APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the changing of a minor child’s surname. Tyler Weseman (“Father”) and Amanda King (“Mother”) are, respectively, the father and mother of the minor child A.M.K.(“the Child”). Father filed a petition to establish parentage and co-parenting time. Father sought to have the Child bear his surname. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) changed the Child’s surname from King to King-Weseman. Mother appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding that changing the Child’s surname to King-Weseman is in the Child’s best interest. We further hold that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney’s fees to Mother. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed.

The defendant, Justin Kenneth Boldus, pleaded guilty in Dickson County Circuit Court to one count of vehicular homicide by recklessness, see T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(1) (2006), and one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death, see id. § 55-10-101. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years and one year to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and by denying alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

This case arises from the circuit court’s execution of judgment. Following dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from the general sessions court, the circuit court specifically affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court, issued execution thereon, and denied Appellant’s motion to quash the execution upon its finding that the ten year time period for collection of judgments, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-110, ran from the date of the circuit court’s order. Upon review, we conclude that, by affirming the general sessions court’s judgment, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to execute the judgment, and that the ten year time period for collection of the judgment ran from the date of the circuit court’s order and was not expired when levy was made. Affirmed.

The Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Smithville suspended and ultimately terminated the chief of police because they were unhappy with his efforts to combat the drug and crime problems in the City. The police chief filed a writ of certiorari and asked the trial court to order the City to reinstate him because he was terminated without cause. The trial court concluded there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify the City’s decision and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The police chief appealed, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari.

In late 2007, the defendant Bill Heath built a fence on a line running generally east and west, said line having been established by surveyor Bill Parsons in 1990 and then re-staked in 2007 by surveyor Dennis Fultz. The plaintiff Glenn Cupp, an adjoining landowner to the south of Heath, hired surveyor Mark Comparoni to establish his northern line because Cupp believed Heath had built the fence much too far to the south. Marjorie Keck, who joins Heath on her northern boundary and Cupp on her western boundary, also commissioned Comparoni to survey her land. Comparoni’s survey confirmed that Heath’s new fence incorrectly encompassed approximately 35 acres of Cupp’s land and approximately 6 acres of Keck’s land. Cupp and Keck filed this action against Heath in 2008 to establish their northern boundary with Heath and the Cupp/Keck common boundary as surveyed by Comparoni. The trial court found that the Comparoni survey correctly established the boundary lines of all the parties. Heath appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of disciplinary proceedings against a chiropractor before the Tennessee Board of Chiropractic Examiners. The allegations originally involved a single incident of solicitation that occurred in 2000, in which Dr. Byrd telephoned a car accident victim just two days after her accident in violation of the Board’s rule governing telemarketing or solicitation. The notice of charges was later amended to include additional allegations regarding Dr. Byrd’s use of an office in Florida to telemarket Tennessee accident victims in violation of the aforementioned rule. Dr. Byrd admitted that telemarketing was being conducted by the Florida employees. However, he claimed that a corporation was responsible for conducting the telemarketing, rather than himself, and he argued that the corporation was not subject to the Board’s telemarketing rules. The Board found Dr. Byrd guilty of several violations and revoked his chiropractic license. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm.

In medical malpractice actions, Tennessee adheres to a locality rule for expert medical witnesses. Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical provider practices or a similar community. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2010). Since the locality rule was enacted in 1975, Tennessee courts have reached different conclusions in interpreting it. The rule does not define "similar community," nor does it provide guidance as to how a community is determined to be "similar" to the defendant’s community. In this case, we address and clarify the applicable standards that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court’s exclusion of the claimant’s two proffered medical experts under the locality rule was error. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.

On or about May 28, 2005, Billie Seay was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Thomas E. Walsh (“the Driver”), which vehicle was owned by the defendant Betty Walsh (“the Owner”). Seay’s insurance company, Nationwide Insurance Company, settled her claim and filed this subrogation action in Seay’s name for the use and benefit of Nationwide against the Driver and the Owner. The Driver and the Owner filed separate pro se answers. The Owner appeared at trial, but the Driver did not appear. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants. Two and a half years later, the Driver filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It was denied. He then filed a series of similar unsuccessful post-judgment motions. The Driver appeals from the last order denying post judgment relief. We affirm.

Appellant, Craig Abston, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years for second degree murder, and twelve years and eight years for each attempted second degree murder conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentence and twelve-year sentence to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the eight-year sentence for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On appeal, this Court reduced the twelve-year sentence to eight years, and remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing regarding the consecutive sentences. State v. Craig Abston, No. W2007-00019-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2030432, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 10, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). On remand, the trial court ordered the one eight-year sentence to be served concurrently with the twenty-year sentence and the other eight-year sentence to be served consecutively to the twenty-year sentence. Therefore, Appellant’s effective sentence is twenty-eight years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan. The parties divorced in Tennessee and agreed to a parenting plan that esignated the mother as the primary residential parent of their two minor children. By the time the divorce decree was entered, both parties had moved to New York.  Months later, the mother filed a petition in the Tennessee trial court seeking court approval to relocate with the minor children to Colorado. The mother also sought an increase in child support, and to recover a child support arrearage.  The father objected and filed a cross-petition in the Tennessee trial court to be designated as the primary residential parent. After a hearing, the Tennessee trial court granted the mother’s petition to relocate, increased the father’s child support obligation, and assessed a child support arrearage against the father. The father appeals. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother’s petition to relocate or the father’s petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother’s request for modification of child support. The trial court, however, retained jurisdiction to enforce the existing child support order. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order insofar as it modified the parenting plan and child support.

