APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Steven James Rollins, filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief on all grounds related to the guilt phase of the trial but granted a new sentencing hearing on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State is not challenging the grant of a new sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s ruling denying relief as to the guilt phase of the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that a biased juror served on his jury, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to voir dire potential jurors properly, and that his mental retardation exempts him from the death penalty. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner was denied his constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Petitioner’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Brenda Holliman, of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, she filed the instant petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a co-defendant recanted statements he made at his guilty plea hearing and that the recantation constitutes newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition based on the statute of limitations. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

I concur with the majority’s decision in all respects, except the decision to affirm the dismissal of the medical battery claim against Dr. Nguyen pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).
 

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Bernette Driver, of facilitation of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I standard offender, to six years for the facilitation of aggravated robbery conviction and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the show-up identification; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of aggravated robbery; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for the conviction of facilitation of aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Anthony P.D. (“Father”) to the minor child Chyna L.M.D. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence of grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The petitioner, Patrick Trawick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him not to testify at trial, which precluded him from presenting his only viable defense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jerry Lee Hunter, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that his entry of a guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After purchasing a home, the plaintiffs sued the sellers’ real estate agent under the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act for failing to disclose that work was done on the foundation of the home prior to the purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment to the real estate agent, finding that she had no knowledge of adverse facts as defined by the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner, Joshua Jameel Bond, filed this petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2009 guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder, which was amended from first degree murder. Petitioner agreed to an out-of-range sentence of forty years. As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate certain witnesses and evidence and that he was unaware of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. Our review of the record and the parties’ briefs reveals no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court entered an order of involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) in this action for malicious prosecution. We affirm.

The defendant, Charles W. White, Sr., was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”) by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but forty-eight hours suspended. His driver’s license was also suspended for one year for violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the stop of his vehicle. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Jefferson County jury convicted appellant, Brandon Sean Sutton, of first degree murder, and he received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted certain photographs; (3) emotional displays from the victim’s family violated his right to a fair trial; (4) the evidence did not support the sentence of life without parole; (5) the victim impact evidence was improper; and (6) the trial judge did not follow proper procedure when selecting the manner in which he removed alternate jurors. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The capital Petitioner, William Glenn Rogers, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s order denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his merged first degree murder conviction and death sentence for the killing of nine-year-old Jacqueline Beard, as well as his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of criminal impersonation. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty-eight (48) years’ imprisonment for his non-capital offenses. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this action, the plaintiff has attempted to assert claims for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against nursing home defendants by filing two separate actions and then seeking to consolidate the cases or to amend the complaint to assert both types of claims in one case. The first complaint filed only asserted claims for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants. Sixty days after having given the statutory notice to the healthcare providers of her intent to file medical malpractice claims, the plaintiff commenced a separate action against the same nursing home defendants and an additional defendant, a physician who treated the nursing home patient, by filing a complaint for medical malpractice. Upon motions of the nursing home defendants, the trial court refused to consolidate the cases, dismissed the medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants upon the ground of a prior suit pending, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in the first case to add claims for medical malpractice against the nursing home defendants. Having determined that the plaintiff complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26121(a) by giving the requisite 60 days notice to the medical providers and that the statute of limitations had not run, we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 motion to amend the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants thus allowing the plaintiff to assert medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

Defendant, Jonathan Austin, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Harold Bernard Schaffer (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (4) the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The plaintiff, a producer of construction aggregates, acquired property with proven reserves for mining and quarrying operations. Afterward, Jefferson County enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance limiting the use of the property to agricultural purposes. Before the passage of the ordinance, the plaintiff undertook various activities designed to establish business operations. When the county issued a stop work order, the plaintiff, without first receiving a decision from the county’s board of zoning appeals, filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that the portion of the property not previously subject to zoning qualified as a pre-existing non-conforming use, protected by Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208 (1992). After concluding that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies, the trial court ruled that the business activities on the property were “in operation” at the effective date of the ordinance for purposes of grandfather protection under section 137-208. Because the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the judgment was set aside. We hold that the trial court, under these circumstances, did not err by ruling that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had established operations sufficient to qualify for protection under Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Ready Mix, USA, LLC’s activities on its property established pre-existing use and, therefore, qualify for protection under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 (2011). I base my decision entirely on our prior precedents construing Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 without any consideration, directly or indirectly, of the diminishing assets doctrine.
 

This action arises from an automobile accident. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on Plaintiff’s claim for damages for medical expenses at the close of proof. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by granting the directed verdict on his claim for medical expenses. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Mauricio Morales, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of three counts of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated burglary, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the 100-year effective sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case arises from an accident involving two semi-trucks. The truck owned by Appellee trucking company rear-ended the truck driven by Appellant, causing injury to Appellant’s back. Litigation ensued and the Appellee filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of Appellant’s medical expert’s testimony concerning Appellant’s possible future need for surgery and the costs thereof. The trial court granted the motion, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm

The Defendant, Curtis Harper, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2010), 39-12-101(a) (2010), 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2008) (amended 2009), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A) (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011). The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions into the attempted second degree murder conviction, and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement for attempted second degree murder and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we vacate the aggravated assault and attempted second degree murder judgments and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the merger of the aggravated assault convictions into the conviction for attempted second degree murder.

The Defendant, Kendell Edward Johnson, appeals from his jury conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by admitting the redacted recording of a conversation between the Defendant and his father made at the police station following the Defendant’s arrest on an unrelated charge, (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the irrelevant testimony of the victim’s brother, and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a condemnation case.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the landowners, finding that Appellant MLGW's attempted condemnation was not necessary. The evidence clearly establishes that MLGW had the right to take, and that the taking was for a public purpose. Therefore, the burden fell to Appellees to show that MLGW’s taking was arbitrary or capricious. The evidence contained in the record does not establish that the taking was arbitrary or capricious with the result being that the condemnation is “conclusive upon the court.” Because the court considered necessity and location in contravention of MLGW’s condemnation power, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court.

Appellant, Roger Harper, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to three years and six months. The trial court set the sentence to run consecutivelyto a five-year diversion sentence imposed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 that Appellant was serving from another case. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred because: (1) the jury failed to specify that it found the aggravating factors required to find Appellant guilty of a Class D felony and furthermore, the trial court sentenced Appellant as if the conviction was a Class D felony; (2) Appellant’s sentence is excessive due to the presence of mitigating factors that the trial court failed to find; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the trial court committed no error. However, the judgment form must be corrected to reflect that Appellant was convicted of the Class D felony. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence but remand for the trial court to enter a corrected judgment.