APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Blair Wood and Gary Wood (“Plaintiffs”) sued Tony Wolfenbarger and Brenda Wolfenbarger (“Defendants”) alleging, in part, that Defendants had wrongfully cut down six trees on Plaintiffs’ real property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendants were liable for negligently cutting the trees, that the current market value of the timber cut was $840, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment in double the amount of the current market value of the timber pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-28-312. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court alleging that the Trial Court erred in awarding damages based upon the timber value. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the finding that timber value was the correct measure of damages in this case. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment to award Plaintiffs damages of $62,100 based upon the trunk formula method of valuation and affirm the judgment as so modified.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to have the appellees held in criminal contempt based upon their failure to comply with various subpoenas commanding them to appear at depositions and produce documents to be used by the appellants in the context of an administrative asset forfeiture proceeding on the docket of the Tennessee Department of Safety. The petition was filed in the Criminal Court for Knox County, Tennessee. It was denied on grounds that the court in which the petition was filed had no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The appellants appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a parental termination and adoption decree. The motion asked relief from the Judgment on the ground set forth in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 62.02(1) and (2). The Trial Court held that petitioner did not establish a basis to set aside the Judgment on the grounds relied upon in the Rule 60.02 motion. On appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Losing proposer for solid waste management services challenges Lawrence County’s decision to contract with another proposer. Because we find that the County acted arbitrarily and illegally in making its decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
 

Property of the appellants was seized following a traffic stop. Requests for return of the property were denied by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department. The appellants, who were not facing any criminal charges, filed an action in criminal court seeking the return of all the seized property. The Sheriff’s Department subsequently filed drug forfeiture warrants and property receipts. The appellants argued that the Sheriff’s Department was attempting to initiate Department of Safety jurisdiction in disregard of their earlier filing in criminal court. The criminal court dismissed the action, asserting lack of jurisdiction. The appellants appeal. We affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued a permit allowing a proposed rock quarry to discharge storm water and wastewater into a nearby creek. Owners of property allegedly affected by the discharge filed an appeal challenging the issuance of the permit with the Water Quality Control Board, as well as a petition seeking a declaratory order construing the rules regarding the protection of existing uses of waters. The Water Quality Control Board refused to issue a declaratory order and the property owners appealed to the Davidson County Chancery Court. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested,we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for dismissal of this cause. Vacated and remanded.
 

Petitioner, Andrew D. Harville, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony evading arrest. Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment for his murder conviction and two years for evading arrest, and his sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions can be found in this Court’s opinion in State v. Andrew Deon Harville, No. W2008-02375-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 571786 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Feb. 19, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 16, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Craig O. Majors, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary in Montgomery County. See Craig O. Majors v. State,No.M2009-00483-R3-CD,2010 WL 2483512 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, Jun. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2010). Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. at *1. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed

At issue is the scope of a binding arbitration clause in a federally-reinsured multiple peril crop insurance policy and the scope of federal preemption of common law claims. The insured, a nursery in Warren County, Tennessee, suffered a catastrophic loss of stock, primarily trees and shrubs, due to a tornado on April 7, 2006. The insured submitted a claim in excess of a million dollars. The adjuster determined, due to “under-reporting of inventory”, that the insured was only entitled to recover $195,225. The insured demanded arbitration; the arbitrator ruled that the insured was due no additional payment. Thereafter, the insured filed this action asserting common law claims against the insurer, its adjustment firm, and the independent insurance agency that solicited the policy, for breach of contract, negligence, breach of the duty of care, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory bad faith. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against the insurer and its adjustment firm finding the claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata because the issues were decided at arbitration and that the insured’s only remedy was judicial review of the arbitration decision. On appeal, the insured contends that its state law claims were not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Appellees disagree and additionally assert that the insured’s common law claims are preempted by federal law. We have determined the claims for breach of contract, breach of duty of care, and statutory bad faith are preempted by federal law; however, the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not preempted by federal law and are not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this action for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

This is the second of two similar but separate civil actions and appeals among the same
parties. At issue is the scope of a binding arbitration clause in a federally-reinsured multiple
peril crop insurance policy and the scope of federal preemption of common law claims. The
insured, a nursery in Warren County, Tennessee, suffered a catastrophic loss of stock,
primarily trees and shrubs, due to a severe freeze in April of 2007. The insured submitted a
claim for indemnity. The adjuster determined, due to “under-reporting of inventory”, that the
insured was only entitled to recover $115,822. Instead of pursuing arbitration pursuant to the
policy of insurance, the insured filed this action asserting common law claims against the
insurer, its adjustment firm, and the independent insurance agency that solicited the policy,
for negligent misrepresentation, breach of duty of care, negligence, breach of contract, and
statutory bad faith. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against the insurer and its
adjustment firm finding there were no issues of material fact and the insurers were entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law because the policy mandated arbitration. On appeal,
the insured contends that its state law claims are not barred by the policy. The insurer and its
adjustment firm disagree contending that all claims related to the insurance policy must be
submitted to arbitration and additionally assert that the insured’s common law claims are
preempted by federal law. We have determined the claims for breach of contract, breach of
duty of care, and statutory bad faith are preempted by federal law; however, the claims for
negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not preempted by federal law and these two
claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

The Defendant, Francisco Javier Ancona, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and employing a handgun during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.§§ 39-13-202,39-13-403,39-14-403, 39-13-102, 39-17-1324(b) (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, fifteen years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction to be served concurrently with the first degree murder conviction, nine years for the aggravated burglary conviction to be served consecutively to the first degree murder conviction but concurrently with the aggravated assault conviction, nine years for the aggravated assault conviction to be served consecutively to the first degree murder conviction but concurrently with the aggravated burglary conviction, and nine years for employing a handgun during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction to be served consecutively to the aggravated burglary conviction, resulting in an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements of the Defendant’s co-defendants into evidence at the trial; (3) the trial court erred by failing to redact a statement made by a co-defendant to the police from a telephone recording played at the trial; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the indictment to include a greater offense than originally charged; (5) the trial court erred by allowing separate convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary; and (6) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Krystal Bowman, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his conviction of aggravated assault and accompanying 10-year sentence of incarceration, the defendant, Yoni Sales Barahona, appeals, alleging some 21 assignments of error. Some of the issues have been waived, and others are redundant. The defendant’s reviewable challenges are these: (1) the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim, (3) the trial court erred by admitting the identification of the defendant by both the victim and a witness, (4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a knife recovered from the scene, (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (6) the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error in either the conviction or the sentence, we affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Isiah Buckley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the petitioner pled guilty, as a Range I offender, to facilitation of second-degree murder, a Class B felony, and received an out-of-range sentence of fifteen years, with the manner of service to be determined. After a hearing, the petitioner was ordered to serve the sentence. In the instant appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically,he contends trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to inform the trial court of withheld exculpatory evidence; and (2) failing to investigate and to interview witnesses. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Attorney representing the husband in a divorce proceeding claimed a statutory lien on funds in his trust account to secure payment of his fee; the attorney filed a separate action seeking a determination of his rights to funds held in his trust account. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Finding that the court dismissed the case employing an erroneous legal standard, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Michael Scott Farner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1988 guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder, assault with intent to commit first degree murder, and seconddegree burglary are void because his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and because his sentences are illegal. Because we perceive no error in the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Ericka Barfield, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation and order that she serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Gregory D. Valentine, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of  Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on Defendant’s motion.

Appellants attempted to appeal the decision of the General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court without filing an appeal bond, but the Circuit Court dismissed the attempted appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants claim that an appeal bond need not be filed where an appeal filing fee is paid. We find that, to perfect an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court, an appeal bond must be filed; payment of the appeal filing fee does not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the matter.

The defendant, Walter Lavar Wright, pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and received a Range I sentence of nine years’ incarceration. Following the successful completion of “boot camp,” the defendant was placed on probation. On January 20, 2011, a probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant violated the terms of his release by garnering a new arrest, failing to report to his probation officer, failing to maintain employment, and failing to pay fines and costs. At the hearing, the defendant admitted to many of the allegations. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In this timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.

The defendant, John Wesley Shutt, pled guilty to first offense DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. As part of his plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law: “whether the officer had probable cause to make the arrest.” After careful review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the officer involved had probable cause to arrest the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between brothers. One brother owned an apartment complex and leased one of the apartments to his brother. The tenant brother allegedly failed to pay rent to the landlord brother. The landlord brother filed a forcible entry and detainer action in general sessions court seeking possession of the property and a judgment for the unpaid rent. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the landlord brother. The tenant brother appealed to circuit court. The circuit court conducted a trial de novo. After the trial, the circuit court awarded the landlord brother possession of the property and a judgment for the unpaid rent. The tenant brother now appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Brenda Holliman, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. She received concurrent sentences of life without parole and fifteen years. The victim was Petitioner’s husband. Her convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Brenda Holliman, No. W2003-01736-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 819735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2005) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). She timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended. Following an evidentiary hearing the petition was dismissed. Petitioner has timely appealed. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Monica Rankin, pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, aggravated statutory rape, exploitation of a minor by electronic means, solicitation to commit aggravated statutory rape,and solicitation to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective sentence of five years and ordered her to serve six months in confinement, followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it:
(1) applied enhancement factors and failed to apply mitigating factors; (2) denied her full probation; and (3) denied her request for a variance from the probation rule prohibiting internet access for sex offenders. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

April Hunter Rigsby (Edmonds) (“Mother”) and Aaron R. Edmonds (“Father”) divorced in 2008. Mother and Father are the parents of the minor child, Elijah E. (“the Child”). In the permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce, Mother was designated as the Child’s primary residential parent. Mother and Father were to have equal time with the Child. Mother later petitioned the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to relocate with the Child. The Trial Court granted Mother’s petition. In 2011, Father filed a petition to modify the final decree of divorce, attached to which was his new proposed permanent parenting plan wherein he requested to be designated the Child’s primary residential parent. Father argued, among other things, that because the Child was approaching school age, the child would be better served going to school in Father’s community. Mother filed an answer to Father’s petition, including her own proposed new permanent parenting plan. The Trial Court found in favor of Father, designated Father as the new primary residential parent of the Child, and set a new parenting schedule. The Trial Court also ordered Mother to pay child support. Mother appeals. We hold that no material change of circumstances occurred to justify a change in the Child’s primary residential parent. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part.