APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Much aggrieved by his conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, the petitioner, Huedel Sparkman, sought post-conviction relief in the Marshall County Circuit Court, alleging that, among other things, he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to file two motions to suppress. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

In this post-trial dispute George Emrich and Mary Emrich (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the Trial Court’s order on Taylor Adams, Wanda Adams, and Adams Roofing Company, LLC’s (“Defendants”) emergency motion for relief from order and Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, among other things. We find no error in the Trial Court’s March 9, 2012 order, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, Dakota Cisneros, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions upon guilty pleas for aggravated sexual battery and three counts of aggravated robbery and his effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that his guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee suffered multiple injuries in a work-related accident in November 2006 when a fan located in a boiler in which he was working suddenly deployed, causing him to lose his footing and fall. After providing medical treatment, the employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and the employee sought additional medical treatment. The trial court found the claim to be compensable and awarded the employee permanent total disability benefits. The trial court imposed no liability on the Second Injury Fund. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Cheatham County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Eugene M. Hogbin, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges both the length and the alignment of the trial court’s sentencing determination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Frances G. Rodgers, as next friend of minors Julia Amber Noll and Joshua Aidan Noll (“Plaintiff”) sued John Adam Noll (“Defendant”) for the alleged wrongful death of their mother, Lori Bible Noll (“Deceased”). During discovery, Defendant filed multiple motions alleging discovery violations. After a hearing the Trial Court entered its order on April 25, 2012, which, among other things, imposed sanctions for certain discovery violations and then dismissed Plaintiff’s case due to discovery violations. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that dismissal was too severe a sanction for the discovery violations found. We reverse the dismissal; remand to the Trial Court for a more appropriate award of sanctions; and affirm the remaining specific sanctions awarded by the Trial Court and the remainder of the Trial Court’s April 25, 2012 order.

The Petitioner, Lance Vogel, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of over half a gram of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and habitual traffic offender, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Elgene Porter ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range I, violent offender to an effective sentence of forty-two years’ incarceration at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce appeal, Husband appeals the trial court’s imputation of income to him for the purpose of setting his alimony and child support obligations, the determination of parenting time, and the award of a retirement account to Wife. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
 

The defendant, Gretchen Rochowiak, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her convictions of conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution and introduction of buprenorphine into a penal institution. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Erica Harris, appeals her Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and evidence of poor quality in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that admission of a map violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner in a proceeding to modify child support filed a motion for recusal with the trial judge alleging that the judge was a personal friend and had a business relationship with the father of one of the parties. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion for recusal.
 

The Petitioner, Timmy Charles McDaniel, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his convictions are void because (1) his indictment failed to state that the Grand Jurors issuing the indictment were from the county in which the offenses occurred, (2) his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy, and (3) his dual convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (2010). Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Madison County grand jury indicted appellant, Timothy Baxter, for one count of aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a persistent offender. Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault based on serious bodily injury. Specifically, he alleges that evidence of extreme physical pain did not support the determination of serious bodily injury by the jury. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-11-106(a)(34) (2010). He also contends that the statutory definition of serious bodily injury is unconstitutional because it is vague and thus violates due process. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Juan D. Hall, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession with intent to sell cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and coercion of a witness, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and carrying a handgun as a felon, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated assault and to a consecutive term of six years as a career offender for carrying the handgun as a felon. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, an adult child seeks an award of retroactive child support from his biological father. The adult child filed a petition to establish parentage, seeking retroactive child support and other child rearing costs. After genetic testing, the juvenile court found that the respondent is the petitioner’s biological father, but it declined to grant an award of retroactive child support. Both parties appealed. Eventually there were two appeals and two remands. After the last remand, the juvenile court determined that the adult child’s biological father was also his legal father, but held that the petitioner adult child could not receive an award of retroactive child support under the parentage statutes. The adult child then filed this third appeal. We reverse in part, holding that the parentage statutes provide for an award of retroactive child support to the adult child complainant. We vacate the finding as to the adult child’s legal father and remand the case for further proceedings on the award of relief against the biological father.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping and to a concurrent ten years for the aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial court erred by failing to sentence her to the minimum sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves alleged employment discrimination based on gender and pregnancy. The female plaintiff was employed as a police officer by the defendant city. While off duty, the plaintiff encountered an ex-boyfriend against whom she had procured an order of protection. Based on this encounter, she filed a criminal charge against the ex-boyfriend for violating the order of protection. The defendant’s police chief ordered an internal affairs investigation, and the ex-boyfriend filed criminal charges against the plaintiff for filing a false charge. The plaintiff was suspended with pay pending resolution of the criminal charges. Soon after that, the plaintiff informed the police chief that she was pregnant. After the ex-boyfriend’s criminal charges against the plaintiff were dropped, the police chief terminated the plaintiff’s employment based on the results of the internal affairs investigation. The termination was upheld by the city’s mayor and its board of aldermen. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the employer city, alleging discrimination based on gender and pregnancy pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The employer city filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff had no credible evidence that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer city. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Company and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company has not been met in this case.

