APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action arising out of a pedestrian-vehicle collision, naming as defendant the owner of the car that allegedlystruck the plaintiff. After discovery, plaintiff amended the complaint to add “John Doe/Jane Doe” as a defendant and served process on her uninsured motorist carrier. Plaintiff subsequently settled with the named defendant and dismissed the action against that defendant; the uninsured motorist insurance carrier then filed a motion to dismiss the uninsured motorist claim. The trial court granted the motion, holding that, in light of the settlement, the uninsured motorist claim no longer existed and dismissed the case. We find that the court erred in dismissing the case.
 

The Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2003 conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred (1) by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim for post-judgment jail credit and (2) by failing to address whether the sentence and judgment are void because the trial court relied on an invalid prior conviction to classify him as a Range III, career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Chudney Valaryck Goff, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his two convictions for sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class B felony, and his effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b) and (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing (a) to provide the Petitioner with the State’s discovery materials before the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas, (b) to provide the Petitioner with a defense, and (c) to communicate adequately and effectively with the Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court awarded the wife a divorce after a marriage of over 30 years and divided the marital property between the parties. The financial assets of the parties were divided more or less equally, but the marital residence, valued at $130,000, was awarded to the wife. To equalize the division of property, the trial court awarded the husband a $65,000 security interest in the residence. The court also ordered the wife to redeem the husband’s security interest by amortizing it over a period of 30 years at an interest rate of 4% a year, which obligated her to pay the husband $310.32 monthly. The sixty-three year old husband argues on appeal that the property division was inequitable as to him because, in light of his age and life expectancy, the security interest in the home was an illusory award. We affirm the division of the property, but conclude that the method for payment of Husband’s share is inequitable under the circumstances. Therefore, we modify the property division so as to award the marital home to the wife and husband in joint tenancy.
 

Pro se Husband filed a complaint for divorce alleging irreconcilable differences. The trial court dismissed Husband’s complaint because it did not conform to the Tennessee statutory requirements. Husband appealed the dismissal of his complaint, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Husband and Wife must comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-103 to be entitled to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case involving siblings, Keara J. and Sierra J. (collectively “the Children”), the minor daughters of Christie J. (“Mother”) and Kenneth J. (“Father”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received a referral from Keara’s pediatrician concerning her persistent lack of growth and development; at some 16 months old, she weighed only 19 lb., and was unable to walk, stand, or speak. DCS immediately removed Keara from her parents’ custody and filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights, alleging that Keara was severely abused as a result of her parents’ neglect. Because of the severe abuse of Keara, she and her later-born sister, Sierra, were placed in separate foster homes. After a bench trial, the court granted the petition and terminated both parents’ rights to the Children. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

A pro se defendant appeals the decision of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a domesticated foreign judgment on the grounds that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case and that the judgment of the foreign court was obtained fraudulently. We affirm the trial court because the foreign court had jurisdiction, the judgment was not the product of fraudulent acts that were pled with specificity, and the judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy.
 

The first time this case was before us, see Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC, No. E2009-00116-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852317 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Sept. 29, 2010) (“Rand I”), we reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment decreeing that Automation Industrial Group, LLC (“Automation”) was not entitled to recover on its counterclaim due to its fraud and we reinstated the trial court’s earlier judgment awarding Automation $2,270,759.22 plus prejudgment interest of $256,705.19. The trial court had entered its earlier judgment against Tennessee Rand, Inc. (“Rand”) on Automation’s counterclaim, and then set it aside on Rand’s motion to alter or amend. Although the parties had not addressed in the first appeal the prejudgment interest portion of the trial court’s earlier judgment, we, without extended discussion, reinstated the prejudgment interest as originally calculated by the trial court. What the parties did not put at issue or otherwise stress in the first appeal was the fact that Rand had challenged, in its motion to alter or amend, the accuracy of the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. In that motion, Rand had argued that the trial court had obviously miscalculated prejudgment interest. In Rand I, we also reversed an award of discretionary costs to Rand because we concluded that Automation was the new prevailing party. Upon remand following our decision in Rand I, Rand asked the trial court to correct the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Rand also asked the court to start the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment on remand. Automation filed a motion for discretionary costs as the new prevailing party. The trial court on remand determined that it had miscalculated prejudgment interest but held that our opinion in Rand I prevented it from granting Rand any relief with respect to the miscalculation as well as with respect to the other relief requested by Rand. The trial court also denied Automation’s motion for discretionary costs, based, at least in part, on Automation’s substantial windfall award of prejudgment interest due to the miscalculation. Rand now appeals the denial of its motions, and Automation challenges the denial of its request for discretionary costs. Automation also asks us to determine an issue pertaining to interest on the unpaid portion of the judgment entered on remand. We conclude that, in the interest of justice, we must take corrective action pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36 by granting Rand relief from the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Since the erroneous and inflated award of prejudgment interest was one of the reasons given by the trial court for denying discretionary costs, we vacate that denial and remand for further consideration of Automation’s request. We affirm that part of the judgment, as modified by us, holding that Automation is entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment in its favor. Rand obtained a stay of collection of Automation’s judgment pending appeal upon posting a bond to cover interest accrued between the original judgment date and the date of the judgment on remand. The amount set by the trial court to obtain a stay did not include interest accrued on the unpaid portion of the judgment. We hold that Automation is entitled to recover post-judgment interest accrued on the judgment. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in part and modified in part. As vacated and modified, the judgment is affirmed.

