APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Employee Dianne Moore experienced bilateral numbness, weakness, and tingling from her mid-chest down after performing a work-related task as a truck driver for Employer Beacon Transport, LLC. Following initial treatment in a local emergency room in Ardmore, Oklahoma, Employee was seen by Oklahoma City neurosurgeon Dr. Joseph Cox. Dr. Cox diagnosed Employee with an incomplete spinal cord injury in the form of a spinal cord contusion or lesion, which he opined resulted from her work-related activity. Employee was subsequently seen by panel physician, Nashville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. W. Garrison Strickland. Dr. Strickland diagnosed Employee with a thoracic spinal cord lesion caused by transverse myelitis, a condition which was not work-related. Employee additionally was seen by Nashville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. Darian Reddick, who similarly diagnosed Employee with idiopathic transverse myelitis syndrome-myelitis of unknown origin—a condition which was not work-related. Employee self-referred to Goodlettsville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. James Anderson, who indicated that Employee suffered a work-related back injury with effect on the spinal cord caused by back strain with transient give-way of structural elements traumatizing the spinal cord. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim for benefits, and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. Employee has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in accrediting the causation opinions of Dr. Strickland and Dr. Reddick, over the opinions of Dr. Cox and Dr. Anderson and concluding that she had failed to establish her condition was work-related. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Asata D. Lowe, appeals the Morgan County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner argues he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was deprived of his right to be present at his initial appearance, deprived of his right to counsel at his initial appearance, and deprived of his right to present a defense at his initial appearance. He additionally contends that the habeas corpus court denied his right of access to the courts when it summarily dismissed his habeas corpus petition before ruling on two of his pending motions. After review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Defendant, Michael Lee Arthur Moreno, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eight years in the Department of Correction. He raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-125 by restricting cross-examination of one of the victims about text messages the victim sent the night before the shooting expressing the victim’s desire to commit a robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613 by allowing the State to introduce rebuttal evidence of a defense witness’s recorded statement to police. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions, that the trial court did not err in restricting cross-examination of the victim, and that the Defendant, who failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial, cannot show plain error in the introduction of the defense witness’s statement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Daniel Hickman, appeals his convictions for criminally negligent homicide and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective 27-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence supporting the defense theory that a third party committed the offenses in violation of Defendant’s right to present a defense; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the entire audio recording of Defendant’s interview with police and photographs taken of Defendant during the interview; (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding a prior suspect’s willingness to take a polygraph examination; (5) the jury improperly considered a lesser included offense for especially aggravated robbery in violation of the trial court’s sequential jury instructions; and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors deprived Defendant of his right to a fair trial. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, oral arguments and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a dispute between three neighbors over the nature and permissible use of an easement created through a 1983 judgment of the chancery court.  The plaintiffs own the property that is burdened by the easement and argue that the trial court correctly found that the 1983 judgment created an easement in gross in favor of the landowner directly north of their property.  We find that the trial court erred in finding an easement in gross and hold that the 1983 judgment created an express easement appurtenant creating a dominant and servient tenement; however, the easement appurtenant was not capable of being conveyed to landowners who were not purchasing the dominant estate.  Likewise, we find that there was no prescriptive or implied easement allowing the easement to be deeded from one neighbor to another.  Because the trial court’s judgment lacked findings of fact relevant to the slander of title cause of action, we remand this issue to the trial court for the entry of specific findings of fact on the elements of slander of title.  We affirm the trial court’s holding that defendants are responsible for the cost of re-installing a gate that they damaged.  The chancery court’s order is reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part.

This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court’s designation of the primary residential parent of two minor children. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm.

Tyler Keith Parrish, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court affirmed the jury verdict, merged the two convictions, and sentenced Defendant to a within-range sentence of 12 years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence as excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiff sued a physician who had interpreted the results of her fetal ultrasound. The physician was employed by a Tennessee state university as a professor. Her job duties included both educational responsibilities and clinical care to patients in the residency clinics. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that she had received no personal gain by her act of interpreting the ultrasound. Therefore, the physician possessed absolute immunity under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act for her actions within the scope of her state employment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between unwed parents, in which the mother filed a petition to modify a parenting plan and the father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan and to modify custody. The juvenile court dismissed both the petition and counterpetition finding that modification was not in the child’s best interests. The father appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Agness McCurry, has appealed the September 29, 2022 order of the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). Because the September 29, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Justin M. Banning, was originally sentenced to a term of four years and placed on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant committed a new criminal offense, engaged in unlawful substance use, and violated a no-contact order with the victim. As a consequence, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered that the Defendant serve the original four-year sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence in its entirety. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father and stepmother sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her child.  The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition.  But the court found the evidence less than clear and convincing that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  We affirm. 

