APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven Malone, of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the second-degree murder and four years for the aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second-degree murder, that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody as to certain evidence, that extraneous information improperly influenced the jury’s verdict, and that cumulative error requires a reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robert Earl Smith, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Shelby County. He was originally convicted of second degree murder and received a sixty-year sentence as a Range III, career offender. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following grounds: (1) trial counsel’s failure to argue the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt during closing argument; (2) trial counsel’s failure to prepare and investigate the case; (3) trial counsel’s failure to challenge the validity of four prior felony convictions at sentencing; and (4) appellate counsel’s failure to argue the validity of the same prior convictions on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the city council’s decision one year earlier to grant a special use permit was arbitrary and capricious.  The trial court dismissed the complaint upon concluding that the petitioner should have challenged the decision by filing a petition for writ of certiorari within sixty days. We affirm.

The petitioner, Artis Whitehead, appeals from the denial of his untimely petition for postconviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition after finding that due process concerns did not toll the statute of limitations. The petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the statute of limitations because (1) appellate counsel still represented him when she sent a letter informing him of the incorrect deadline for filing his petition for post-conviction relief and (2) that incorrect information was a misrepresentation sufficient to cause due process concerns to toll the statute of limitations. Upon our careful review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

Daniel H. Jones (“Jones”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Mark Gwyn and Avis Stone (“Respondents”), Director and Coordinator, respectively, of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”), in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”).1 Jones sought to have the Trial Court direct Respondents to act on an earlier order by the Criminal Court for Sullivan County at Blountville, Tennessee (“the Criminal Court”) to expunge all public records related to a dismissed rape charge against Jones. Respondents moved to dismiss. The Trial Court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue. Jones appeals. We find that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Jones’s petition. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his confession to police was coerced and because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The State argues that the post-conviction court erred by determining that the one-year statute of limitations for filing the post-conviction petition was tolled and, therefore, that the petition is time-barred. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State that the statute of limitations was not tolled in this case because trial counsel did not mislead the petitioner regarding the status of his appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

Petitioners filed a Petition to Adopt the minor child, Don Juan J.H., and the Department of Children's Services then filed a Waiver of Guardianship stating that DCS approved of adoption by the petitioners. The Trial Court granted petitioners partial guardianship of the child before trial, and the appellants filed a Petition to Intervene in the adoption proceeding which the Trial Court granted. Upon trial of the case, the Trial Court dismissed appellants' intervening petition and granted the adoption. Appellants appealed, arguing that the Trial Court refused to conduct a comparative fitness analysis between petitioners and appellants to determine the best interests of the child. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court because appellants were required to contest the guardianship before they would have been eligible to petition for adoption of the child.

The Petitioner, Elmer Harris, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years in confinement. In this appeal, he argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. He claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate witnesses, failing to question discrepancies in the witnesses’ statements, and failing to provide complete discovery until after trial. He further claims appellate counsel was ineffective because the Petitioner was not notified that his direct appeal had been denied until after the deadline to file a Rule 11 appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court had expired. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to trial counsel. In regard to appellate counsel, we conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to petition the Tennessee Supreme Court for further review pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The pro se petitioner, Grover D. Cowart, appeals the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

This appeal results from the trial court’s order, finding six of Appellant’s children dependent and neglected. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of dependency and neglect and severe child abuse, we affirm.

In January 1995, a Unicoi County jury convicted the Petitioner, Billy Joe Smith, of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, aiding and abetting aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated rape. The Petitioner was, thereafter, sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to a total of 135 years in the Department of Correction. After this Court and our supreme court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Following multiple appointments of counsel, amendments to the petition, and other procedural matters spanning ten years, the post-conviction court denied relief after a full evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by (1) denying his motion to continue the evidentiary hearing based upon the unavailability of three material witnesses, (2) denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen his proof on evidentiary issues surrounding suppression of the evidence, (3) denying relief as to “all issues” raised by the Petitioner, and (4) failing to proceed with his post-conviction hearing in a timely manner. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Willie McLeod, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony; disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This dispute involves a bail bond contract which the Appellant contends should be invalidated due to illegality, lack of mutual consent and because she allegedly executed the contract under duress. The trial court found the contract to be enforceable and entered a $4,000.00 judgment against Appellant. Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of its application for counsel fees as provided for in the contract. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I must dissent from the holding of the majority that the search warrant, despite its failure to name the city in which it is to be executed, nevertheless identifies Appellant’s residence with sufficient specificity. As noted by the majority, the federal and state constitutions as well as statutory law require that a search must particularly describe the place to be searched. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7; T.C.A. § 40-6-103. The majority also correctly points out that this “specificity” requirement is met if the description of the place to be searched “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others, and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)).

A Rhea County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, William T. Minton, of two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences of thirty-five years and eighteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to offer testimony that lacked any scientific indicia of reliability and was outside her area of expertise; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to present evidence of a State witness’s prior violent acts when the defense’s theory was that the witness killed the victim; and (5) his sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John Williams, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery, with an effective sentence of 161 years. He contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a public trial and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to partial closure of the trial and failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Because the trial court’s order denying post-conviction relief is incomplete, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The appellant, Calvin Cathey, pled guilty in the Crockett County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and received an eight-year sentence to be served as one hundred eighty days in jail and the remainder on probation. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law, namely whether the search warrant obtained to search his home sufficiently described the property to be searched. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal more than thirty (30) days after the order appealed was entered by the trial court. Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal of an award of attorney fees in a post-divorce matter. The father had filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, seeking to increase his parenting time and reduce his child support obligation. Approximately six months later, after Father’s discovery deposition was taken, he asked the court to dismiss his petition to modify without prejudice.  The trial court dismissed the petition but awarded the mother $20,000 for her attorneys’ fees.  The father appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees and that the amount awarded was arbitrary and unreasonable. We find that the trial court had the authority to award attorney’s fees, but due to the lack of findings by the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the fee award, we vacate the award and remand for further proceedings.

This application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 arises from the trial court’s decision to stay the implementation of the parenting plan that the trial court was directed to adopt pursuant to our decision in In re Madison K.P., No. M2009-02331-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 4810665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010). The Supreme Court denied the father’s application for permission to appeal on April 14, 2011 and the mandate of this court was issued on April 27, 2011. Despite this, the ruling of this court has yet to be put into effect, because the parenting plan that was to be approved and entered by the trial court, and which was approved and entered, was immediately stayed by the trial court following its entry, rendering our decision and the parenting plan of no effect.

The Petitioner, Matthew Jackson , appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The former husband appealed the trial court's order finding him in willful contempt of the
final decree of divorce. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The buyer of unimproved real property sued the sellers for breach of implied warranties, imposition of a permanent nuisance, and diminution in value of the property; buyer also sought damages for alleged violations of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. The trial court held that Tennessee does not provide a cause of action for breach of implied warranty in the sale of unimproved real property; the court also held that buyer had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the lot was “unbuildable.” The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the buyer appealed. Buyer asserts that the sellers had a duty to disclose “possible adverse soil conditions.” She also urges this Court to adopt a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of suitability for residential construction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner filed a Common Law Writ of Certiorari, alleging he was convicted of a disciplinary infraction while incarcerated, and that the conviction was illegal, arbitrary and fraudulent. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Petition contained no oath or affirmation and did not state it was the first application for a writ pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §27-8-104(a) and 106. Further that petitioner failed to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §41-21-807(a). The Trial Court entered an Order of Dismissal for the deficiencies set forth in the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner has appealed and we affirm the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal on the grounds set forth in that Order.

The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee , appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.