This case arises from a dispute over an alleged partnership. Douglas Cofer (“Cofer”) filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) against Donnie Harris and Marcia Harris (“the Harrises”, collectively). Cofer alleged that the Harrises were successors in a partnership established between Cofer and the Harrises’ father, Homer Harris, regarding the development of a trailer park on Homer Harris’s land. After a trial, the Trial Court found that, rather than a partnership, a lease relationship existed between the parties. The Trial Court awarded the Harrises damages for unpaid rent. Cofer appeals, raising various issues. The Harrises raise one issue on appeal concerning the calculation of damages. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects.

The circuit court entered a judgment against Defendant following a bench trial. Defendant appealed, but he failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our limited ability to review the proceedings below, we affirm the decision of the
lower court.

The appellant has appealed from an August 30, 2011 final judgment awarding him $1733.00 in damages. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.
 

In this contentious divorce action, after numerous hearings, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce incorporating the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement and the Permanent Parenting Plan. The Court suspended the PPP and reserved the child support issues. The mother appealed, arguing that the Trial Court refused to permit her to produce her argument, and erred in confirming the referee's recommendations. We hold that the record before us does not substantiate her contentions, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Carl Ross, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1995 convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft over $1000, and resulting sentence of 162 years’ confinement. The Petitioner contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as a Range III, career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the principal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will was not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid. The contestant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring the will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did not expresslyrule on the alternative motion for a new trial.The proponent of the will appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict and entering judgment in favor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in its role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.
 

At a proceeding in Juvenile Court, appellant was found guilty of severe child abuse, which she appealed to the Circuit Court. On motion of the Department of Human Services, the Trial Court dismissed the appeal without a trial. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court on the grounds that Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159 requires the Trial Judge to conduct a de novo trial on the appeal from Juvenile Court.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground that Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Father appeals, contending that the pleadings did not allege abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought; Father also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his counter-petition for custody. Because we have concluded that the petitioners failed to plead abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we vacate the termination of Father’s parental rights on that ground and remand for consideration of whether Father’s parental rights should be terminated based on a ground alleged in the petition or supplemental petition; we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s counterpetition for custody.
 

This is a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-14102.The petitioner, who was convicted of three felony drug offenses in Georgia, was granted a full pardon by the State of Georgia that expressly restored his right to possess a firearm, now resides in Tennessee and desires to purchase and possess firearms. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony offense for a person, who has been “convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon” or who has been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm in Tennessee. Therefore, Petitioner filed this action seeking a declaration that he would not be in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) by purchasing or possessing a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee responded to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Second Amendment, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution.The chancery court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the State’s Rule 12.02(1); however, the chancery court granted the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution,the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The State raises one issue on appeal, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed for that reason. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction. As for the decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we have determined that the complaint for declaratory relief states facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy concerning the matter at issue; therefore, the chancery court erred by granting the State’s motion pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) instead of rendering a declaratory judgment as the facts and law require. Accordingly, the complaint for declaratory relief is reinstated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The Petitioner, Lemar Brooks, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel regarding his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call two potential witnesses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to request a jury out hearing” regarding the State’s cross-examination about a witness’ gang affiliation; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prejudicial remarks made by the State during closing arguments; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object “to the selective and vindictive prosecution by the State”; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the “physical facts” rule;(7)appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the voluntary intoxication jury instruction issue on appeal; (8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s prejudicial remarks on appeal; (9) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s “selective and vindictive prosecution” on appeal; (10) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the standard of review used by the trial court in denying the Petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis; (11) the cumulative effect of trial and appellate counsels’ errors establishes that their performance was deficient and that the Petitioner was prejudiced by their performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Tracy Glenn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her Class E felony theft conviction, arguing that she was denied a fair trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury was not instructed on facilitation as a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The parties agreed to submit the valuation of Defendants’ membership in Plaintiff LLC to arbitration. Following arbitration, Defendants moved to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment in the matter. Defendants appeal. We affirm.
 

The defendant, Timothy Leon McKenzie, pled guilty to theft of more than $10,000 and forgery, receiving an agreed term of ten years probation in conjunction with a grant of judicial diversion. Also included in the plea agreement was a condition that the defendant pay the victim of the crimes $157,900 in restitution at a rate of $1315 per month. Thereafter, the defendant was found to be in violation of his probation based upon his failure to report to his probation officer and failure to pay restitution as ordered. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years, which the court ordered to be served in confinement. The court further reaffirmed restitution due in the amount of $156,000 and ordered that payment of such restitution be made a condition of the defendant’s parole. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of confinement; (2) the trial court lacked the authority to impose the special condition that ordered the defendant to make restitution when he was paroled; and (3) the court erred in imposing the full amount of restitution absent an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial could did not err in ordering a sentence of confinement. However, the court did lack the authority to impose payment of restitution as a condition of parole and did fail to appropriately determine the amount of restitution in consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay. As such, remand is necessary for a determination of the proper amount of restitution in this case.

The defendant, Antonio Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery, all Class A felonies, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for each conviction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court modified a previous custody order and named father the primary residential parent. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding a material change in circumstances. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
 

The Petitioner, Aisha Wiggins, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce dispute over father’s obligation to help pay for the parties’ child’s college education. We conclude that, pursuant to the parties’ permanent parenting plan, father is contractually obligated to continue paying support in the amount of $790 a month until the child reaches the age of 21 as long as the child is in college. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified.