APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Brandon Watson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery and his effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Juvenile Court for Bradley County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Debbie D. (“Mother”) to the minor child Roni M.H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child.

This is a divorce case. The parties are Priscilla Lee Slagle (“Wife”) and Lawrence Fred Slagle (“Husband”). They were married for more than thirty years and, prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, they shared the custody of their adopted grandson (“the Child”). Wife sued for divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Husband filed a counterclaim on the same grounds. At a pre-trial hearing, the court held Husband in contempt for violating the statutorily-mandated injunction prohibiting, among other things, the transferring of or the borrowing against “any marital property.” Following the trial, the court additionally found Husband in contempt (1) for failing to comply with discovery requests and (2) for dissipating marital assets. Husband left the country and did not appear at trial. The court granted Wife a divorce predicated on Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct; designated Wife as the Child’s primary residential parent; and prohibited any contact between Husband and the Child until he had purged himself of contempt. The court classified and divided the parties’ assets, awarded Wife $5,000 a month in alimony in futuro, and set Husband’s child support obligation. Husband appeals. He challenges the contempt findings and some financial aspects of the court’s decree. We reverse that part of the judgment barring contact between Husband and the child and downwardly adjust the award of alimony to $3,200 per month. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Ronald Duckett, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to serve two concurrent life sentences. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to voluntary intoxication; 2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and 3) the trial court erred by reconvening the jury to alter its verdict after the jury had been discharged. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the collection of credit card debt. The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the debt, filed this collection action against the appellant debtor. On appeal, the appellant debtor argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence various documents from a previous owner of the debt, pursuant to the hearsay exception for business records under Tenn. R. Evid. Rule 803(6). We hold that two of the exhibits were not appropriately admitted into evidence under the business records exception. Without those exhibits, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the creditor, and reverse.
 

A dispute over the extent of lawn being mowed and the manner in which it was being mowed boundary line between the neighboring lots be established and demanded compensatory and punitive damages. The Defendants filed a third-party complaint against their predecessor in title, Sandra Stallings, based upon her alleged misrepresentation in her disclosure to them. After a bench trial, the court awarded the Plaintiff a judgment establishing the boundary according to one of her two surveys, and awarded her the cost of her surveys as damages. The court also ordered the Defendants to remove all encroachments. The court found that Ms. Stallings failed to disclose known encroachments and held her liable to the Defendants for one-half of the cost of the surveys. The Defendants appeal. We reverse that part of the judgment awarding as damages the cost of the surveys. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Roy Allen Scott, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because the trial court for the underlying convictions was without jurisdiction to enter his conviction for aggravated assault. In addition, he contends that his convictions for driving under the influence and vehicular assault violate double jeopardy principles. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance policy. The plaintiff was working in a volunteer capacity for the city. While doing so, the plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid through the city’s on-the-job-injury program. The plaintiff had uninsured motorist coverage under his insurance policy with the appellee insurance company. The appellee insurance company denied the plaintiff’s claim based on language in the policy reducing the insurance company’s liability by sums paid under laws similar to workers’ compensation laws. The insurance company asserted that the city’s on-the-job-injury program was similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and the plaintiff and the insurance company filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the plaintiff’s benefits under the city’s on-the-job-injury program were similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, for the reason stated by the trial court.

The plaintiff in this case is Donna Bellomy. The defendant is a prior employer of hers, AutoZone, Inc. In Bellomy v. AutoZone, Inc., No. E2009-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4059158 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 24, 2009) (“Bellomy I”), we vacated, in part, a summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s entire complaint. We held that the Plaintiff had created genuine issues of material fact with respect to her Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claims. On remand, the case progressed through discovery and opening statements, following which the trial court granted a mistrial, holding that the Plaintiff had violated certain rulings made by the court on AutoZone’s motions in limine. The court later granted the defendant partial summary judgment and dismissed the constructive discharge aspect of the Plaintiff’s THRA claims. In the same order, the trial court held the Plaintiff in civil contempt and ruled that the dismissal of the constructive discharge claim was also appropriate as a sanction for violating the court’s rulings entered on AutoZone’s motions. The Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the judgment of dismissal and all other orders of the trial court inconsistent with this opinion and remand for further proceedings.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Nathaniel P.Carson, of two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life for the murder convictions and fifteen years for the especially aggravated robbery convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court allowed improper evidence under Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, and (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress telephone records. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves remittitur of a jury verdict. The defendant driver caused a vehicular accident that resulted in substantial personal injuries to the plaintiff. At trial, several witnesses testified to the amount of the plaintiff’s economic damages as well as the noneconomic impact of her injuries. After a trial, the jury returned a special verdict with awards for various categories of economic and non-economic damages. The trial court denied the defendant insurance company’s motion for a new trial but suggested an overall remittitur as to the total verdict. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and filed this appeal. We affirm the denial of a new trial, reverse the suggestion of remittitur, and reinstate the original jury verdict.

