur in the majority opinion with regard to the holding that the incarcerative sentences in this case are appropriate. However, I dissent from the holding of the majority that the error by the trial judge in the imposition of the mandatory minimum fines prescribed by statute for the offenses in this case requires plain error review and a remand for a jury determination as to the imposition of these fines.

A McNairy County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Earl Borner, of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the recording of the transaction; that the trial court erred by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the indictment against him was defective; and that he was denied a jury of his peers. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Barry Hogg, was indicted by the Wilson County Grand Jury for eleven counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, nine counts of criminal exposure to HIV, nine counts of aggravated statutory rape, and one count of sexual battery. Prior to trial, the State dismissed one count of sexual battery, two counts of criminal exposure, and three counts of aggravated statutory rape. A jury found Appellant guilty of the remaining counts, including eleven counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, seven counts of criminal exposure of another to HIV, and six counts of aggravated statutory rape. As a result of the convictions, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve years at one hundred percent incarceration for the especially aggravated sexual exploitation convictions, six years at thirty percent for each of the criminal exposure of another to HIV convictions, and four years at thirty percent for each of the aggravated statutory rape convictions. The trial court ordered the convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation to be served consecutively to the seven convictions for criminal exposure of another to HIV and consecutively to each other. The trial court ordered Appellant’s aggravated statutory rape sentences to run concurrently with one another and with all other counts, for a total effective sentence of 174 years. Appellant appeals his convictions, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentences. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the evidence supported individual convictions for events that occurred during one sexual encounter. Further, the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Derrick Sorrell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first-degree murder conviction, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Craig Beene, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for attempt to commit first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault, for which he is serving an effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce case, the trial court’s judgment ended the twenty-year marriage of Kelley Higgins (“Wife”) and Bobby Higgins (“Husband”). Husband appeals. He challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. He also contends that alimony was improperly awarded to Wife. We affirm.

This case involves a trust. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded for the appointment of a corporate co-trustee as specifically required by the terms of the trust. Thereafter, the defendant existing trustee, who is also a beneficiary, unilaterally appointed a corporate cotrustee and then sought to have the trial court “ratify” her appointment. The plaintiff beneficiary challenged the appointment, claiming that the trustee was not authorized to unilaterally appoint a corporate co-trustee and arguing that the corporate co-trustee who was chosen did not meet the qualifications listed in the trust agreement. After hearing some testimony about the proposed co-trustee, the trial court decided that the plaintiff beneficiary lacked standing to participate in the selection or ratification of a corporate co-trustee. The trial court then granted the defendant trustee’s motion to ratify her appointment of the cotrustee. The plaintiff beneficiary appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court dismissed this matter on appeal from general sessions court upon finding that Appellant failed to perfect his appeal where he failed to file a bond for good surety or pauper’s oath. We affirm.

I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. I agree with the majority’s holding on whether Father presented a meritorious defense in support of his Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment. However, I must disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’ s finding that Father’s failure to respond or appear in the default proceedings was willful, and its affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside..

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant- Appellant Kevin Glenn Tipton agreed to enter a guilty plea to one count of felony driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) in exchange for a sentence of one year, which was suspended after service of the mandatory minimum sentence of 150 days in confinement. At the plea submission hearing, the trial court accepted Tipton’s guilty plea and imposed the agreed upon sentence but reserved judgment until October 6, 2010. On October 5, 2010, Tipton’s newly retained counsel filed a notice of appearance. On October 22, 2010, Tipton, through his newly retained counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Tipton argues that the trial court erred by (1) applying the “manifest injustice” standard under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f)(2), and (2) denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusion of law. The Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his back in 2007 as a result of his work as a maintenance technician. His employer denied that a compensable injury had occurred and denied that employee had provided timely notice. The trial court found the Employee had sustained a compensable injury and that timely notice had been given. The trial court also found that the Employee had been terminated for cause and limited the award to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The Employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on compensability. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Isaiah Lawler, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; possession of an open container of beer while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403(a)(1)(A)(vi), -406, -416. As a result of these convictions, the Defendant received an effective two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, fourth offense; and (2) that the trial court, by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict with respect to the charge of DUI, fourth offense, failed to fulfill its duties as the thirteenth juror. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The trial court refused, however, to order Husband to pay for the costs of providing COBRA benefits for Wife. Husband and Wife appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Antonio Butler ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to one count each of robbery and aggravated assault. In his plea agreement, he agreed to concurrent sentences of five years for each count, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the manner of service of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the statutory employer rule under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendant subcontractor rented a crane from a construction rental company. The crane rental company sent its employee to the job site to operate the crane. On the job site, the crane rental company’s employee sustained crippling injuries. The employee’s co-conservators sued the subcontractor in tort. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was a statutory employer of the crane rental company’s employee, pursuant to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically T.C.A. § 50-6-113, and thus was immune from liability under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The trial court held that the subcontractor was not a statutory employer and therefore was not shielded by the exclusive remedy provision. The subcontractor was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether it is a statutory employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act. We hold that, to reach the issue of whether the subcontractor is a statutory employer, it is first necessary to determine if the crane rental company was a subcontractor within the meaning of the Act, an issue not addressed by the trial court. Consequently, as we are unable on this record to consider the issue raised on appeal, we hold that this Court improvidently granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and dismiss the appeal.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Petitioner, Michael Collins, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and the resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of the ineffectiveness of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.