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues that the petition was fatally flawed, and Petitioners should not have been allowed to amend after the close of their proof. We conclude that the trial court did not err in deciding the case on its merits because the amendments were not prejudicial to Mother and remedied the petition’s deficiencies. We further conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim. Mark Leedy (“Plaintiff”) and Hickory Ridge, LLC (“Defendant”) executed the Real Estate Land Installment Contract (“the Contract”) under which Plaintiff would purchase real estate from Defendant located at 195 Derby Drive, Kingsport, Tennessee (“the Property”). Although Defendant accepted money from Plaintiff to be applied toward insurance, Defendant opted to “self-insure.” Sometime later, severe storms damaged the Property. Defendant failed to properly assess or repair the damage. Plaintiff spent another 18 months living on the Property all the while making payments before he left. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of loss. We hold, inter alia, that Defendant was obliged to insure the Property pursuant to the Contract and associated documents. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees and expenses as there is no provision in the Contract for such an award to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Steven Jeffrey Pike, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, wherein he challenged his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to impeach a witness for the State with the witness’s prior statement to police; (2) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise on appeal the trial court’s limitation of defense expert’s testimony; (3) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise on appeal that the Petitioner’s involuntary statements constituted a due process violation not subject to harmless error analysis; and (4) the multiple errors committed by trial counsel and appellate counsel constituted prejudicial error in the aggregate.1 After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to four of her children. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court erred when it terminated her rights because the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We have determined that DCS proved grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Defendant, David Wayne Eady, was convicted by a jury of eleven counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a repeat violent offender and imposed eleven concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court ran the life imprisonment sentences concurrently with a fifteen-year sentence for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Defendant contends 1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the offenses; 2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress his statements; 3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, 4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery as charged in count eight of the indictment; and 5) his convictions for aggravated robbery as charged in counts one and two of the indictment violate Double Jeopardy as a matter of plain error. Because the facts and circumstances support only one conviction for aggravated robbery as charged in counts one and two, we merge the two counts, and remand for entry of amended judgments in counts one and two reflecting the merger. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

For the reasons that follow, I am compelled to dissent from the section of the majority opinion affirming the decision of the trial court to deny severance of the offenses in this case. I agree that the trial court correctly determined that permissible joinder, pursuant to Rule 8(b)(2), was proper because of the similar nature of the crimes alleged in this case. In these circumstances, a defendant has an absolute right under Rule 14(b)(1) to have offenses separately tried unless the prosecution shows (1) that the offenses are part of a common scheme or plan, and (2) evidence of each crime would be admissible in the trial of the others. State v. Garrett, 331 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Tenn. 2011); State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 228 (Tenn. 2003); see also State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 239 n. 7 (Tenn. 1999) (“[A] common scheme or plan for severance purposes is the same as a common scheme or plan for evidentiary purposes.”). To justify consolidation here, the State relied upon the second category of common scheme or plan evidence, that each of the offenses committed and to be joined were part of a larger, continuing plan or conspiracy. State v. Garrett, 331 S.W.3d at 404 (observing that there are three types of common scheme or plan evidence: (1) offenses that reveal a distinctive design or are so similar as to constitute signature crimes; (2) offenses that are part of a larger, continuing plan or conspiracy; and (3) offenses that are all part of the same criminal transaction) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because there was no proof that the offenses were part of a larger, continuing plan, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the severance request under Rule 14(b)(1). Garrett, 331 S.W.3d at 403 (the prosecution bears the burden of producing evidence to establish that consolidation is proper).

Petitioner, Micah Transou, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily because “it created an illegal sentence” and that it was not entered with the effective assistance of counsel. Following oral argument, our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a detainer action brought by a landlord to evict its tenant for possessing a firearm in his apartment in contravention of the lease agreement. The landlord, Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corporation (“Columbia Housing”), provides subsidized housing for the City of Columbia pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-20-101 to -709, and operates Creekside Acres, a multifamily, low-income public housing complex in Columbia, Tennessee. The tenant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement with Columbia Housing that contained a prohibition against firearms on the premises; nevertheless, the tenant defended the detainer action, contending that the lease agreement violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of the landlord on the ground that the lease agreement was a valid and enforceable contract, and the tenant voluntarily waived any rights he may have had to possess a firearm on the leased premises. This appeal followed. Significantly, the landlord is a governmental entity “acting as a landlord of property that it owns.” See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002). As such, its actions must comply with the Constitution, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982), and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine “prevent[s] the government from coercing people into giving” up constitutional rights. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013). Although laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” do not violate the Second Amendment, see D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), not “all places of public congregation” are “sensitive places.” See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2134 (2022). Moreover, although public housing is government-owned, the leased premises at issue is the tenant’s private home, which is not the kind of “sensitive place” where the government may categorically ban firearm possession. See id. at 2128. Further, complete prohibitions on possession of handguns in the home for self-defense are “historically unprecedented.” See id. Therefore, we hold that Columbia Housing’s prohibition against handguns in the tenant’s “home” is an unconstitutional lease condition. As a consequence, the tenant’s possession of a handgun in his apartment, his home, did not constitute a breach of the lease agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a consolidated appeal involving two breach of contract actions filed against the Tennessee Department of Human Services in the Tennessee Claims Commission. Following the presentation of the claimant’s proof, the Commissioner dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal.