APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this parental termination case, the father was appointed counsel at the time the Court held a dependency hearing in the Juvenile Court and the Order appointing counsel in that proceeding also appointed the attorney for the subsequent termination of parental rights trial. When the Petition to terminate the father's parental rights trial was held, neither the father nor counsel appeared at trial and a Judgment was entered terminating the father's parental rights. On appeal, appellant argues that the statue and rule governing this proceeding required notification to the father's attorney. We vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that both the Court and the Department of Children's Services were charged with the knowledge that the appellee was appointed counsel and that the termination Petition's Judgment was prejudicial to the judicial process when the father's lawyer was not notified of the Petition or trial. We vacate and remand for a new trial.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The subject child is the eighth born to the appellant mother. The appellant mother failed a prenatal drug screen prior to the birth of the child at issue, so the appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took the child into protective custody three days after birth. A permanency plan was adopted and the mother made efforts to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to this child. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The mother now appeals only as to the grounds for termination. We reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan but affirm as to the ground of persistent conditions. On that basis, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property. Appellee church purchased the disputed property from the seller bank in 1974, but failed to record its deed. Through a clerical error, the seller bank sold the disputed property to Appellant real estate investor in 2008. Appellant promptly recorded his deed. After the investor demolished a portion of a wall constructed by the church on the disputed property, the church sued to quiet title and for damages. The trial court ruled that the deed to the investor was void as champertous because the church’s possession of the property was open and obvious at the time of conveyance. Thus the trial court ruled that the church was the true owner of the property. Although we affirm the decision of the trial court, we rely on grounds other than those found by the trial court.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ameale Hudson, guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) denying his motion to bar the State from referring to him by his nickname,“Pistol”; and (3) denying his motion to prohibit the admission of postmortem photographs of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter arose from a car accident between Traci Jones and Bernice Jones. At trial, the
jury found Bernice Jones 100% at fault and awarded Traci Jones a portion of her requested
relief. On appeal, Traci Jones argues that the trial court erred by reversing its pre-trial ruling
on a motion in limine, denying her motion for mistrial, and denying her motion for directed
verdict. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Gibson County grand jury indicted appellant, Christopher Alexander Jones, for first degree murder. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not show sufficient proof of premeditation and that his intoxication negated the required culpable mental state for this offense. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Memphis police officer was terminated after he was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend during which she sustained facial injuries. The Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the chancery court affirmed. In the initial appeal to this Court, we remanded for the Commission to make  findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission issued an amended decision with additional findings. Upon reviewing the amended decision, the chancery court  reversed the termination and reinstated the officer. The City appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. The officer presents numerous arguments in support of his assertion that reversal of the Commission was proper. We affirm the order of the chancery court in part, but we vacate the reinstatement of the officer and reinstate the Commission’s decision to uphold termination.

The Defendant, Matthew T. McGee, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved two certified questions of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal we held that the parties did not have a contract for the sale of the property, and we remanded it back to the Trial Court to determine a reasonable fee in quantum meruit for the plaintiff as the facilitator of the sale. Upon remand, the Trial Court heard proof and held that plaintiff was entitled to a 6% commission on the sale price. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment as modified.

Plaintiff purchased a vent hood from defendant. The hood was paid for at the time of purchase and delivered, but was returned to defendant as being unworkable. Plaintiff brought this action for reimbursement of payment for the hood in Sessions Court. Sessions Court entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Judge entered Judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500 for the amount paid for the hood to defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. 

Plaintiff in suit seeking to have court declare boundaries of fifteen acre tract of land appeals
the declaration of boundaries and award of the tract to Defendants, adjoining landowners.
Defendants appeal finding that Plaintiff adversely possessed a portion of the fifteen acre
tract. Finding no error, we affirm.

Jeffery D. Allen (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to call two witnesses to testify at trial, (2) failed to adequately cross-examine a witness, and (3) failed to move to sever the Petitioner’s offenses prior to trial. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bethany Lorraine Kuykendall, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $1000 but less than $10,000, for which she was granted judicial diversion with the requirements that she complete two years of probation and pay $150 per month toward restitution. On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the restitution amount. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we dismiss it.

