APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case, the Trial Court initially granted plaintiff a default judgment against the defendant, and set a trial on the issue of damages. Defendant was given notice of the subsequent hearing, and defendant's attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed plaintiff's case. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Rebecca W. Ford (“Plaintiff”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s daughter, Lynsey M. Ford. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reversed the Trial Court’s judgment as to Zachary L. Robinson being solely at fault, and held that the State was 50% at fault for the Accident in our Opinion in Robinson v. State, docket No. E2011-01540-COA-R3-CV (“Robinson v. State”), released contemporaneously with this Opinion. We, therefore, remand this case to the Trial Court for the calculation of damages awarded to Plaintiff from the State for the death of Lynsey M. Ford.

Defendant, who was arrested for DUI and subsequently refused to submit to a blood test, appeals the revocation of his driver’s license, contending that he was not properly informed of the consequences of refusal to take the test. We hold that the defendant was adequately advised under the circumstances presented and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Hamilton County Criminal Court grand jury charged the defendant, Derrick Keith Walker, with one count of attempt to commit the premeditated first degree murder of the victim, Charles Vandergriff, and one count of the aggravated assault of the victim. The defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement calling for dismissal of the attempted murder count and a plea of guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with a six-year Range I sentence to be served as 11 months and 29 days in confinement followed by supervised probation. The agreement provided for the defendant to pay $13,000 in restitution at the rate of $175 per month beginning on March 15, 2010. On December 17, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment that implemented the terms of the plea agreement. In August 2011, the State obtained a probation violation warrant claiming that the defendant garnered new arrests and had failed to pay restitution. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him into confinement to serve the balance of his sentence. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking the probation and by ordering him to fully serve his original sentence. Because the record supports the order of the trial court, we affirm the order.

The Defendant, Jason Peter Meeks, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, and leaving the scene of an accident, all misdemeanor offenses. The Defendant appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, contending that he should be granted a new trial because the State failed to record his trial. We disagree with the Defendant’s claim and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Victor Byndum, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for two violations of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordering him to serve his six-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order appointing a conservator for the adult son of divorced parents. The father contends that the evidence does not support the determinations that the son lacks the capacity to fully attend to his needs without assistance and that the appointment of a conservator is warranted; Mother contends that the father does not have standing to appeal. We affirm the court in all respects.

The parties married twice and divorced twice. Under the terms of their second divorce decree, the wife was awarded the marital home, the husband and wife were made jointly responsible for the mortgage on the home, and the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro of $1,200 per month. About five years after their second divorce became final, the husband filed a petition to terminate or to modify his alimony obligation. He alleged among other things that his income had declined and that his wife no longer needed his support, as demonstrated by her conveyance of the marital home without consideration to the party’s son, and her relationship with her new boyfriend. For her part, the wife petitioned the trial court to increase the husband’s alimony obligation, alleging that her need had actually increased because her physical ailments had worsened and that the monthly cost of medications to treat them had soared. The trial court denied both petitions. We affirm

The appellant, Glenda Nash Clemmons, pled guilty in the Marion County Circuit Court to failure to appear in case numbers 8109 and 8721. In case number 8109, the trial court sentenced her to two years to be served as sixty days in jail and one year, ten months in community corrections. In case number 8271, the trial court sentenced her to three years to be served in community corrections and consecutively to the two-year sentence in case number 8109. Subsequently, the trial court revoked her community corrections sentences and ordered her to serve her effective five-year sentence in confinement. The appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her community corrections sentences and ordering her to serve her original sentences in confinement. She also contends that she did not receive all the jail credits to which she was entitled. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Appellant filed a motion to correct a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The trial court subsequently entered an order denying the Appellant’s motion. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion. Because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of a Rule 36 motion to correct a judgment, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises out of a personal injury suit, wherein the plaintiff and Dewayne Duffer filed suit against a trucking company for injuries suffered in an accident and for loss of consortium as a result of the accident. Plaintiff’s employer intervened to recover worker’s compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Soon thereafter, the trucking company discovered that plaintiff was male, had filed the action using an assumed female identity, and had lied throughout the discovery process. The trucking company filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s and employer’s complaints,finding that plaintiff had committed a fraud upon the courtand thatemployerhad failed to file suitwithin the applicable statute of limitations because plaintiff’scomplaintwas rendered void ab initio. Plaintiff and employer appeal. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint but reverse the dismissal of employer’s complaint.
 

The mother of a five year old boy alleged that the boy’s father had sexually abused him, and she petitioned the juvenile court to have the father’s visitation privileges revoked. After a long course of proceedings that included an investigation by the Department of Children’s Services, testimony by a number of mental health professionals, and a report by the guardian ad litem, the court concluded that the Mother’s allegations were unfounded, that her hostility against the father was having a detrimental effect on the child, and that it was in the child’s best interest that the father be named as the child’s primary residential parent in place of the mother. The mother raises numerous procedural issues on appeal, and she also contends that her allegations of abuse against the father were true, or at the very least that she had a good faith belief in their truth. Having carefully considered the mother’s allegations and her arguments, we affirm the trial court.
 

