APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Randy Maray Cheairs, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of second-degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and possession of a handgun in the commission of a felony for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kimberly Holliday, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for coram nobis relief. In 2000, the Petitioner entered a “best interest” guilty plea to theft of services and issuing a false financial statement and received an effective four-year-suspended sentence. Over ten years later, in 2011, she filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that failure to report earnings to a public housing authority does not constitute “theft of services” based on State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558 (Tenn. 2010). In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because (1) “a person cannot be guilty of something that is not a crime;” (2) “due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations;” (3) “this case is timely filed as a petition for postconviction relief;” and (4) “a best interest plea rather than a voluntary admission of guilt preserves the appellant’s right to bring a petition for writ of error coram nobis.” Upon review, we affirm dismissal of the petition.

Victor Armando Martinez ("the Defendant") appeals his jury convictions for possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, simple possession of Alprazolam, possession with intent to sell one-half (1/2) ounce or more but less than ten pounds of marijuana, possession of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of diazepam, simple possession of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his residence. He also alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in applying no mitigating factors in its sentencing of the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The pro se Petitioner, Manuel Haynes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. Because the petition was untimely and the Petitioner has not shown that due process concerns tolled the one-year statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tyrone Douglas, was placed on community corrections after his plea of guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of cocaine in Davidson County. After the trial court found a violation of community corrections in 2011, Appellant was reinstated to community corrections on the condition that he complete a drug and mental health assessment and comply with any recommendations made in the assessment. Subsequently, another affidavit was filed alleging Appellant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence by failing to attend required meetings with his case worker and pleading guilty to new charges. The trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence, reinstating Appellant’s sentence of thirteen years, to be served as a Persistent Offender at forty-five percent incarceration. Appellant appeals that revocation. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

We granted review in this divorce case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s denial of transitional alimony. The trial court divided the parties’ real and personal property, awarded custody of their children to the wife, and declined to award spousal support to the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s custody determination and, except for the trial court’s refusal to divide the wife’s post-separation income, upheld the classification and division of the marital estate. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the wife to pay the husband transitional alimony in the amount of $2000 per month for thirty-six months. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the husband transitional alimony. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment awarding the husband transitional alimony but affirm in all other respects the intermediate appellate court’s decision.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. Sean and Amber G. (“the Petitioners”) filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to Hope A.P. (“the Child”) against Jessica N. (“Mother”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The petition alleged that Mother willfully failed to visit or support the Child in the four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that Mother’s willful failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence showed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves the petitioner’s efforts to be paroled. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to recommend the petitioner for parole, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. The Board filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the Board’s motion, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm.

On June 6, 2012, Esmat Eslami (“Plaintiff”) filed a notice of appeal of an order entered by the Trial Court on May 9, 2012. On November 5, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Plaintiff did not respond to the show cause order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of motions for recusal in two post- ivorce cases involving custody of the parties’ minor children. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.

Property owners’ permit to place a mobile home on their property was revoked by the county building commissioner on the grounds that the property on which the home was to be located did not meet the minimum lot size requirement in the zoning ordinance; on appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals, the property owners were granted a variance. The County filed a petition in Chancery Court seeking certiorari review of the grant of the variance, naming the Board of Zoning Appeals and property owners as defendants. After a hearing, the trial dismissed the petition; the court denied the property owners’ request for attorney fees incurred in connection with the Board of Zoning Appeals and certiorari proceedings. We hold that the property owners are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Kearn Weston, for robbery, a Class C felony. A jury convicted him as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Mooneyhans were brought into court by the county government and were forced to defend a decision by the county’s board of zoning appeals. After that decision was upheld in the trial court, the county once again forced the Mooneyhans into this court. They were required to spend money on an attorney in both courts to defend an action by the county government from attack by the county government. These egregious actions by the county were unauthorized.

Susan Michelle Barnett (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated assault, two counts of misdemeanor assault, and unauthorized use of an automobile in Gibson County Circuit Court case no. 17702. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her six-year sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. On the date of the sentencing hearing in case no. 17702, the Defendant also pleaded guilty to failure to appear in Gibson County Circuit Court case no. 18191 and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year, to be served consecutively to her six-year sentence. Thereafter, the Defendant attempted to appeal both cases. Having determined that we lack jurisdiction in case no. 17702, we dismiss that appeal. We also dismiss the appeal in case no. 18191 because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, and the Defendant is not entitled to appeal her guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b).

This is the second appeal in this divorce case. During the parties’ ten-year marriage, they had two children. The husband served in the military, stationed in several different places. Eventually the family moved to Tennessee, where the wife worked part-time and took care of the children while the husband was deployed. Just after the husband returned from his deployment, the wife filed a petition for divorce, and the husband filed a cross-petition. The parties reached an agreement on property issues, but no others. After a trial, the trial court entered a final decree, found the husband at fault for the demise of the marriage, and granted the wife a divorce. The final decree designated the wife as the children’s primary residential parent, awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony, and divided the marital estate in accordance with the parties’agreement. The husband filed the first appeal.The appellate court dismissed the first appeal for lack of a final order and remanded the case for resolution of several issues. After a post-remand hearing, the trial court entered an order mostly reaffirming its initial decision. However, in light of the wife’s post-remand admission of infidelity during the marriage, the trial court declared the parties to be divorced, rather than granting the wife a divorce. The husband again appeals, challenging the trial court’s failure to find the wife at fault for the demise of the marriage, its designation of the wife as the children’s primary residential parent, the award of rehabilitative alimony, the property division, and the award of attorney fees in favor of the wife. We modify the award of alimony, but otherwise affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted petitioner, Jamila Nunn, of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, for which the trial court ordered a twenty-year sentence. Following the direct appeal, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, and petitioner now appeals. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff filed this action alleging that the defendant killed the latter’s husband thereby forfeiting any rights she had under a trust the husband had created. After the complaint was filed, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of her husband. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the judgment of conviction and other documents. The defendant filed an affidavit denying any responsibility for her husband’s death. While the motion for summary judgment was pending, the defendant filed a motion asking the trial judge to recuse himself. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. It then granted the motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to recuse but vacate the order granting the motion for summary judgment.

Appellant, Jerry Ray Norton, challenges his conviction for driving under the influence, fourth offense. As grounds, he claims that the State’s evidence did not prove that he operated a motor vehicle on a public roadway and that the officer’s failure to file an accident report should have resulted in dismissal of the indictment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments on count four, driving on a revoked license, third offense, and count five, driving under the influence, fourth offense, reflecting a disposition of count one, driving under the influence, and count two, driving on a revoked license. The corrected judgments should reflect merger of count one into count five and count two into count four. The trial court should also enter a judgment disposing of the third count of the indictment, violation of the implied consent statute.

The former husband appeals from the denial of his Motion to Set Aside or in the Alternative Alter or Amend the Final Decree of Divorce, which was filed 23 days after the entry of the Final Decree. In his Motion for relief, Husband sought to amend the Final Decree as it pertained to the division of the parties’ mortgage debt on two homes, the division of Husband’s military pension, and the award of rehabilitative alimony to Wife. We have determined the trial court should have granted partial relief as it pertained to Husband’s continuing liability on the mortgage on the Miami, Florida property awarded to Wife, and to address a mathematical error pertaining to Wife’s interest in Husband’s military retirement. Thus, we remand for review of these two issues and affirm in all other respects.

Husband appeals from an order of the trial court granting Wife a divorce and making a distribution of marital property. We affirm.

The trial court dismissed “petitions for medical support” of non-marital children filed by the Department of Human Services as inconsistent with the child support statutes and guidelines. We affirm.

Elizabeth C. Wright (“the Seller”) filed suit against Frederico A. Dixon, III (“the Buyer”) for breach of a contract to purchase real property. The contract allowed the Buyer to terminate in the event he was unable to obtain financing. Under the contract, termination was to be effective only if notice of same was “received.” The Buyer claims to have sent a notice of termination through his agent by fax to the Seller. The Seller claims that she did not receive it. The trial court found that the attempted termination was ineffective because it was not received. The Buyer appeals. We affirm.

An employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his back. His employer denied the claim.  The trial court found the injury to be compensable and awarded the employee 30% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury is compensable. On appeal, the employee asserts that the award of benefits was inadequate. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Kenneth E. King was arrested for driving on a revoked license. He was put in a cell with several violent criminals. At his arraignment, the court ordered him released. The person charged with processing the release delayed his release by simply doing nothing. While awaiting his release, Mr. King was assaulted by one of his cellmates. He sustained serious injuries, including partial loss of vision in one eye. He filed this action against Anderson County (“the County”). After a bench trial, the court found the County 55% at fault and King 45% at fault for provoking the assault. It determined that the total damages were $170,000 reduced to $93,500 to account for King’s comparative fault. The County appeals. We affirm.

Martha Scent filed a declaratory judgment action against multiple defendants to establish her rights with respect to a deed of trust that granted her a lien on a tract of land. In addition, Scent sought to establish that “her” signature on a release of her deed of trust is a forgery. The trial court granted Scent partial summary judgment voiding and nullifying the release of her trust deed. The case proceeded to a bench trial with the focus on the priority of trust deeds as between Scent and the defendant Ellen W. Hood. Based upon the application of the doctrine of merger, the court ruled that Scent held the priority position. The court awarded judgment in her favor and Hood appeals. We affirm.