In January of 2011, Ezra Williams (“Plaintiff”) sued Stephen Leon Williams and Regions Bank . Plaintiff died in May of 2011. Regions Bank filed a Suggestion of Death. No motion for substitution of proper party was made within ninety days after Plaintiff’s death was suggested upon the record. In July of 2011, the attorney who had represented Plaintiff prior to Plaintiff’s death filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. In October of 2011, Regions Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court granted the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice. Regions Bank appeals to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court should have dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01 for failure to timely move for substitution of proper party. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and dismiss this case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01.

Petitioner, Bobby Lee Scales, Jr., filed a pro se etition for habeas corpus relief attacking two convictions of theft in Davidson County and one conviction of theft in Williamson County. The habeas corpus trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.

This is the second time the attempt to recall Chattanooga’s mayor has been before this court. In the initial appeal, we concluded the trial court acted prematurely and without jurisdiction when it enjoined the election commission from placing the recall issue on the ballot, because the election commission, at that point in time, had not formally decided whether or not to certify the recall petition. After we vacated the void judgment of the trial court, the election commission certified the recall petition and the mayor again filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition process was flawed and to enjoin the placement of the recall issue on the ballot. The trial court found that the petition seeking the recall of the mayor is invalid and illegal because it does not comply with all the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-5-151. The leaders of the recall effort appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The remaining counts were dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner received an effective sentence of sixteen years at 100%, and was ordered to lifetime supervision after the service of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his sentences were void and illegal. The petition was dismissed as untimely. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the petition was properly dismissed as untimely as Petitioner failed to show any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled. As a result, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant, Andrew Helton, has appealed the Davidson County Criminal Court order dismissing his motion for new trial in which Appellant alleged that: (1) the trial court erred by denying Appellant the right to be present at his trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to allow the jury to examine evidence during deliberation. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion for new trial as duplicitous and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Fletcher Gordon, pled guilty to second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and it awarded him no jail credit. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court failed to award him pretrial jail credit. He asserted that he was incarcerated pending arraignment and trial from December 20, 2004, to August 24, 2006. The State filed a motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s motion based upon the Petitioner’s failure to provide documentation supporting his claim. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Derwin Thomas, filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment charging him with especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and first degree murder was defective for failure to allege the theory of criminal responsibility. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to allege grounds upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Cedric Davis, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioners appeal from the dismissal of their complaint for declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, and damages wherein they challenged the constitutionality of a now superseded
section of the Tennessee Bail Reform Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-11-118(a).
Petitioners contended that the 2011 statute prohibited night court judges or magistrates from
setting bail for persons charged with a second or higher driving under the influence violation,
thus requiring they be confined until a general sessions court judge or criminal court judge
was available. The trial court dismissed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel and dismissed the claim for monetary damages
against Governor Bill Haslam upon the ground of sovereign immunity. We find the challenge
to the constitutionality of the 2011 version of subsection (a) moot as the challenged
provisions of subsection (a) have been deleted and superseded. We also affirm the dismissal
of the claims against Governor Haslam for monetary damages as he has sovereign immunity.

Petitioner, Miqwon Deon Leach, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He challenges his 2001 conviction for felony murder, for which a jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He also challenges his conviction for conspiracy to commit second degree murder that arose from the same case. As grounds for habeas corpus relief, petitioner argues that: (1) conspiracy to commit second degree murder is not a cognizable offense under Tennessee law, rendering his conviction void; and (2) the evidence at trial did not establish his intent to commit felony murder. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the court.

Jay Garrity ("the Defendant") was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to sixteen years on each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of forty-eight years. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred "in allowing the State to call a ‘surprise’ witness." He also claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Finally, the Defendant challenges the length and consecutive service of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. We, however, are compelled to vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant in this action filed a motion for recusal with the trial judge alleging bias against both himself and his counsel. The trial judge denied the motion, and the defendant filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.