APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Gary Reeves, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and criminal trespass, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because sufficient evidence supports both convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Dean Marlin, was found guilty by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of three counts of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; robbery, a Class C felony; aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the especially aggravated burglary convictions. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years each for the especially aggravated burglary convictions and the aggravated robbery conviction, to ten years each for the robbery and the aggravated assault,and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault, to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that double jeopardy protections and Tennessee Code Annotated section 3914-404(d) bar simultaneous convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments for robbery and assault, but we reverse the especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments in which the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated burglary are modified to aggravated burglary and he is resentenced accordingly, and the conviction for aggravated assault is merged into a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery.
 

Appellant, the second mortgage holder on the subject property, appeals the trial court’s determination that Appellee held a valid first mortgage on the property, when Appellee’s mortgage was taken under a deed of trust that contained a scrivener’s error that incorrectly identified the property’s lot number. The trial court held that: (1) the scrivener’s error was not fatal to Appellant’s deed of trust as the instrument otherwise clearly identified the property; (2) Appellant’s mortgage was superior to Appellee’s; and (3) Appellee’s bid at Appellant’s foreclosure sale created a valid contract, under which Appellee owed Appellant the purchase price. Finding no error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce dispute, wife challenges the trial court’s credibility finding, an award for alimony arrearage, and an award of attorney fees. While we find that the amount of the arrearage award should be modified, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects.
 

The Appellant, Fernandez D. Davenport, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

An in-state bottled soft drink manufacturer argues, pursuant to the bottler’s tax statute, that the in-state distributor to which it sells may pay the bottler’s tax on such sales and utilize its own franchise and excise tax credit. Absent this flexibility, the manufacturer contends, equal protection guarantees are offended. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue, finding that the manufacturer bore the tax burden and that it could not utilize the distributor’s credit. We affirm.

This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case to this court. Donna Lynn Lund (“Wife”) and John Fredrik Lund (“Husband”) were divorced in 2008. In the first appeal of the trial court’s classification of marital property, this court held that the increase in value of Husband’s pre-marital annuity was separate property. On remand, the trial court divided the property as consistent with this court’s opinion. Wife filed post-judgment motions and a subsequent motion for Rule 60.02 relief, asserting that the order on remand contained errors of law and that she mistakenly failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Defendant, Larry Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony and was sentenced to serve thirty (30) years as a Range III, career offender. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in State v. Larry Edward Moore, Jr., No. M2008-00703-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 457493 (Tenn. Crim. App., filed Feb. 10, 2010) (hereinafter “Moore I”). From that judgment,Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11. In his application, Defendant presented only one specific issue, which is set forth below. In its order concerning the Rule 11 application, the Supreme Court ordered a supplementation of the record on appeal. The Supreme Court also remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration, in light of the supplemental record, of Defendant’s “argument that the trial court erred in not redacting from [the supplemented exhibit] certain portions of [Defendant’s] statement to police.” Upon reconsideration of Defendant’s “redaction” issue, which we initially held was waived for multiple reasons, we conclude the trial court erred, but the error was harmless. Accordingly, we again affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido beginning after three years of rehabilitative alimony. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision.
 

The petitioner,Timmie Darrell Boston,appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and assault by offensive or provocative contact, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received an effective twenty-year sentence. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to (1) object to the prosecution’s use of leading questions when examining the victim, and (2) impeach the testimony of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I fully concur with the reasoning and result in this opinion.Agreeing that the two most significant points we derive from Gonsewski are “the great deference appellate courts are to give to the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony and the disfavor for long-term alimony,” I write separately to recognize an important exception to the deferential standard of review that was not affected by Gonsewski, that being the less deferential standard that applies when the alimony decision is based upon findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence.Such was the case in Jekot v. Jekot, No. M2010-02467-COA- R3CV, 2011 WL 5115542 (Tenn. Ct. App.Oct.25,2011), wherein we recently reversed the trial court’s alimony award.
 

The Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals denied plaintiff's use on review application for a proposed shopping center. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Circuit Court by way of a Writ of Certiorari. The Trial Court upheld the Board of Zoning Appeals' decision and plaintiff appealed to this Court. We reverse the decision of the Circuit Court on the grounds the record before the Board of Zoning Appeals does not contain substantial material evidence to uphold the Board's ruling. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

In a divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent, its allocation of the marital debt, and its denial of alimony. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Richard L. Williams, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to second degree murder and twenty-five year sentence. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily due to the various failures of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case concerns a holographic will executed by the testator while under a conservatorship.  After the testator died, Appellant sought to be named personal representative over the decedent’s estate and to have the decedent’s holographic will probated. The decedent’s daughter objected, arguing that at the time the holographic will was executed, the decedent was under a conservatorship that expressly revoked the decedent’s right to make a will. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the decedent’s daughter. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The legal guardians of the child filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on her alleged willful failure to visit and support the child. The trial court found that Mother’s efforts to visit and support had been frustrated by the legal guardians’ actions. Therefore, the trial court concluded that Mother’s failure to visit and support was not willful. Because the legal guardians failed to prove any of the grounds required to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the trial court denied the petition. We affirm.

Appellant, Frederick Edward Braxton a/k/a Frederick Frank Brown, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, evading arrest, and criminal impersonation. On appeal, Appellant complains that: (1) the indictment did not adequatelycharge Appellant with selling a controlled substance in a drugfree school zone; (2) the State did not establish a sufficient chain of custody prior to the introduction of the cocaine into evidence; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sold cocaine in a drug-free school zone. After a review of the record, we determine the indictment was not invalid for failing to reference the Drug Free School Zone Act because it adequately described the offense. Further, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cocaine into evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant sold cocaine weighing less than .5 grams within 1000 feet of a Drug Free School Zone. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This case involves a race to the courthouse after a Benefit Review Conference ("BRC"). The employee, a Dickson County resident, was allegedly injured in Davidson County during the course and scope of his employment. The employee and his employer unsuccessfully attempted to settle the employee’s claim at a BRC held on October 11, 2010; an impasse was declared at 10:27:19 a.m. Employee’s complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Dickson County at 10:27 a.m. Employer’s complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County at 10:28 a.m. The employee filed a motion to dismiss the employer’s Davidson County complaint based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court granted the motion, and the employer appealed.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Gerald James Wingard, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his request for a particular jury instruction; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to apply certain mitigating factors offered by the defendant at sentencing. After careful review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Carl T. Jones, pled guilty to robbery and agreed to a sentence of six (6) years. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition. The Petitioner now appeals that dismissal. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. Moreover, the Petitioner offers no reasons why the interests of justice would support a waiver of the filing deadline. Accordingly, we dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal

The Defendant, James John Lewis, pled guilty to four counts of rape of a child and four counts of incest, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years, twenty years of which to be served at 100% and the remaining five years to be served at 30%. Two years later, the Defendant filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence and to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he was not informed his sentence required that he be placed on community supervision for the remainder of his life. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Petitioner, Justin Tyler Brewer, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief in which he claimed that he received a sentence outside of his range. Petitioner raises an additional claim on appeal, that the judgment for one of his convictions is void because it provides for release eligibility. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that his judgment for second degree murder is void or that his sentence has expired. Further, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief for his aggravated kidnapping conviction according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101.

The Defendant, Tianje R. Johnson, pled guilty to four counts of sale of a controlled substance, four counts of delivery of a controlled substance, and two counts of possession with the intent to deliver or sell a controlled substance. The appropriate counts were merged and the trial court sentenced her on the five remaining counts to an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied her an alternative sentence and erred when it denied her motion to reduce her sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This lawsuit for damages arises out of an explosion. The plaintiff customers went to the defendant  propane gas facility to fill their recreational vehicle with propane. Soon after they arrived, one of the propane hoses began to leak, and propane gas vapor began to envelope the premises. After a short period of time, the propane gas tank exploded, causing devastating property damage and destroying the plaintiffs’ recreational vehicle. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendants, alleging that they were near the explosion site when the explosion occurred, and that the explosion caused them numerous physical and psychological injuries. The defendants admitted liability and compensated the plaintiffs for their property damage. The defendants claimed, however, that the plaintiffs were not present  at the explosion site when the explosion occurred and did not sustain any personal injuries caused by the explosion. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, determining that the explosion did not cause any personal injuries to the plaintiffs and awarding zero damages. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves a trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award. The parties engaged in arbitration over a dispute in which the respondent investors asserted that the petitioner investment company mismanaged their funds. The investors prevailed and received a substantial arbitration award against the investment company. The investment company filed a petition in the trial court to vacate the arbitration award, alleging partiality and bias on the part of two members of the arbitration panel. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order vacating the arbitration award and remanding the matter to the regulatory authority for a rehearing before another panel of arbitrators. The respondent investors now appeal. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.