APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, James Edward Farrar, Jr., appealed the Bedford County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. This court reversed the trial court’s revocation, concluding that the State failed to establish a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation. See State v. James Edward Farrar, Jr., No. M2009-01285-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 10, 2010). The State filed an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. On April 14, 2011, the supreme court granted the State’s application and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in State v. Teddy Ray Mitchell, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. E2008-02672-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2011). We have reconsidered our prior opinion in light of Teddy Ray Mitchell, and following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, although we reject part of that court’s rationale for the revocation.

In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse.

The majority opinion has provided an excellent analysis of the facts and the law in this case, and I agree with the conclusion regarding the lack of evidence of public intoxication. I also believe that the present statute regarding revocation requires a preponderance of the evidence to show that a probation violation has occurred and that a subsequent decision regarding revocation is within the trial court’s discretion. See, e.g., State v. Vincent Jordan, No. M2009-02488-CCA-R3-CD, Montgomery County, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010); State v. Richard Thomas Jones, No. E2009-01241-CCA-R3-CD, Hamilton County, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2010). I respectfully disagree, however, with the result reached regarding “excessive consumption of alcohol.” My problem in this case is with the concept of “excessive consumption” and what proves it has occurred.

The Petitioner, Keith Ezell, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective 198-year sentence. He contends that his trial attorney failed to provide effective assistance because counsel did not advise him that accepting a guilty plea offer was in his best interest and did not accurately advise him of the likelihood he would receive a greater sentence after a trial than if he accepted the plea offer. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bryant Adair, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated robbery and from his effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that principles of due process require the tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month.

The Defendant, Carl Lee Houghton, was found guilty by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years’ confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession because it was not made voluntarily, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by not giving more weight to applicable mitigating factors. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal involves recusal of the trial judge. In the initial divorce proceedings, the trial judge recused himself based in part on friendship with the parties. A special judge was appointed to hear the case. The special judge tried the divorce, divided the parties’ property, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Several years later, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify his alimony obligation. The trial judge who had previously recused himself declined to do so for the post-divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the trial judge terminated the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself and that he erred in terminating the alimony. We reverse the trial court’s decision on recusal, and therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling on the husband’s petition to modify.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Nancy L. Blue, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed her convictions but modified her sentences. See State v. Nancy Blue, No. W2008-00187-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1097450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 23, 2009), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2009). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief; however, the postconviction court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that the petition was not timely filed. The Petitioner alleges that both prison notaries were unavailable for several days preceding the date that her petition was due and, because of their absence, she was not able to get her petition to the appropriate prison authorities for mailing until the day after the one-year statute of limitations ran. After our review, we remand to  the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant tolling the statute of limitations for due process concerns and whether the Petitioner timely filed her petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Steven Craig Wilcox, pled guilty to conspiracy to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class E felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for an alternative sentence, ordering instead that the defendant serve his term in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of confinement. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Sally Jo Witty is a teacher employed by the Blount County School System. She filed this action after her request to draw pay from a pool of donated sick leave was denied. She named as defendants the trustees appointed to administer the pool (collectively “the Trustees”). She also sued the Blount County Board of Education (“the School Board”) and alleged it is vicariously liable. She demanded the full monetary value of the requested sick leave and also asked for damages to compensate her for the mental suffering resulting from the “wrongful” decision to deny her  benefits. The trial court held that the Trustees were an independent body for which the School Board could not be held vicariously liable. It also held that the Trustees were immune from liability in their individual capacities and that the action filed against the Trustees in their official capacity was a petition for writ of certiorari that was not timely filed. Therefore, it dismissed the complaint. Witty appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate it in part.

This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving. The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student’s emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended  to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic  accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Carlos Walls, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s statement to the Department of Children’s Services as evidence, and that the trial court applied improper enhancement factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Steven R. Chance, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Alonzo Fishback, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of an offense. He argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Derek Deon Hester, stands convicted of felony murder; aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony; and aggravated rape of a child; a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to a life sentence for the felony murder conviction; as a Range I, violent offender to twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence; and as a Range III, violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape of a child conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion to consolidate the cases; that the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of certain evidence; and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Andrew Soimis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Dwane Washington, appeals the post-conviction court’s ruling that he failed to prove prejudice by clear and convincing evidence after his case was remanded for a determination of prejudice. The proper standard of review was whether the petitioner had shown that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. After a careful review, we conclude that the post-conviction court used the wrong standard in requiring the petitioner to prove prejudice by clear and convincing evidence and that the record before us clearly establishes that there was a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s inaccurate assurances that the petitioner was eligible for boot camp, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate the petitioner’s judgment of conviction, and remand the case for a trial.

This is a parentage action in which an adult child seeks retroactive child support from his biological father. The juvenile court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court for failure to join a party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, John W. Foster, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting sentence of thirty years to be served at sixty percent before eligible for release. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Elmi Adulahi Abdi, of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, consecutive to his sentence in Davidson County case number 2006-A-30. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by admitting videotape evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by enhancing the defendant’s sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence consecutive to case number 2006-A-30. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff home buyer and defendant home seller entered into an agreement to repair a drain at some future date because it had been improperly piped out of the buyer’s house. When the time for performance came, the drain was not moved, resulting in damages to the buyer’s home. The buyer sued for breach of contract. The circuit court granted a directed verdict to the defendant on the ground that there was no consideration to support the contract. We find that the mutual promises made by the parties constituted adequate consideration. We accordingly reverse the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as necessary.

Property owner seeks review of the trial court’s decision that two citations were properly issued against him because he did not have a permit for hosting historic home events on his property as required by the Metropolitan Government. We affirm.