Petitioner, Ricky Lee Nelson a/k/a Russell Wellington, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. Upon review, we conclude that petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal of the denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action against Shelby County and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, a health care provider contracted by the County to provide health care to inmates, for the failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated  29-26-121. We affirm dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Correct Care Solutions, reverse dismissal of his claim against Shelby County, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Perrier, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, and aggravated assault in counts 3 through 8. He was subsequently convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, aggravated assault in counts 3 through 7, and the lesser included offense of assault in count 8. The trial court merged count three into count one before sentencing Perrier as a Range I, standard offender to four years in counts 1, five years in counts 4 through 7, and eleven months and twenty-nine days in count eight. The court also sentenced Perrier as a Range I, violent offender to a mandatory consecutive sentence of six years in count 2. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1), (h)(i) (2006). The court ordered counts 1 through 7 to be served consecutively to one another and ordered count 8 to be served concurrently with the other counts for an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Perrier argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case solely for the purpose of correcting a clerical error on the judgment for count 4.

The Petitioner, Craig U. Quevedo, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2002, the Petitioner pled guilty to numerous counts of rape and incest, and pled nolo contendere to multiple counts of rape, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery, as well as one count of aggravated rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2), -13-503(a)(1), -13-504(a)(4), -13-522(a), -15-302(a)(1). Following a sentencing hearing, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of ninety-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress a journal written by the Petitioner prior to the entry of his pleas; (2) that trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever certain offenses prior to the entry of his pleas; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of his journal into evidence and failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to the Petitioner’s first two issues. However, the post-conviction court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the Petitioner’s issues regarding his sentencing hearing. As such, the case is remanded for the post-conviction court to enter an order stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the sentencing hearing issues.

Employee of company providing services to an intellectually disabled adult appeals the finding that he committed abuse and neglect against the adult and the resulting placement of the provider’s name on the abuse registry maintained by the Tennessee Department of Health. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal involves the validity of a will executed in contravention of an earlier contract to make mutual wills. A husband and wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after the husband’s death, the wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following the wife’s death, her son of an earlier marriage sought to probate his mother’s last will in the Chancery Court for Knox County. In response, the children of the husband’s earlier marriage filed an action in the Chancery Court for Knox County asserting (1) that their stepmother’s last will had been procured by undue influence, (2) that this will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills, and (3) that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted to probate. The wife’s son asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his stepfather’s children’s claims and that the contract to make mutual wills was void for lack of consideration. Following a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for a summary judgment, the trial court determined (1) that the husband’s children had failed to prove that their stepmother’s will had been procured through undue influence, (2) that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by the husband’s children, (3) that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration, and, (4) that the wife’s last will, therefore, was null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re Estate of Brown, No. E2011-00179-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4552281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011). We affirm.