APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Rodney Turner, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his postconviction petition, in which he challenged his two convictions of attempted first degree murder and one conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the resulting total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal and that the post-conviction court erred by denying funds for a fingerprint expert. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff in this personal injury action was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant when an accident occurred after an animal purportedly ran into the roadway. Upon the defendant’s motion and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of a trial judge’s recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B or, alternatively, a common law writ of certiorari. Such review is beyond the scope of Rule 10B. And a judge’s recusal may not be reviewed by a writ of certiorari. So we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the purchase and sale agreement for a 98,094-square-foot, multi-use commercial development in Nashville, Tennessee, known as Houston Station. Before marketing the property for sale, the defendant-seller discovered that approximately 100 square feet of the building encroached on neighboring property owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. and sought a lease from CSX to cover the encroachment. But before it could reach an agreement with CSX, the seller agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff-buyer. The buyer deposited $3 million as earnest money, and the parties scheduled a closing. Before closing, however, CSX demanded $550,000 per year for the encroachment. The seller then informed the buyer that it could not meet its obligations under their agreement. Meanwhile, the seller breached the agreement by executing two new leases without the buyer’s approval. The buyer extended the closing several times to allow the seller to cure its defaults, but the seller refused to terminate the new leases and could not reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with CSX. The buyer then let the closing deadline lapse and sued for, inter alia, reformation of the purchase agreement, specific performance, and damages. The seller then moved for summary judgment and requested an award of the earnest money on the theory that the buyer waived its objections by allowing the closing deadline to lapse. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the buyer had constructive notice of the encroachment and then breached the purchase agreement by failing to buy the property. Accordingly, the court found the seller was entitled to the $3 million deposit as liquidated damages and an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses under the agreement as the prevailing party. The buyer appeals. Following a thorough review, we respectfully disagree that the buyer had constructive notice that the seller did not have good and marketable title. We also disagree that the seller had a right to terminate the contract and receive the earnest money. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal addresses mootness when a law challenged in the trial court is altered or amended after the trial court issued its final judgment and while the appeal is pending.  The plaintiff homeowners operated businesses out of their homes.  They filed a lawsuit against the defendant municipality challenging an ordinance that prohibited them from having clients visit their home-based businesses.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant municipality, and the homeowners appealed.  While the appeal was pending, the municipality repealed the ordinance that was the subject of the complaint and enacted a new ordinance that allowed limited client visits to home-based businesses.  The Court of Appeals held that the repeal of the original ordinance rendered the homeowners’ case moot, and the homeowners were granted permission to appeal to this Court.  While the appeal to this Court was pending, the ordinance was amended again. On appeal, based on the current record, we cannot determine whether the homeowners suffer ongoing harm from the new ordinance, how the change will affect their claims, and whether they retain some residual claim under the new ordinance.  Consequently, we vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in which the parties may amend their pleadings to address any claims the homeowners may assert under the new ordinance.  

The petitioner, Rodney Deon Porter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, William Benning, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a third promissory note constituted a novation of two earlier promissory notes. Following a bench trial, the court found the defendant “carried her burden of proof to establish that the third note was a novation and cancelation of the previous two notes.” Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

The Defendant, Barry Jamal Martin, was convicted in the Giles County Circuit Court of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of not less than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an effective twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that a new trial is required due to the grand jury and the petit jury being exposed to extraneous prejudicial information in the “Confederate jury room”; that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel; that the trial court erred by excluding an undisclosed, exculpatory letter written by the Defendant from evidence; that the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify that a person could not possess more than two grams of cocaine for personal use; that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing; and that he is entitled to relief due to cumulative error.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric Dates, sought post-conviction relief from his conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”), for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twentynine days on probation with service of forty-eight hours in confinement. Relevant to this appeal, he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in his advice concerning a plea offer the Petitioner rejected prior to his trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a petition for grandparent visitation filed by the paternal grandparents. The juvenile court granted the petition and the parents appeal. We reverse and dismiss the case.

The petitioner, Malik DeWayne Hardin, appeals the partial denial of his Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical error, asserting that a clerical error resulted in his being sentenced as a Range II offender and that he did not receive all the pretrial jail credit he was promised. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bradley County jury convicted the defendant, Bryan A. Erwin, of simple assault and aggravated assault for which the trial court imposed an effective three-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at various times during the trial and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings and in sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. Additionally, we remand for the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect the appropriate conviction for count 1, for simple assault, and count 2, for aggravated assault.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Trimon J. Pruitt, of one count of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-four years, at 100%. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Trimon Pruitt, No. W2018-00039-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 1501552, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 4, 2019), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Aug 19, 2019). The Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Following the entry of a default judgment against a mother who failed to answer the petition to terminate her parental rights, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights to her child on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother moved to set aside the default judgment. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned grounds for termination. However, we remand for the trial court to determine whether the termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child pursuant to the new statutory factors which became effective on the date the petition was filed.

