APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Sheila Marie Lott (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her open plea and effective sentence of eighteen years and six months to one count of theft over $1000, eight counts of criminal simulation, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card; and (2) that her plea was not voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This is a post-divorce case in which Mark Steven Devore (“Husband”) petitioned for modification of child support. Rhonda M. Devore (“Wife”) counter-petitioned for contempt. The trial court held that Husband was no longer liable for child support because the children had reached the age of majority but that the amount of overpayment was offset by obligations provided for in the marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The court also held that Husband was liable for future college expenses. Following Wife’s motion to reconsider, the court held that Husband owed $11,230.43 for past due college expenses. Husband appeals. We hold that the court erred because it did not use a child support worksheet to calculate the amount of support owed. We vacate and remand for the court to utilize a worksheet.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, J’Menski C. Holt, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sherri A. Elliott, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve eight months of split confinement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1979 convictions for two counts of second degree criminal sexual conduct and petition for post-conviction relief from his 1984 conviction for attempt to commit a felony. The trial court summarily dismissed both petitions as untimely. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petitions without an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. The Petitioner also contends that the original trial court erred by failing to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hamilton County grand jury charged the defendant, Jereme Dannuel Little, in case number 253372, with two counts of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006), and, in case number 253374, with one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-305. At the close of proof at trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgments of
acquittal on the two aggravated robbery counts. The jury, however, convicted the defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 18 years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to inform the jury regarding the judgments of acquittal of the aggravated robberies; (2) failing to instruct the jury regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; (3) instructing the jury regarding criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (4) prohibiting counsel from “putting into evidence or mentioning” during closing argument that the defendant had been acquitted of the two counts of aggravated robbery; and (5) allowing the district attorney to argue at closing that the defendant had committed the aggravated robbery offenses, as relevant to motive for the especially aggravated kidnapping charge. Additionally, the defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors denied him a fair trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Based on the cumulative effect of the errors committed in this case, I would reverse the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, I respectfully dissent.

This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ Compensation.The stated reason for the penaltywas the failure to file Form C-20,Tennessee Employer’s First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty. We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department’s basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner’s due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its “interpretation” of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court’s holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner.
 

The defendant, Dontayvis Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of ten years for each conviction. He raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior conviction for facilitation of aggravated robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge certain lesser-included offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother’s parental rights to her son were terminated on grounds that she was mentally incompetent to provide for the child and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. She appeals, contending that the grounds are not supported by the evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Walter Thomas Godsey, Jr., was convicted by a Chester County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal arising from a disputed “temporary” conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). The petitioner was appointed “Temporary Conservator” and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a “disabled person” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a “fiduciary” was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the “prevailing party.” The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the “temporary conservator” and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant-Appellant, Albert W. Bentley, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a ten-year term of imprisonment in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, Bentley presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the photographic lineup in which the victim identified Bentley as impermissibly suggestive; (2) whether the evidence, primarily the victim’s in court identification of Bentley, was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. My concern is with the summary disposition of the Defendant’s due process claim of an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup. The majority opinion relies on State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), to conclude that the analysis provided in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), need not be used if the identification process was not “unduly suggestive.” “Unduly suggestive” is not a term used in Biggers, which focused on suggestive and unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-200.
 

This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant’s air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties’ homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant’s air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed an action against the City of Murfreesboro pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, claiming a dangerous and unsafe roadway caused an automobile accident in which her son was killed. The trial court determined the City had no notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition, and entered judgment in favor of the City. Upon appeal, we reversed on the issue of notice, holding that previous accidents on adjacent areas of the roadway provided sufficient notice to the City of a potentially dangerous condition. Upon remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and assessed 60% fault to the City. We vacate and remand for further findings consistent with Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant, Miguel Angel Salinas, entered a best-interest plea to one count of possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell over 300 grams, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the negotiated agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The only issue which remained undetermined by the agreement was whether the defendant’s ten-year sentence would be served concurrently with or consecutively to a twenty-five year Georgia sentence which he had received in 2004. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the separate sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends that this was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Ryan Love, of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He received a suspended sentence of two years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of serious bodily injury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Insured was injured by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. Insured filed a claim with Insurer seeking uninsured motorist coverage benefits and settled for an amount that was less than his actual damages. Insured then sued Insurer seeking damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Act. Insurer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Insured failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of his causes of action.

Appellant, the owner of several lots in a subdivision managed and maintained by the Appellee home owners association, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the question of whether Appellant owed an increase in dues and fees on his lots, and the denial of his counter-claims for fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, outrageous conduct, and invalidity of the restrictive covenants on grounds that these causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or the doctrine of laches. We conclude that the Appellee followed the correct procedure in amending its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues. However, because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, concerning the grounds for its application of laches, we cannot review the question of whether Appellant’s counter-claims were properly dismissed. Vacated and remanded.

On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to reinstate probation. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have a Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson (“the Proponent”), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the “will” of Thomas Grady Chastain (“the Deceased”) was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the “will,” but did not sign the second page of the two-page “will.” The Proponent appeals. We reverse.

This appeal involves claims of defamation. After words were exchanged in the course of a parenting dispute, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant father of the plaintiff’s girlfriend’s daughter. A bench trial was held in which both parties were self-represented.
The trial court held in favor of the defendant father. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Opinion. I believe that the answer to the issue of “Whether the Will was signed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104” is a simple no. The majority, however, strives mightily to arrive at a conclusion that the Testator’s signature on a document other than the purported Will somehow satisfies the statutory requirement that the Testator signed the purported Will.

The Defendant-Appellant, Patsy Lynn McCoy, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s revocation of her probation in two cases. She originally pled guilty to aggravated burglary, burglary, and theft under $500. She received an effective seven-year sentence, all of which was suspended to probation after sixty days’ incarceration. On appeal, McCoy argues that (1)Tennessee’s statutory scheme allowing incarceration after a revocation of probation based on judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence is unconstitutional, and (2) the trial court erred in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the sentences in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.