In this appeal, numerous beneficiaries under a will challenge the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees of $9,024.75 out of the funds of the estate to another beneficiary who is their adversary. At an earlier time, the court had entered an order setting the attorney’s fees of that beneficiary at $34,669.25 without specifying who was responsible for the payment of those fees. On the motion of that beneficiary, the court granted a new trial on the subject of attorney’s fees. When the matter came on for the “new trial,” the court announced that it would listen to argument but would not receive substantive evidence on the subject. Following that “hearing,” the court awarded the fees now before us. The court’s order does not articulate any findings with respect to whether the attorney’s services were reasonable, necessary or benefited the estate. The “challenging” beneficiaries filed a notice of appeal. We vacate the order awarding attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order on attorney’s fees complying with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A grand jury indicted appellant for possession of a substance containing .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (a)(4), a Class A felony. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight years and 270 days and placed him on probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify several questions of law challenging the validity of the search that yielded the evidence against him. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This action was filed after the defendant, a life insurance company, denied payment of benefits on the grounds that the decedent/insured made material misrepresentations in her application for life insurance. The specific basis for the denial was that the insured allegedly failed to disclose “methadone treatment for a narcotic addiction.” The trial court found there was no proof that the insured was taking methadone at the time of the application or that she was ever treated for “drug related problems.” On this basis, the trial court concluded the insured did not make anymisrepresentations in her application for life insurance and ordered the defendant to pay the death benefit plus pre-judgment interest. We affirm.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. On appeal, the sole issue presented by Mother is whether the trial court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burgess, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape and two counts of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, for which he is serving an effective twenty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. He also contends that the trial court erred in treating his letters as a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parental rights of the parents of three children were terminated on two statutory grounds, persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3), and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2), and the finding that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Both parents appeal contending the trial court erred in finding any ground existed for termination and that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee insurance company. Appellee denied Appellant’s claim for fire loss on the ground that Appellant made material misrepresentations in the application for insurance. The trial court determined that Appellant took contradictory positions in his examination under oath and in his discovery deposition on the question of whether his application for insurance was completed when he signed it, or whether he signed it in blank before it was completed by the insurance agent. The trial court determined that Appellant’s inconsistent statements were not effective to create a dispute of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. We conclude that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted. Reversed and remanded.
 

Wade Robinson and Melanie Robinson (“Plaintiffs”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiffs’ son, Zachary L. Robinson. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s findings that the State did not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I), that the State did not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that Zachary L. Robinson was the sole proximate cause of the accident. We find and hold that Zachary L. Robinson was 50% at fault for the accident and that the State was 50% at fault for the accident.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of four counts of rape, Class B felonies, and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies. The defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the prosecution committed misconduct during closing argument, and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence on a single rape count consecutive to his remaining concurrent sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Keisha M. Howard, was indicted for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and for violating the Tennessee Computer Act, both Class B felonies. She entered guilty pleas to the offenses as charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of her sentence as well as the amount of restitution, if any. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(5), -602(a)(1) (2006). The trial court sentenced Howard as a Range I, standard offender and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years. Under the special conditions in the theft judgment, the court ordered that Howard “may apply to Community Corrections” and that she “owes $215,000 [and] cannot pay that amount but must pay no less than $200 a month.” Howard filed a motion to clarify the total amount of restitution owed, and the trial court, in determining that its previous judgment regarding restitution violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(c), ordered Howard to pay $1,000 per month for eight years, for a total of $96,000 in restitution. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court’s order requiring her to pay $96,000 in restitution was unreasonable, given her financial resources and ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order that Howard pay $1,000 per month for eight years for a total of $96,000 in restitution, and we amend the judgments to show that the victim’s loss in this case is $156,951.30 and that the restitution, based on the proof established of Howard’s present ability to pay, is reduced to $48,000, which shall be paid at the rate of $500 per month for eight years. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

The great aunt and the great-grandmother of a little girl obtained an emergency order giving them temporary custody of the child when she was less than eight months old. The child’s mother was informed that she was entitled to appear at a preliminary hearing and an adjudicative hearing on a more permanent custody order, but she failed to appear for those hearings. The trial court found that the child was dependent and neglected, and awarded custody of the child to her two older relatives. They subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of abandonment and of persistence of conditions. The trial court found that both grounds were proved and granted the petition. We affirm the termination on the ground of persistence of conditions.
 

This case arose from a dispute between neighbors over the ownership of an elaborate stone and metal gate used for entry into both their residential properties. The predecessors-ininterest of the defendants installed the gate at their own expense, placing it on an easement over the plaintiffs’ adjoining lot. The plaintiffs decided to sell their house, and included a picture and a description of the gate in their real estate listing and advertisements. The defendants asserted that they owned the gate and compelled the plaintiffs’ realtor to remove all mention of the gate from sales materials. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to quiet title. After a bench trial, the court found that the gate belonged to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred because the gate is a fixture and, thus, that it has become part of the plaintiffs’ property by operation of law. We affirm the trial court.