APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Terry Robinson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its rebuttal closing argument, and he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Charles Phillip Maxwell, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a six-month sentence, with Maxwell to serve forty-eight hours in jail prior to serving the remainder of his sentence on probation. In Maxwell’s appeal, he argues that the trial court erred: (1) in failing to appoint counsel to represent him at trial; and (2) in orally denying his interlocutory appeal for the appointment of competent counsel. The State has conceded that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to appoint counsel for Maxwell prior to trial. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial following the appointment of counsel.

The defendant, Wanda Elaine Brock, appeals her Sullivan County jury convictions of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years of age and two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child less than eight years of age, Class A felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions into one count of aggravated child abuse and imposed a Range I sentence of 20 years to be served at 100 percent by operation of law. See T.C.A. § 40350501(i)(1), (2)(k). On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, (2) the trial court’s exclusion of extrinsic evidence concerning an inconsistent statement made by the victim, (3) the length of the sentence imposed, and (4) the trial court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of aggravated child neglect. In consequence, with respect to counts three and four, the judgments of conviction are reversed, the verdicts are vacated, and the charges are dismissed. We further conclude, that the trial court erred by excluding extrinsic evidence of the victim’s prior inconsistent statement. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of conviction in counts one and two and remand those counts for a new trial. Concerning the trial court’s denial of coram nobis relief, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis and affirm the trial court’s order with respect to the coram nobis petition. In summary, the judgments of the trial court in counts three and four are reversed, and the charges are dismissed; the judgments of the trial court in counts one and two are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial on those counts; and the order of the trial court denying coram nobis relief is affirmed.

This post divorce appeal arises from the lack of symmetry between the parties’ 1995 Final Divorce Decree and a 1996 Qualified Domestic Relations Order that was not entered into contemporaneously with the Divorce Decree. The ex-husband, a General Motors retiree, contends the trial court erred in finding that his ex-wife was entitled to the marital portion of his early retirement supplements of his pension and in finding that her benefits are based on post-divorce increases to his pension benefits. For her issue, the ex-wife contends the trial court erred in failing to grant her survivorship rights in the ex-husband’s retirement benefits. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Maria Maclin, appeals from the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The State filed a motion requesting this court to affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ricky D. Garrett (“Employee”) was injured when he fell from the roof of a barn during the course and scope of his employment as a handyman for William David Brown (“Employer”), a farmer who carried worker’s compensation insurance. Subsequently, Employee filed a complaint for worker’s compensation benefits against Employer and Employer’s insurance carrier. Employee also named the Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”) as a defendant and alleged that the injury he sustained in the fall in combination with his pre-existing disabilities rendered him totally disabled. The trial court agreed that Employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury sustained in the fall combined with the pre-existing disabilities and awarded Employee full benefits with 40% liability for the award assigned to Employer and 60% assigned to the Fund. The Fund appealed, asserting, 1) that Employer does not meet the definition of “employer” for purposes of the Second Injury Fund statute; 2) that the proof is insufficient to show that Employer had knowledge of Employee’s pre-existing disabilities; and 3) that the judgment awarded Employee was incorrectly apportioned between the Fund and the Employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Clay, of two counts of facilitation of the sale of less than .5 gram of cocaine, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant, as a career offender, to concurrent twelve-year sentences for each count. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of facilitation of the sale of a Schedule II narcotic less than .5 gram; (2) the court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for the sale of Schedule II narcotics; and (3) the statutes under which the court sentenced him are unconstitutional as applied to him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, LaKeith Humphrey, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court erred in granting a special jury instruction; the trial court abused its discretion by allowing some testimony and limiting other testimony; the trial court erred in admitting the murder weapon into evidence; and the cumulative effect of these errors suffices to justify a new trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

This appeal involves an arbitration agreement that was executed when a patient was admitted to a nursing home. The arbitration agreement was signed by the patient’s sister, who had presented a power of attorney document to the admissions staff that designated her as the patient’s attorney-in-fact. The patient’s representative in this lawsuit contends that the patient was incompetent when he executed the power of attorney document, and therefore, the sister lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement on his behalf. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the patient was incompetent when he signed  the document and denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. We affirm and remand.

Plaintiff in shareholder derivative action appeals the dismissal of his suit alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and other misconduct, including insider trading, by current and former officers and directors of corporation. Plaintiff filed suit without first making demand on the board of directors of the corporation that the directors initiate the lawsuit. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege with requisite particularity that such demand would have been futile. We affirm the dismissal of the action.

This appeal involves a home construction dispute between an LLC contractor and the homeowners. The contractor entered into a written contract with the homeowners for the construction of a 6000 square foot home. Upon the relationship between the parties becoming strained, the homeowners claim the contractor told them to find another builder. The contractor contends it was fired from the project. The instant action was commenced by the contractor to enforce a lien. The trial court found in favor of the contractor. The homeowners appeal. We affirm.

