APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. (“Husband”) sued his former spouse, Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick (“Wife”); her attorney, David W. Noblit (“Counsel”); and Noblit’s law firm (collectively “Defendants”). Husband alleges that, since the time of the parties’ divorce, Wife and Counsel had conspired against him in an effort to destroy him and gain access to his separate funds. Husband claims the Defendants are guilty of fraud on the court, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a civil conspiracy, for which he seeks eight million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed Husband’s complaint. The court stated “that the[] causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations or that the complaint failed to state a claim, or both.” Husband appeals. We affirm.

The Department of Revenue conducted an audit on plaintiff's partnership, and as a result franchise and excise taxes of $317,659.72 plus interest of $59,525.59 were assessed against plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action contesting the assessments, and since the Commissioner had relied on Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320-6-1-.20 to make the assessment, the plaintiff charged the Rule was inconsistent with the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2006. The Trial Judge held the regulation was in conflict with the code section to the extent that the Rule attempted to restrict the deduction for charitable contributions made to only the book basis, rather than the fair market value, and the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on that issue and an abatement in the assessment of $303,049. The Court also found that the plaintiff was in error in not including certain real property in calculating the net worth under the ruling of Crown Enterprises, Inc., v. Woods, and that the defendant was entitled to a judgment of additional tax in the amount of $14,610.72. Both parties appealed. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court's Judgment regarding excise tax and we remand for a Judgment on the excise tax as assessed by the Commissioner. The Trial Court's Judgment regarding the franchise tax is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial and sentenced as a Range III offender to fourteen years and six months incarceration. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by permitting him to be impeached with a hearsay statement contained in a police report. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a retail business specializing in hair restoration and related services that leased “beauty equipment” from a third party lessor, filed this action against the manufacturer of the “beauty equipment” and the distributor of the products asserting claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff obtained a monetary judgment against the distributor, however, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the manufacturer. Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of its claims against the manufacturer. We affirm.

Following a jury trial,the Defendant, Maurice O.Byrd,was convicted of aggravated robbery, felony first degree murder, and premeditated first degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202,-402. The trial court merged the premeditated first degree murder conviction into the felony first degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with the life sentence for the felony first degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The trial court found that a proposed construction project involving the petitioner’s property was not covered by the local zoning ordinance, and, therefore, the petitioner was not required to seek a variance from the local board of zoning appeals in order to obtain a building permit. The respondents appeal. We affirm.

Elizabeth C. Wright (“the Seller”) filed suit against Frederico A. Dixon, III (“the Buyer”) for breach of a contract to purchase real property. The contract allowed the Buyer to terminate in the event he was unable to obtain financing. Under the contract, termination was to be effective only if notice of same was “received.” The Buyer claims to have sent a notice of termination through his agent by fax to the Seller. The Seller claims that she did not receive it. The trial court found that the attempted termination was ineffective because it was not received. The Buyer appeals. We affirm.

An employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his back. His employer denied the claim.  The trial court found the injury to be compensable and awarded the employee 30% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury is compensable. On appeal, the employee asserts that the award of benefits was inadequate. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a dispute over a claim for rent reimbursements in a lease agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the undisputed facts showed that a limitation of remedy provision in the lease relieved the defendant from any liability. We affirm the judgment of the court below.

This appeal arises from a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. Delwin Huggins (“Huggins”) sued R. Ellsworth McKee (“McKee”) and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”) (McKee and AF as “the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Huggins filed for bankruptcy. Konvalinka later purchased the claims asserted by Huggins in this lawsuit. The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, even if Konvalinka’s claim for damages was successful, McKee had an offset far in excess of these damages which rendered any further proceedings useless. The Trial Court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the case. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

Appellant, David Joseph Buckhanon, was convicted by a Maury County jury of facilitation of attempted first degree murder, facilitation of especially aggravated burglary, and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty three years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. He challenges: (1) the trial court’s exclusion of testimony by a witness who heard the Appellant’s co-defendant state that he, rather than Appellant, was responsible for the shooting; (2) the trial court’s admission of Appellant’s alleged street name “Laylow”;
(3) the trial court’s admission of testimony from a detective that there was no evidence of a third participant in the shooting; (4) the insufficiency of the evidence; and (5) the application of enhancement factors to his sentence. After a review of the evidence, we determine: (1) the trial court properly excluded hearsay testimony; (2) the trial court properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s street name; (3) the trial court properly excluded evidence of Appellant’s claim of a second accomplice where there was no corroboration;(4)the evidence was sufficientto supportthe convictions;and(5)thetrialcourtproperlysentenced Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted appellants, Alejandro Neave Vasquez and Nazario Araguz, of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. The trial court sentenced appellant Vasquez to an effective twenty-year sentence and sentenced appellant Araguz to an effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, both appellants argue that: (1) the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding money recovered by law enforcement; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellants’ requests for a special jury instruction and in granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Derron S. Guy, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2010 Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over five hundred dollars. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to apply certain mitigating factors and byfailing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after declining to review the sentences because the defendant had failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas, affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon a presumption that the evidence was sufficient to support the sentences. After granting the defendant’s application forpermission to appealbecause of conflicting opinions bythe Court of Criminal Appeals as to whether the absence of a transcript of a guilty plea submission hearing precludes appellate review on the merits, we ordered that the record be supplemented. In this instance, the record was adequate for a meaningful review of the sentences either with or without the transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas. By use of the recently adopted abuse of discretion standard for the review of sentences, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case. The original plaintiff, the decedent, filed the initial malpractice action against the defendant, but the case was dismissed after the decedent passed away during the pendency of the suit. Her sole surviving heir re-filed the action without complying with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122, which require a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit (1) to give a health care provider who is to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit, and (2) to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Glen A. Forrest, was convicted of attempted cocaine delivery in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court ordered six months of his sentence to be served in prison and the remaining five years and six months to be served on probation. The trial court subsequently found the defendant to be in violation of the terms of his probation and revoked the probation, ordering the defendant to serve the original sentence. The defendant appeals the trial court’s determination that he violated the terms of his probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court has committed no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation denying his application for a billboard permit because his proposed location was within 1000 feet of another permit location. He contends the Department erroneously deviated from its regulation requiring permit applications for locations within 1000 feet of each other to be considered on a “first come first served” basis, insisting he submitted a “complete” application before the applicant who was granted a permit for the nearby location. The Chancery Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Department’s decision to grant a permit to the other applicant. The court also found that the Department complied with its rules in issuing the permit to the other applicant and denying the petitioner’s application because petitioner’s location was less than 1000 feet away from the other applicant’s location. We affirm.

A Madison County Jury convicted Defendant, Jonathan Freeman, of possession of more than one-half ounce (14.175 grams) of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. Defendant waived his right to a sentencing hearing, the two convictions were merged, and he received an agreed sentence of two years, to serve ten days, and the balance on probation, including sixty hours of community service work. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rickey Dickerson, was convicted of two counts of second degree murder. He filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and in failing to consult more thoroughly with the petitioner prior to trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding neither deficiency nor prejudice. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was placed on supervised probation in 2007 with the special condition that he not be involved in dog fighting or have more than two dogs in his home. The defendant’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to another three years probation on the grounds that nine dogs were found in his home. Defendant appeals, claiming that the special condition placed on his probation was not reasonably related to his conviction and that the judge did not articulate sufficient grounds to place an additional special provision on his newly-imposed probation that he not be permitted to possess any dogs. We conclude that the special conditions affecting the defendant’s dog ownership are reasonably related to the purposes of his sentences and are not unduly restrictive or otherwise impermissible. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed accordingly.

The Petitioner, James E. Gayles, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void because he was sentenced in direct violation of Tennessee statutory law. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jeff Henson, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 1 aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, attempted aggravated sexual battery, driving under the influence third offense, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, as a Range I offender, to an effective sentence of twelve years of confinement followed by community supervision for life. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective and because his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Appellant takes exception to the trial court’s order, enforcing a settlement agreement. ollowing a judicial settlement conference, the parties signed a written agreement, which contemplated the execution of more formal settlement documents. When the formal documents were presented to Appellant, he refused to sign. Upon Appellees’ motion, the trial court enforced the settlement and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant, occupant of the property which had been foreclosed. Plaintiff held a deed of ownership. Plaintiff sued for possession and for damages for unlawful detainer of the property. The Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment for possession and damages for unlawful detainer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-120. On appeal, we affirm.

In this case the Trial Court entered a "Final Judgment". The Judgment did not resolve defendant's Counter-Claim. On appeal, we hold we are without jurisdiction to consider the Appeal and dismiss the Appeal.