APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Lisa Joyce Tyler, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the non-payment of her restitution was not willful but, instead, due to her inability to pay. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Victor Pritchard, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Plaintiff appeals the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 dismissal of her claims against two defendants, the Circuit Court Clerk of Jackson County, individually and in his official capacity, and Jackson County, Tennessee for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and numerous intentional torts. The trial court dismissed all claims against these defendants finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

The Petitioner, Dearice Cates, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the statutorily mandated mitigating factor that he “voluntarily” released the victims of his especially aggravated kidnappings alive. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305(b)(2). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Cocke County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, John Hall, guilty of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty percent of which the appellant would be required to serve in the county jail. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The petitioner, Anthony Allen, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a Shelby County jury of multiple counts of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. See State v. Anthony Allen, W2004-01085-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1606350, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 8, 2005). The petitioner was sentenced to a term of 104 years. Id. On appeal, the petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Willie Clark Bennett, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his person. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Aaron Malone, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement, arguing that (a) he did not waive his rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and (b) that the court should have suppressed the statement under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine after ruling that his arrest was illegal; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s teeth into evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing a state witness, qualified as an expert in crime scene investigation, to testify about blood spatter analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Lynn Inman, was convicted by a Benton County jury of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and assessed a $5,000 fine. On appeal, Inman claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this commercial real estate lease dispute is whether the individual defendants are additional lessees and, thus, personally liable under the lease. Plaintiff, the lessor of retail space, filed this action against the three defendants when the limited liability company, Décor Fabrics, LLC, a lessee, breached the lease by failing to pay rent for the term of the lease. The individual defendants denied liability, asserting that Décor Fabrics, LLC, was the only lessee. The trial court found that the lease unambiguously identifies each of the individual defendants as additional lessees and assessed damages against them for breach of the lease, including the plaintiff’s attorneys fees. Only one of the defendants appealed. He asserts that the trial court erred by finding the lease unambiguous as to the identify of the lessee(s) and by failing to consider the parties’ conduct to conclude that Décor Fabrics, LLC, was the only lessee. We affirm.

In this divorce action, Mother appeals the trial court’s permanent parenting plan, residential schedule, child support determination, and division of marital property and debt. We affirm the designation of Father as primary residential parent; modify the residential schedule  and award of unpaid child support; and vacate the “paramour provision” in the parenting plan and the “equalization payment” from Mother to Father. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court.

An attorney who was suspended from the practice of law for two years and assessed costs associated with the suspension proceedings appeals to this Court for relief from all or a portion of the assessed costs. While this appeal was pending, the attorney filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and his pre-bankruptcy debts were discharged by order entered by the Bankruptcy Court on December 10, 2010. We hold that the assessment of costs of the disciplinary proceeding was a debt that was discharged in the attorney’s bankruptcy case and is, therefore, no longer due and owing. Accordingly, the attorney’s appeal to this Court is moot.

The Petitioner, Travis Dean Jackson, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2008 conviction for rape of a child. He claims his conviction is void because his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and was the result of misrepresentations that he would receive sentence reduction credits that were not applicable to his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cornelius O’Brien Love, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property worth at least $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403, 39-14-103, 39-14-105(2) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ incarceration for aggravated burglary and two years’ incarceration for theft, with the sentences to be served concurrently. He was ordered to pay $1,906.06 in restitution to the victims. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

David Bates d/b/a David Bates Construction Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued Caroline Benedetti (“Defendant”) for breach of a construction contract involving demolition of an existing residential garage and construction of a new one. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, (1) that Plaintiff had not proven damages, (2) that Defendant had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-36-103 with regard to her counterclaim and, therefore, pursuant to the statute her counterclaim should be abated, and (3) that Defendant also had failed to give notice and an opportunity to cure pursuant to the common law and that her counterclaim should be dismissed for that reason as well. Defendant appeals the abatement and dismissal of her counterclaim. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-36-103 does not apply to the case at hand, but that the Trial Court correctly dismissed Defendant’s counterclaim. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order.

The defendant, Elton Crawford, entered an Alford guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court to the attempted rape of his daughter and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the county workhouse. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The mother and stepfather of a nine year old boy filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the boy’s father, who was incarcerated at the time the petition was filed. The sole ground alleged in the petition was abandonment by failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s rights. The court ruled that the ground of abandonment had been proved because there was clear and convincing evidence that the father had failed to support the mother during her pregnancy, and that the father had subsequently shown wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to his incarceration. The court also found that termination of the father’s rights was in the child’s best interest.  We reverse.

This case arises from a car accident in which Appellant was injured when her vehicle was struck by Appellee’s vehicle. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded Appellant damages, including $100,000 for Appellant’s loss of earning capacity claims. Acting as the thirteenth juror, and based upon its finding that Appellant had failed to meet her burden to show loss of earning capacity, the trial court suggested remittitur of the entire $100,000 loss of earning capacity award. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees and from the trial court’s grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(1) motion for involuntary dismissal in favor of Appellees. The trial court granted both motions upon its finding that Appellant had committed fraud upon the court in filing his complaint under an assumed name. Specifically, the court granted the motion for summary judgment finding that the statute of limitations had expired because the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, which the court determined was a nullity ab initio. The Rule 41.02 motion was granted based upon the court’s finding that the Appellant had perpetrated a fraud upon the court in filing the complaint under an assumed name. Concluding that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Appellant committed fraud and, specifically, as to whether Appellant’s alleged mental incapacity negates a finding of fraud, we reverse both the order on the motion for summary judgment and the order granting the Rule 41.02 motion. We remand for further hearing on the issues of fraud and mental incapacity. Reversed and remanded.

The employee alleged that he sustained a lower back injury as a result of his job. His employer denied the claim based upon findings by its work site medical staff. An evaluating physician opined that the employee’s job had caused an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment, but we decline the employee’s request to find the appeal to be frivolous.

This post divorce appeal arises from the lack of symmetry between the parties’ 1995 Final Divorce Decree and a 1996 Qualified Domestic Relations Order that was not entered into contemporaneously with the Divorce Decree. The ex-husband, a General Motors retiree, contends the trial court erred in finding that his ex-wife was entitled to the marital portion of his early retirement supplements of his pension and in finding that her benefits are based on post-divorce increases to his pension benefits. For her issue, the ex-wife contends the trial court erred in failing to grant her survivorship rights in the ex-husband’s retirement benefits. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

The petitioner, Young Bok Song, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleges that he was denied the opportunity to contact the Korean Consulate General in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Treaty; therefore, he asserts that his judgments of conviction for seven counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery are void. We conclude that the petition fails to state a cognizable claim, and, therefore, the petition is a proper subject for summary dismissal. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found the Department of Children’s Services proved the grounds of abandonment and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Jay Bean, filed a “Motion to Furlough Defendant” from his sentence of incarceration in order for him to be admitted to a drug treatment program. The trial court denied the motion and Defendant filed a notice of appeal. Among other assertions, the State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because Defendant’s chosen avenue to seek review of the trial court’s order, Tennessee Rule of Appellant Procedure 3(b), does not permit an appeal as of right in this case. We agree with the State and dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Jeffrey Gaylon Douglas, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of rape, a Class B felony, and sexual battery, a Class E felony, and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and two years, respectively. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.