Appellant, Craig Abston, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years for second degree murder, and twelve years and eight years for each attempted second degree murder conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentence and twelve-year sentence to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the eight-year sentence for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On appeal, this Court reduced the twelve-year sentence to eight years, and remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing regarding the consecutive sentences. State v. Craig Abston, No. W2007-00019-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2030432, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 10, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). On remand, the trial court ordered the one eight-year sentence to be served concurrently with the twenty-year sentence and the other eight-year sentence to be served consecutively to the twenty-year sentence. Therefore, Appellant’s effective sentence is twenty-eight years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Randy Antonio Rice, was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and twelve years at thirty percent, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Sumner County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Keith A. Howard, of one count of forgery, see T.C.A. § 39-14-114 (2006), and one count of attempting to evade sales tax, see id. § 67-1-1440(g), and the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of six years’ incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury and admission of evidence, that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant as a persistent offender and by imposing consecutive sentences. Because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial, all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing are waived. Discerning no error in those remaining issues, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee had a compensable back injury in 2008. His doctor assigned 19% permanent anatomical impairment for the injury, based upon the Sixth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. He had previously settled a claim for a compensable back injury in 1996. That injury resulted in a 15% permanent impairment according to the Fourth Edition of the Guides, then in effect. Based upon those ratings, the treating physician for the 2008 injury apportioned 4% of the total 19% impairment to the more recent injury. An evaluating physician used the Sixth Edition to rate both injuries and opined that the impairment for the 2008 injury was 13% to the body as a whole. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician’s rating and based its award of permanent disability benefits on it. The employer has appealed,arguing that the trial court erred by adopting the evaluating physician’s rating. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Christopher Locke, pled guilty to one count of incest, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of three years, all suspended upon compliance with the terms of probation and sex offender supervision. On appeal he argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Gregory Tyrone Greer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his sole issue on appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves parental relocation. Mother intended to relocate from Tennessee to Las Vegas with the parties’ two children in order to accept another position with her current employer. Father filed a petition opposing the relocation and seeking modification of the parenting plan to be named primary residential parent. The trial court found that the parties were not spending substantially equal intervals of time with the children, and that the move had a reasonable purpose. Therefore, it permitted Mother to relocate with the children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108. Father raises numerous issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The petitioner, Melissa Beth Mackey, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief challenging her conviction of attempted aggravated robbery for which she received a sentence of six years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, she argues that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance that rendered her guilty plea involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Walter Alan Martin, was convicted by a jury of rape and was, thereafter, sentenced to ten years in prison at 100%. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure (1) to adequately address the timeframe surrounding the events and (2) to fully investigate the case by inspecting the cab of the truck where the incident occurred. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Hickman County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Bethany Jade Abel, for attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with the length and manner of service for her sentence left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 3 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation following the service of 14 days in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her application for judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. was convicted and sentenced to death on seven counts of first degree murder. Reid’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the supreme court. The instant appeals stem from evidentiary hearings wherein the Montgomery and Davidson County trial courts concluded that Reid was competent to decide on his own behalf to forego any post-conviction relief on his convictions and sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.

Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. was convicted and sentenced to death on seven counts of first degree murder. Reid’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the supreme court. The instant appeals stem from evidentiary hearings wherein the Montgomery and Davidson County trial courts concluded that Reid was competent to decide on his own behalf to forego any post-conviction relief on his convictions and sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.

The defendant, Stephen Davis, a pharmacist at Rite Aid, was convicted of one count of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud (a Class D felony) after he filled several suspicious prescriptions for Hydrocodone (a Schedule III controlled substance). The trial court imposed a two-year suspended sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial and by failing to place him on judicial diversion. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant allegedly suffered an on-the-job injury to his knees over the course of several years, and Plaintiffs paid workers’ compensation benefits on his behalf. However, after Defendant was videotaped building a barn, his employment was terminated and suit was filed against him for fraud. Defendant then filed a counter-complaint alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim, and we affirm and remand.

 Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. was convicted and sentenced to death on seven counts of first degree murder. Reid’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the supreme court. The instant appeals stem from evidentiary hearings wherein the Montgomery and Davidson County trial courts concluded that Reid was competent to decide on his own behalf to forego any post-conviction relief on his convictions and sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.