APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case concerns the administration of a generation-skipping exempt trust. On review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order is not a final judgment, so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. Specifically, the trial court did not adjudicate: (1) the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees; (2) Appellees’ prayer to remove David M. Sullivan as trustee; (3) Appellees’ motion to disqualify David M. Sullivan from acting as legal counsel for the Trust; or (4) Trustee’s motion for sanctions against Appellees and Appellees’ legal counsel. Appeal dismissed.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Demarcus Wooten, guilty of the offenses of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-nine years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his murder and attempted murder convictions, arguing principally that the proof did not establish the elements of intent and premeditation. We respectfully disagree, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Brown, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault by a Shelby County jury. The Petitioner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to disclose discovery materials and failed to call particular witnesses. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Lynn Thornton, was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of heroin with intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of alprazolam, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and simple possession of diazepam and received an effective ten-year sentence to be served as one year in confinement followed by nine years on community corrections. The State appealed the Defendant’s community corrections sentence, and this court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court again imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served as one year in confinement followed by community corrections. The State appeals, claiming that the Defendant is not eligible for community corrections due to his past pattern of behavior indicating violence and pattern of committing violent offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stephen Paul Hampton and Margaret Mary Hampton were charged in the Madison County Circuit Court with drug and weapon offenses, but the charges were dismissed after the trial court granted their motions to suppress statements made to a police officer and evidence found in their vehicle. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motions to suppress because the statements were not made during a custodial interrogation and because the police officer had probable cause to search the vehicle. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the trial court’s orders granting the motions to suppress, vacate the order dismissing the indictment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Aggrieved of his Williamson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated kidnapping, simple possession, violating the financial responsibility law, speeding, and the improper use of a vehicle registration, the defendant, Terry James Lee, appeals. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the admission of evidence of certain uncharged conduct, and the admission of certain of his pretrial statements to the police. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; (4) severe child abuse; (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; and (6) mental incompetence. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that three of the statutory grounds were not supported by sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support, abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child’s welfare prior to incarceration, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The petitioner, Jacob Tate, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2018 guilty-pleaded convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and rape, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this boundary line dispute in which the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment concerning the boundary between the parties’ adjoining parcels of real property, the trial court, following a bench trial, entered declaratory judgment adopting the boundary line of a survey presented by the plaintiffs over other competing surveys. The court, however, did not adopt a boundary line alternatively propounded by the plaintiffs claiming adverse possession of a disputed portion of land. The court dismissed all other claims with prejudice, including, inter alia, competing trespass claims and the plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. The plaintiffs have appealed, raising issues regarding the trial court’s denial of their adverse possession and trespass claims and requests for damages and injunctive relief. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim and the court’s declaration of the parties’ boundary line. However, determining that the trial court erred in applying an intent to trespass as a necessary element of civil trespass, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim. We remand for the trial court to (1) apply the proper intent standard for trespass to determine, with the boundary line as declared by the trial court, whether the defendants trespassed on the plaintiffs’ property; (2) if trespass occurred, determine the type(s) of damages to be awarded; and (3) if trespass occurred, set the amount of damages to be awarded with discretionary costs as appropriate. Discerning that the trial court made no findings regarding the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, we also remand for consideration of that request based on relevant factors and entry of an order granting or denying injunctive relief with appropriate findings of fact. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We deem the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal to be waived.

A mother and stepfather filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court dismissed the petition after finding that the mother and stepfather failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of any ground for termination. Because the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact in its order dismissing the petition, we vacate the order and remand for the trial court to enter an order making sufficient findings of fact.

The Defendant, Eric R. Wright, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of robbery committed by the use of a deadly weapon and two counts of assault with the intent to commit first degree murder, for which he is serving an effective 150-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. He filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court denied. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying relief without appointing counsel and conducting a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jacquiz McBee, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and received a life sentence to be served consecutively to his prior three-year sentence for aggravated assault. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by excluding the victim and Defendant’s minor child’s statement to a forensic interviewer; that the trial court erred by failing to redact the words “on probation” from searches made on the internet from Defendant’s cell phone; that the trial court erred by admitting the results of a Google search conducted by Detective McFarland consistent with a search made by Defendant; that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and that cumulative error entitles him to relief. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“the Act”), wherein he sought DNA testing of evidence related to his first degree murder conviction. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns a divorce. Larry Mark Mangum (“Husband”) sued Laney Celeste Mangum (“Wife”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment, which Wife appealed. In Mangum v. Mangum, No. E2018-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1787328 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 24, 2019) (“Mangum I”), we vacated the Trial Court’s judgment except as to the divorce itself. We remanded with instructions for the Trial Court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that consider all of the relevant and applicable statutory factors guiding child custody and property division matters, respectively. On remand, the Trial Court entered a new final judgment in light of our Opinion in Mangum I. Wife appeals, arguing that the Trial Court erred in fashioning the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor sons (“the Children”) as well as in its classification, valuation, and division of the parties’ property. Husband raises the separate issue of whether this appeal is frivolous. We find that the Trial Court, in considering all of the relevant statutory factors, complied with our instructions on remand. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings with respect to its application of the statutory factors.

The defendant, Adam Holmes, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a Cellebrite cellular telephone data extraction report and the prior testimony of a State witness and by permitting a State witness to testify remotely. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Elijah Bowman, was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twelve years. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions of first-degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. We affirm.

Defendant, Espiridion Evangelista Kolimlim, III, appeals the criminal court’s dismissal of his general sessions appeal from payment of a traffic citation after he filed a motion to withdraw payment of the citation. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal.

A father appeals the modification of a parenting plan. Because the order appealed does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Narcotics officers seized two vehicles and approximately $23,000 in U.S. currency while executing a search warrant at a residence. An administrative law judge ordered the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security to return the seized property to the purported owner. The judge determined that the search warrant was issued without probable cause, resulting in an illegal seizure. And, if not, the Department failed to prove that it strictly complied with the forfeiture statutes. The Department petitioned for judicial review. After reviewing the administrative record, the chancery court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the administrative decision for further proceedings. We affirm.

Following a conviction for theft of property, the Defendant, Tanya Dawn Everett, was sentenced to a term of four years and placed on probation. Thereafter, the Blount County Circuit Court found that the Defendant violated the terms of her probation by failing to report and by committing new criminal offenses. As a consequence, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of her original sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Calvin Sanchez Amos, Defendant, was indicted for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest. Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and proceeded to trial on the remaining charges. A jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offenses of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and attempted possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant agreed to an effective sentence of 12 years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a video from Defendant’s phone in which he is seen cooking crack cocaine. After a full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a challenge to a chancery court’s granting of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement related to litigation over the partition of family-owned property. The appellant is incarcerated, which caused complications for all parties in efficiently resolving their dispute. The chancellor concluded the appellant was bound by the settlement reached by his agent, who was acting with both actual and apparent authority. On appeal, the appellant contends the chancellor erred in finding his agent had actual and apparent authority to agree to a settlement on his behalf. We conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the chancellor erred in finding the appellant conferred actual authority upon his agent; accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s granting of the appellees’ motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.