The petitioner, Ricky Terrell Cox, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises out of a four-day trial over a boundary line dispute. Numerous surveyors and other witnesses testified at trial, and many maps, aerial photographs, survey plats, deeds, and other documents were entered into evidence. The chancellor personally viewed the property in question as well. Thereafter, the court established the boundary line as set forth in the survey plat prepared by the defendants’ surveyor.  The plaintiff contends that this was error. We affirm.

The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of confinement.

The defendant, Doris Miller, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of assault by provocative contact, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to three months in the county workhouse. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Don Allen Rodgers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Milton Leon Simpson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

Defendant, Steven Van Tucker, was convicted of the indicted charge of theft of property valued greater than one thousand dollars and less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, Defendant asserts that 1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s objections to the State’s
challenges of three African-American jurors under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); 2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; 3) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes; and 4) the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request to be sentenced to Community Corrections. After a careful review of the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights, claiming that the order failed to make sufficient findings regarding grounds for termination. We reverse in part, vacate and remand for the preparation of an order that contains the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The petitioner, Drew David Kirkman, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery and is currently serving an effective sentence of life in prison plus twenty years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred in denying him relief because he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately prepare for trial and communicate with the petitioner; (2) arguing the motion to suppress on the day before trial which precluded proper review by the trial court; (3) failing to strike two jurors from the panel; and (4) failing to perfect and present a mental defense. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

An Episcopal parish in Nashville asserted its intention to disassociate from The Diocese of Tennessee, causing the Diocese to file a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it or the local congregation owned and controlled the real and personal property where the local congregation worshiped. The trial court determined that The Episcopal Church is hierarchical, and based on the canons and constitutions of the Church and its Diocese, ruled that the local parish held the property in trust for the Diocese. The church appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The State appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order granting habeas corpus relief to the Petitioner, Author Ray Turner, and allowing him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The State argues that the Petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because the thirty percent release eligibility for his two aggravated rape convictions was not a material element of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment allowing the Petitioner to withdraw his guilty pleas if he cannot reach an agreement with the State and remanding the case to the Davidson County Criminal Court for further proceedings.

In this extraordinary appeal, the State of Tennessee appeals the trial court’s decision to order a new trial for the defendant, Cordell Remont Vaughn, after a jury returned a guilty verdict of first degree (premeditated) murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court, after a hearing, granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the court: (1) erroneously concluded that a State’s witness committed perjury at a suppression hearing based solely on the defendant’s submission of an affidavit that conflicted with that witnesses’ testimony at that hearing, and (2) erroneously concluded that the outcome of the defendant’s trial would have been different had this alleged perjury not occurred and had the defendant’s motion to suppress been granted. The defendant responds that the trial court properly considered the affidavit and reached the proper conclusion concerning whether the State’s witness committed perjury. Furthermore, the defendant contends that because the perjury at issue related to a constitutional right, the State was required to establish that the effect of the perjury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and it failed to meet that burden. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct because it failed to make any finding that the prosecution had, in fact, engaged in any misconduct. Moreover, the defendant has failed to show any prejudice resulting from the alleged perjury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting a new trial is reversed.

I concur with the majority opinion. As indicated in the opinion, I have criticized Summers v. Fortner, 267 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), for its holding that a habeas court, not the convicting court, is to determine from the existing record if a petitioner subjected to an illegal sentence should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea. I believe it misinterprets Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124 (Tenn. 2006). In Smith, a habeas corpus case, after the court concluded that an illegal sentence had been imposed, it determined from the guilty plea record that the plea to the relevant charge was not material to the “bargained-for” agreement and resulting effective sentence and held that the petitioner was not entitled to withdraw that guilty plea. Id. at 130. It distinguished the case from one in which the illegal sentence materially resulted from a plea agreement. See Henderson v. State ex rel. Lance, 419 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (Tenn. 1967) (holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence).

Petitioner, Marquette Houston, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petition was timely filed. The State concedes that the petition was timely filed because Petitioner delivered his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing within the applicable limitations period. Following a review of the record, we agree and accordingly reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition for postconviction relief.