The Defendant, Raymond Paul Lankey, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding that the Defendant violated his probation. The Defendant’s probation began in December 2019, when he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for an effective three-year sentence, with two years, eleven months and eight days to be served on supervised probation. In July 2021, a probation violation warrant was issued, the Defendant’s second, alleging multiple violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation, ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal is a landlord-tenant dispute involving issues of liquidated damages and material breach of contract. The landlord filed a civil warrant in general sessions court to recover an early termination fee and other related fees pursuant to the parties’ lease agreement. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the landlord finding that the early termination fee was reasonable and was not a penalty. The tenants appealed the judgment to the circuit court. The circuit court also entered a judgment in favor of the landlord finding that the early termination fee was reasonable and was not a penalty and that the landlord did not breach the lease agreement. The tenants appeal. We affirm as modified and remand to the circuit court for calculation of damages.

The Defendant, Phillip Myron Looper, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated animal cruelty and one count of aggravated assault.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 364 days to be served in the county jail, followed by twelve years of probation, including a restriction from leaving the county of residence except for medical treatment.  The Defendant did not object to the sentence but filed a timely appeal, contending that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence in excess of the agreed upon five years and by improperly imposing travel restrictions.  After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand the case for entry of an order as set forth herein. 

The Defendant, Daniel Smith, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his ten-year probation sentence for aggravated assault. The trial court determined that the Defendant’s act of sending a letter to the victim violated the terms of his probation sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence. The Defendant asserts that the trial court’s revocation of his probation sentence was an abuse of discretion and that he should be returned to service of a probation sentence. After review, we conclude that revocation of the probation sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

The Defendant, John P. Stone, was convicted of aggravated burglary following a bench trial, and he received a sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aggravated burglary. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c).  The trial court dismissed two of the plaintiff’s three claims for relief pled in his amended complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), upon its finding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted on the two claims.  The third claim also was included in the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as well as arguments for improper venue and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all of which were denied by the trial court.  More than thirty days after a final judgment was entered, the defendant requested an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs.  In his supporting affidavit, the defendant’s counsel included attorney’s fees as relevant to the entire motion to dismiss instead of distinguishing the time spent regarding the claims that were dismissed pursuant to Rule 12.02(6).  The trial court awarded the defendant attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000, which is the maximum amount of attorney’s fees a trial court can award under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c).  The trial court denied the defendant’s request for discretionary costs as untimely.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of discretionary costs, vacate the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for the Trial Court to reconsider the attorney’s fees award as consistent with this opinion and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Donovan v. Hastings, No. M2019-01396-SC-R11-CV, -- S.W.3d -- , 2022 WL 2301177 (Tenn. June 27, 2022).

This appeal involves a multitude of challenges brought to the orders of the trial court in a post-divorce dispute involving minor children. We vacate the trial court’s decision to sua sponte order a new parenting plan, as well as to enter a temporary and permanent injunction against Mother. We also reverse the trial court’s decision to award Father discretionary costs for expert fees regarding an issue on which he did not prevail. Otherwise, we affirm the rulings of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a last will and testament, which provided for the creation of a trust. The decedent’s wife is the current income beneficiary of the trust, with the decedent’s son being a remainder beneficiary. The son requested an accounting of the trust financials, to which the trustees of the trust responded that the son was not entitled to receive them. The trustees filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to instruct the parties whether the son was entitled to the information he requested. The son subsequently filed a counterclaim asking that the trustees be required to provide him with the information he requested and alleging breach of trust by the trustees. The Trial Court granted the trustees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings after finding that the son was a remainder beneficiary and not a current income beneficiary of the trust and, therefore, was not entitled to financial information regarding the trust. The Trial Court found that the language in the decedent’s last will and testament was intended to override the reporting requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-813(a) and limit the trustees’ statutory obligation of reporting to qualified beneficiaries. In doing so, the Trial Court determined that the trustees were not required to provide the son with reports or other financial information concerning the trust. The Trial Court denied the son’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Bryan Shawn Blevins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, which rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. The State argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying the State’s motion to summarily dismiss the petition as time-barred. Based on our review, we conclude that the Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Thus, the Petitioner’s post-conviction claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We, therefore, reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.