APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Homeowner challenges the trial court’s dismissal at the summary judgment stage of all of her claims against lenders. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the homeowner’s claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of the Truth-In-Lending Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of her claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
 

Plaintiffs, who voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit, appeal the trial court’s award of discretionary costs to the defendants. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
 

An employee viewed the bodies of co-workers who had died as a result of work accidents on two separate occasions in February and April 2008. On June 23, 2008, the employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the two incidents. On June 23,2009, the employee requested a benefit review conference. The employer filed a complaint to determine the amount of workers’ compensation benefits due. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the second accident and that the claim was therefore barred. The employee contended that the statute did not begin to run until the date of his diagnosis and that his claim was timely. The trial court granted the employer’s motion. The employee appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with the trial court’s alternative findings.
 

Much aggrieved by his convictions of aggravated rape and robbery and resulting 23-year sentence of imprisonment, the petitioner, Ricky Lee Morgan, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

Wilson County appeals from the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed order of compromise and settlement based upon its contention that the agreement would violate a policy of the Wilson County Road Commission and that it “forgot” the policy when entering into the agreed order. The county also appeals from the trial court’s finding that it was in contempt of the agreed order and must comply with the order within six months, the trial court’s denial of its request to stay the judgment, and the trial court’s award of $750 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
 

The Petitioner, Cleven Johnson, pled guilty to several charges that spanned six different cases: one count of attempting to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free zone; three counts of possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony; one count of evading arrest; two counts of driving on a suspended license; two counts of driving without insurance; one count of driving under the influence, first offense; one count of simple possession of marijuana; one count of possession of a weapon; two counts of aggravated burglary; six counts of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; one count of aggravated robbery; two counts of aggravated assault; one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery; one count of especially aggravated burglary; and one count of attempted first degree murder. The plea agreement included a total effective sentence of forty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

After being indicted for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), reckless driving, and violation of the implied consent law, Defendant, Evan Deyo, entered into a negotiated plea agreement and reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question reserved for appeal specifically states the issue as: “whether the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that his pre-trial detention was not for a valid remedial purpose but rather was punitive.” After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jesse Wade Glover, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of facilitation of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class E felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years incarceration. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jesse Wade Glover, No. W2008-00185- CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2015230 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed July 13, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 23, 2009). A summary of the facts underlying Defendant’s conviction can be found in this Court’s opinion cited above. Defendant timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, asserting as grounds that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Demance Beasley, of first degree felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for felony murder because the State’s witnesses provided inconsistent testimony and were not credible. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, James Britt, charging him with premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting two autopsy photographs. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jason M. Justice, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jason M. Justice, No. W2008-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1741398 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 15, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 23, 2009). An appellate summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction can be found at this Court’s opinion cited herein. In this appeal as of right, Petitioner asserts: 1) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; 2) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the post-conviction proceedings; and 3) the post-conviction court erred by denying Petitioner’s requests to have his post-conviction counsel relieved and the post-conviction hearing continued. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Weldon Christopher Frazier, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his initial statements to the police, (2) not granting a mistrial after a witness for the State mentioned polygraphs, plea negotiations, and used the word “confession” to characterize the Defendant’s statements to the police, and (3) refusing to give a jury instruction regarding his not fleeing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dwight Randy Rowe, pled guilty to sale of a controlled substance in a drug-free school zone and to possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective because he incorrectly advised him of parole eligibility and failed to throughly investigate the case or prepare a defense. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves various claims by a beneficiary of several trusts against his sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. The defendants/trustees filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void either because they were fabricated, or because he executed them due to undue influence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and the beneficiary voluntarily dismissed all of his remaining claims. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was severely injured when a padlock, which was allegedly thrown from a City of Memphis mower, broke through her vehicle window. Plaintiff and her husband successfully sued the City. On appeal, the City argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of the Public Duty Doctrine. Because the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to amend fails to explain the basis for its denial, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a reasoned explanation of its actions regarding the City’s motion to amend its answer.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to continue and awarded summary judgment to Defendant Bank. We affirm.

Wife appeals the trial court’s classification of property and its division of marital property following the parties’ divorce. She also argues that Husband failed to demonstrate his need for spousal support and that the award exceeds Husband’s actual need. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. We find it appropriate to award Husband his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of such fees reasonably incurred.

The Defendant, Jacob Aaron Faulkner, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. Under the terms of the agreement, he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to probation following the service of forty-eight hours. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he violated the “move over law.” After our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and there is no reason justifying waiver of the filing requirement.
 

An employee filed a motion requesting that a former employer be ordered to provide postjudgment medical treatment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the employee’s motion. The former employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting the employee’s motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Edward Niles, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. On appeal, Niles argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his ex parte motion for funds for a psychiatrist. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this divorce action, Father appeals certain provisions of the parenting plan, the award of rehabilitative alimony and award of counsel fees to Wife, and the finding that he was in criminal contempt. Mother appeals the valuation and division of marital assets, the failure of the court to require that payments to Mother be secured, rulings with reference to certain pre-trial matters, and the classification of alimony. We remand the case for further consideration of the amount of Father’s annual contributions into the children’s educational accounts; we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the requirements for rehabilitative alimony. All types of alimony are statutory, and the legislature’s definitions must be applied. The legislature has stated that it intends that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, through an award of rehabilitative alimony, whenever rehabilitation possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2).
 

The petitioner, Melvin J. Reed, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations in his case. Because we agree that the petitioner alleged grounds for due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, we reverse the dismissal of his petition and remand the case for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations.
 

The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

Donna J.S. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ethin E.S. and Mary J.C. (collectively “the Children”). The younger child, Ethin, was born drug-exposed and required intensive care for treatment of his withdrawal symptoms. As a result, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) became involved. In the weeks after Ethin’s birth, a protective order was entered and DCS took temporary custody of the Children. Following a two-day bench trial, the court found that there are multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights and that termination is in the best interest of the Children, both findings by the court said to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges both of these determinations and, in addition, contends that DCS failed to provide reasonable efforts to assist her toward reunification with the Children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.