APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Michael Raines, pro se, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his petition was barred by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the employee suffered a compensable back injury. The trial court awarded 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and additional temporary total disability benefits, resulting in an award of 400 weeks of benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting that the permanent partial disability award is excessive and that the trial court erred by awarding  additional temporary total disability benefits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff sued for damages for the destruction of a tractor and trailer and for the loss of its
use. Defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that loss of use and/or loss of profits
cannot be recovered because the property was destroyed and it was not unique. The jury
found liability for the destruction of the property and for loss of use and/or loss of profits.
The trial court then granted a directed verdict on the loss of use/loss of profits, stating that
such damages cannot be recovered for destroyed property. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

The appellee in this case filed a motion to dismiss appeal on July 20, 2012, arguing that the judgment of divorce entered by the trial court on December 6, 2010, is not a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken and the appellate record on file is therefore incomplete. The orders entered by the trial court on July 9, 2012, confirm that the notice of appeal was filed prematurely, as all claims between the parties have not yet been resolved. The appellant did not file a response to the motion. Our review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Marcus Anderson, of domestic assault by causing reasonable fear of bodily injury, and he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on domestic assault by causing reasonable fear of bodily injury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A show cause order was entered in this case on August 16, 2012, directing the non-attorney father of the minor child in this case to state why this appeal should not be dismissed based upon his filing of the notice of appeal on behalf of his son and without the benefit of counsel. The father responded to the show cause order, but his contentions do not cure the defect in the notice of appeal. Our review of the record reveals that this court lacks jurisdiction. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Larry Boyd, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which led him to enter a guilty plea “under duress.” Specifically, he asserts that counsel “refused” to set the case for trial and failed to investigate the facts of the case, interview key witnesses, and adequately communicate with him. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Chester Carr Peterson, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a sentence that included community corrections. The Defendant’s community corrections officer filed a violation warrant, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Joseph Davison, was convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to twelve years for each count, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the fact that the original charges filed against him only identified his DNA profile, and he was not identified by name until after the statute of limitations had expired. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, who sustained injuries while attempting to repair a piece of food service equipment, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Later, the employer terminated the employee, alleging misconduct in the performance of his duties. The trial court ruled that because the employer had discharged the employee in retaliation for the claim, the employee did not have a meaningful return to work and, furthermore, was entitled to the statutory maximum of six times the medical impairment. The employer appealed. Because the evidence supports the ruling of the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Edward Kilby, III, pled guilty to felony reckless endangerment and reckless aggravated assault. For the felony reckless endangerment conviction, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence, ordering the Defendant to serve six months of incarceration before release to the community corrections program. For the reckless aggravated assault conviction, the trial court imposed a four-year sentence, ordering the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days of incarceration before release to the community corrections program. The trial court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of six years, to serve eighteen months of incarceration followed by community corrections. In this appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court improperly ordered the Defendant to serve more than one year in split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant. As such, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand the cases for a new sentencing hearing.

Appellant, Larry D. McGuire, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for felon in possession of a handgun. After a guilty plea, Appellant was sentenced to two years in incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. After several months in incarceration, Appellant was granted determinate release. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed. Appellant’s probation was partially revoked for time served and Appellant was reinstated to a new, two-year term of probation. A second probation violation warrant was filed. After a hearing, Appellant’s probation was revoked. The trial court ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. Appellant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in determining that he violated his probation and ordering that he serve the sentence in incarceration. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued a draft permit allowing a proposed rock quarry to discharge storm water and wastewater into a nearby creek. Owners of property allegedly affected by the discharge filed a declaratory order petition with the Water Quality Control Board, seeking a declaration construing the rules regarding the protection of existing uses of waters.The Water Quality Control Board dismissed the petition as not ripe. The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation subsequently issued a final permit to the quarry and the property owners filed both a permit appeal and another declaratory order petition with the Water Quality Control Board. The Water Quality Control Board again dismissed the declaratory order petition. The property owners subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the Davidson County Chancery Court. The Water Quality Control Board and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation argued that the petition was not ripe and that the property owners had not exhausted their administrative remedies. In addition, the Water Quality Control Board and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation argued that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 69-3-105(i) precluded the property owners from bringing a declaratory order petition prior to issuance of a permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the property owners and issued a declaratory judgment on the construction of Tennessee Compiled Rule and Regulation 1200-04-03-.06. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 69-3-105(i), but reverse the grant of summary judgment on the construction of Tennessee Compiled Rule and Regulation 1200-04-03-.06 and remand for further proceedings.
 

Defendant, Charles Reginald Underwood, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposition of a sentence of confinement. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Richard Dale Capps, charging him with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. An indictment was also returned against co-defendant Sarah Malone charging her with conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. The present appeal only involves Defendant. Following a joint jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Co-defendant Malone was convicted as charged. Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years for aggravated assault and six years for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with the sentences to be served concurrently in confinement. Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault merged with his conviction for aggravated assault. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request to admit the prior inconsistent statements of Andrew Pugh and Maurice Smith as substantive evidence; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender because the State did not give timely notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed suit for benefits, alleging that he aggravated a back injury while performing his job responsibilities. His employer contended that the incident resulted only in an increase in pain from a pre-existing injury and was not, therefore, compensable. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found in favor of the employee and, using an eight percent medical impairment rating and a multiplier of one and one-half times the medical impairment rating, awarded permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that a compensable injury occurred and, alternatively, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee was entitled to an eight percent medical impairment rating. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a human resources director, slipped and fell while performing her job responsibilities. The employee did not return to work following the incident and was subsequently terminated. Although the employee received temporary total disability benefits, she filed suit alleging that she was entitled to additional temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. While concluding that the employee had sustained a 19% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, the trial court capped the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating because the employee was not denied a meaningful return to work. The employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that she had a meaningful return to work. She also contends that she is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. In response, the employer asserts that the 19% impairment rating is excessive. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, the judgment is affirmed.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Anthony P.D. (“Father”) to the minor child Chyna L.M.D. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence of grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The petitioner, Patrick Trawick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him not to testify at trial, which precluded him from presenting his only viable defense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jerry Lee Hunter, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that his entry of a guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After purchasing a home, the plaintiffs sued the sellers’ real estate agent under the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act for failing to disclose that work was done on the foundation of the home prior to the purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment to the real estate agent, finding that she had no knowledge of adverse facts as defined by the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner, Joshua Jameel Bond, filed this petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2009 guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder, which was amended from first degree murder. Petitioner agreed to an out-of-range sentence of forty years. As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate certain witnesses and evidence and that he was unaware of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. Our review of the record and the parties’ briefs reveals no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court entered an order of involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) in this action for malicious prosecution. We affirm.

The defendant, Charles W. White, Sr., was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”) by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but forty-eight hours suspended. His driver’s license was also suspended for one year for violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the stop of his vehicle. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A grand jury indicted appellant, Michael Jarvis Shipp, for one count of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. A jury found him guilty of first degree murder and the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life and eight years, respectively. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence underlying both counts. We find that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant on both counts and affirm the judgments of the trial court.