This case arises from the grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss, whereby the trial court dismissed one of the party-defendants from this lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Specifically, the trial court determined that: (1) the Appellants had failed to serve process on the Appellee; (2) that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose operated to save the Appellants’ cause of action; and (3) that Appellants were not entitled to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 relief on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision in this case. The Majority found that the Trial Court “did not err in finding that Wise Construction, LLC was the contracting party....” I believe the evidence and Tennessee law shows that John S. Wise, III rather than Wise Construction, LLC was the contracting party, and I would so hold.

In this declaratory judgment action, the parties sought interpretation of a real estate purchase contract. The contract between the buyer and the seller provided for the assignment of all leases on the property and proration of rents to the buyer. The parties disputed whether these provisions contemplated a separate agreement between the seller and a third party. At the behest of the parties, the trial court construed both agreements and granted summary judgment to the buyer. On appeal, we raise, sua sponte, the question of whether all necessary parties were before the trial court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19. After concluding that all necessary parties were not included in this action, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case arose over the construction of a home for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued the construction company and a bank and several individuals. The Trial Court resolved the issues as to defendants, except Mark Rodriguez, prior to trial. The plaintiffs' case against Rodriguez was tried by the Trial Court who directed a verdict at the end of plaintiffs' proof. Plaintiffs appealed to this Court. Plaintiffs insisted that material evidence established a violation of the Consumer Protection Act by defendant, and the directed verdict should be reversed. Upon review of the evidentiary record, we conclude that the Trial Judge properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, and we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Elgene Porter aka “Twin,” was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. For these convictions, he received an effective sentence of forty-two years at 100% in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police; (2) the trial court erred in failing to immediately remove a juror once a potential conflict was identified; (3) the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentences; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentences. After our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a wrongful death action filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Commission”) by the parents and brother (“the Claimants”) of six month old Demitrus M. T. (“the Infant” or “Demitrus”), individually and on behalf of Demitrus, after he drowned in a bathtub while in the care of Sherika Hamilton, a friend of the family identified in a Tennessee Department of Child Services (“DCS” or “the Department”) safety plan as the “placement caretaker.” There is no dispute that Hamilton left the Infant unattended in the bathtub while she was otherwise occupied in an adjacent room. The primary disputes at trial before the Commissioner, and on appeal, are whether the Infant was in the “care, custody and control” of the Department so as to provide jurisdiction to the Commission; whether the Department’s “Case Recordings,” some of which were made more than a month after the event they purport to record, are inadmissible hearsay; and whether it was foreseeable to the Department that Hamilton would leave the helpless Infant unattended in a bathtub and let him drown. The Commission found that it had jurisdiction because the Department had control of the Infant even though it did not have custody, that the Case Recordings were admissible, and that the Department was not negligent because it could not have foreseen this tragic event. The Claimants appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate the dismissal on the merits.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Calvin Demetrius Shaw, of simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. During a sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that the appellant had two prior convictions for simple possession and sentenced him to twenty months in confinement for simple possession as a Class E felony pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by sentencing him for a Class E felony when the jury found him guilty of a misdemeanor and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e) is unconstitutional because it allows for enhanced punishment without prior notice. The State concedes that the trial court improperly sentenced the appellant for a Class E felony. We agree and conclude that the case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The petitioner, Terry D. Sneed, aggrieved of his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and two counts of aiding and abetting aggravated rape for which he received sentences totaling 124 years’ incarceration, filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Following multiple appointments of counsel, amendments to the petition, and other procedural matters spanning over nine years, the post-conviction court denied relief after a full evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by (1) denying his motion to sever his post-conviction hearing from that of his co-defendant, (2) denying his motion to continue the evidentiary hearing based upon the unavailability of two witnesses, and (3) denying relief for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the single allegation that trial counsel failed to introduce evidence of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) laboratory report at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The order from which the appellant Anna Marie Roller seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, December 15, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, January 18, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, James G. Watson, entered guilty pleas to theft, felony reckless endangerment, and two counts of aggravated assault in the Knox County Criminal Court. He subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Johnson County Criminal Court, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the probationary sentence he received for his theft conviction expired before the trial court revoked his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Julie Alexander died in an automobile accident on South Rutherford Boulevard in Murfreesboro. Her husband sued the city, claiming that the road was unsafe or dangerous and that the city had notice of the condition of the road. After a trial, the trial court found that the city did not have notice and that the road was not unsafe or dangerous. Ms. Alexander’s husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision that the city had no notice of the condition.

This appeal is from the General Sessions Court of Roane County. It is the opinion of this Court that the appeal is premature as there is no final judgment as provided in the applicable rules. It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Costs on appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Brett D. Stokes, and his surety, for which execution may issue, if necessary.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Reginald Maurice Adkins, was convicted of first degree felony murder, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-302, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-12-107(a), -13-403(b). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of either offense. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.