APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Joseph G., Trinity G., and Stephen G. (“the Children”), the minor children of a married couple, J.G. (“Father”) and E.G. (“Mother”). The Children, then ages four, two and one respectively, were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) following the incarceration of both parents. The Children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected by stipulation of the parents. A year after the Children entered foster care, DCS filed suit to terminate the parents’ rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted DCS’s petition. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother separately appeal. As to both parents, we reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012).

Donald Chill and his wife, Martha Chill, brought this action against their homeowner’s insurance carrier, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), alleging breach of contract by virtue of its refusal to pay for their loss caused by an earthquake. The insurance policy required suit to be brought within one year of the loss. The Chills filed their complaint almost seven years after the loss and over three and a half years after the Chills refused to accept Insurer’s offer to settle the claim for $88,086.49. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand.

In this appeal we must determine whether an injured worker was an “employee” or a
“temporary worker” within the meaning of a commercial general liability insurance policy.
The policy excludes coverage for injuries to the insureds’ employees, but it covers injuries
to “temporary workers” who are not employees, as that term is defined in the policy. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the worker upon concluding that he was a
“temporary worker,” and therefore covered under the policy, and it denied the insurer’s
motion for summary judgment. We find that the worker was not a “temporary worker” as
that term is defined by the insurance policy. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the
worker’s motion for summary judgment and denying the insurer’s motion. We reverse and
remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the insurer.

Eric Bledsoe (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and theft of property over $1000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of sixty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction for aggravated rape. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it denied him the opportunity to discover past allegations and cross-examine the victim about them; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request to access the victim’s mother’s diary regarding the events; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder.

This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, James A. Johnson Jr., pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Knox County to possession with the intent to sell marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, a Class E felony, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to three years for possession with the intent to sell marijuana with two years of the sentence to be served at 100% and the remaining year to be served at 30%, three years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served consecutively to the marijuana sentence, eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently with the marijuana sentence, and six months for driving on a suspended license to be served concurrently with the marijuana sentence. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop and subsequent arrest and searches that led to his convictions. Because the certified question was not properly reserved, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital in which she asserted claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a party and did not contemporaneously file a certificate of good faith. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We affirm the trial court.
 

Wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony in 2004 that was to terminate in 2012. In 2009 Wife filed a petition to increase the duration and amount of her alimony, or, in the alternative, for an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court found Wife was in need of support, but it denied Wife’s petition, finding Wife had not used all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself. On appeal we find Wife’s inability to be rehabilitated as that term has been defined by the legislature warrants a modification of Wife’s alimony award. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s petition for alimony and conclude Wife is entitled to alimony in futuro but in a lesser amount. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees.
 

Timothy William Jelks seeks post-conviction relief from a guilty plea and conviction for aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402. Jelks claims his counsel failed to advise him properly during his plea bargain and asserts the one (1) year statute of limitations should be tolled due to new constitutional rights established by the United States Supreme Court. Finding no merit to the assertions of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court in all aspects.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail time credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition sua sponte, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed this appeal. We hold that the Trial Court, stating no compelling substantive basis for its decision, erred in dismissing Nagorny’s petition sua sponte. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for proceedings consistent with our Opinion.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of property, specifically the appreciation in value of farm property he owned in his own name prior to the marriage as marital property and of a life insurance policy owned by Wife as her separate property. Finding that the court erred in its classification of the increase in value of the farm property, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.
 

The Defendant, Terry Marcum, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation for two counts of domestic assault and ordering him to serve his consecutive sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Appellant, Matthew B. Graham, pled guilty to attempted abuse of a child, under 8 years of age, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, section 39-15-401, a Class E felony. On the same day, he pled guilty to three informations, each charging him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, section 53-11-402. Appellant received a two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the attempted child abuse and each of the possession of a controlled substance pleas. Appellant’s total effective sentence was 8 years, to be suspended on state supervised probation. Appellant violated his probation and was ordered to serve the remainder of his 8 year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed a motion to modify sentence to allow him to go back on probation. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to modify the sentence.

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Vario Talley (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery and carjacking. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to object to the admissibility of video surveillance evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On April 10, 2008, the petitioner entered a no contest plea to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. State v. Winfrey (Winfrey II), No. M2009-02480-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4540288, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010). The petitioner was ultimately sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, with ten of the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of just under ten years. The trial court ordered three of the consecutive sentences to be served in confinement and the remaining seven to be served on probation. The petitioner was arrested on December 8, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal; and after a hearing held in April 2011, the trial court revoked the petitioner’s probation and ordered him to serve his remaining seven consecutive eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentences in confinement. The petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Instead, on March 15, 2012, the petitioner filed a motion to serve the balance of his sentence on probation. In the alternative, the petitioner sought to have the court set aside the probation revocation pursuant to the writ of error coram nobis based on the expunction of the record of his December 2010 arrest due to a stay of probation in effect at the time. The trial court denied both the motion to serve the remaining sentence on probation and the petition for the writ of error coram nobis, as well as an oral motion for the judge’s recusal. The petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and accordingly affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lessor and Lessee executed a lease agreement that gave Lessee an option to purchase the rented property during a two-year period. A purchase and sale agreement was executed the same day outlining the terms of the sale if the option were exercised. Lessee did not exercise the option during the period specified, and Lessor sued the Lessee for breaching the purchase and sale agreement. Lessee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Lessor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. Because Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property, the purchase and sale agreement did not become operative.
 

A jury convicted the defendant, Clifton Williams, Jr., of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The defendant also pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years’ confinement for the manslaughter conviction and four years’ confinement for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for manslaughter. The defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to include the definition of curtilage in the self-defense instruction, in enhancing the defendant’s sentences, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on several grounds and determined that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.
 

We granted Robert Ledford Funeral Home, Inc.’s (“the Funeral Home”) application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to consider the issue of whether the Funeral Home was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that its “on call” employee, Johnny Tipton, was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home when the vehicle accident causing injuries to the plaintiffs occurred. We find and hold that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mr. Tipton was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home, and that the Funeral Home is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.