APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Orlando M. Reames, entered an “open” guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the State dismissed one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(e)(1), -16-609(e). The trial court  sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately prepare for the Petitioner’s trial, resulting in the Petitioner feeling coerced to accept the State’s plea offer. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.DAVID H. WELLES,

Following a change of venue, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant of voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his request for a continuance to secure a material witness to the case; (2) denied his request for a jury instruction on ignorance and mistake of fact; and (3) sentenced him as a Persistent, Range III offender. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a dependency and neglect appeal from a finding of severe child abuse. The respondent mother gave birth to premature twins. Before the hospital released the premature infants to the mother’s care, she was given extensive instructions on their feeding. Two weeks later, one twin was hospitalized, near death from severe malnutrition and dehydration. Days later, the other twin was hospitalized, also severely malnourished and dehydrated. The twins were taken into State protective custody, and a petition for dependency and neglect was filed, alleging severe child abuse. The mother stipulated to dependency and neglect, but denied severe child abuse. The juvenile court held that the first twin had been subjected to severe child abuse, but not the second twin. The mother appealed this finding to the circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court held that both twins had been subjected to “severe child abuse” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(23)(A) and (B). The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding, inter alia, that subsection (B) of the statute does not require proof that the mother’s conduct was “knowing” in order to find severe child abuse.

The Defendant, Randy Lynn Shelby, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of two counts of aggravated burglary and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sixty-year sentence to be served at 100%. In this direct appeal, the Defendant’s only challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, arguing that the short period of confinement was incidental to the burglary and did not substantially interfere with the victim’s liberty. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought reconsideration of his earlier workers’ compensation settlement, which had been “capped” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that he had been terminated for cause, and was therefore not eligible for reconsideration. The trial court found for the employee and awarded additional benefits. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Rickey Clayton Rogers, was charged in a three-count indictment with DUI third offense; driving on a revoked or suspended license, third offense; and violation of the implied consent law. He filed a motion to dismiss all charges in the indictment on the basis that the charges were filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant pled guilty as charged in the indictment, and purported to reserve certified questions of law for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because of Defendant’s failure to comply with all of the requirements to reserve a certified question of law for appeal; in the alternative, the State argues that the judgments should be affirmed. After a review of the record and a review of the applicable case law, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellant appeals the trial court’s issuance of orders of protection against him. The appellant’s sister and brother-in-law filed petitions for ex parte orders of protection and alleged that on two separate occasions, the appellant fired shots toward their home. The appellant denies the allegations. After a hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that entry of the orders of protection was necessary. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Timothy Carl Johnson, Jr., pled guilty to attempted second degree murder, theft of property valued over $1000, attempted escape, burglary, nine counts of burglary of a vehicle, and ten counts of theft of property valued under $500. The trial court sentenced him to eighteen years in prison. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed this petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate the case. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charles A. Walker, of two counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years, at 100%, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this Court affirmed his two rape of a child convictions but reversed and remanded for a new trial the aggravated sexual battery conviction. State v. Charles A. Walker, No. M2005-00165-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3313651, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 15, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the prosecutor committed several acts of prosecutorial misconduct at trial; (3) his convictions should be reversed based upon “cumulative error and bias”; and (4) his sentencing was illegal. After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee injured her back while discharging her duties in the housekeeping department of her employer in October 2003. After treatment in the emergency room, she received conservative treatment from her physicians. She was released by her physician and returned to work. In February 2005, she was terminated by her employer. She continued to receive medical treatment for her back. In 2006, her physician recommended surgery, which was performed in December 2007. The trial court found that the employee was  permanently and totally disabled as a result of her injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that the award should be limited to two and one-half times her medical impairment ruling pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). The employer also contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Guy T. Graves, was indicted in November of 2009 by the Madison County Grand Jury for three counts of burglary. At trial, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for acquittal on count three of the indictment. The jury found Appellant guilty of the two remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twelve years for each conviction, ordering Appellant to serve the sentences consecutively. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the following issues are presented for this Court on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes; and (2) whether the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Lovard Deanta Horton, appeals from a Davidson County Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted in a multi-count indictment for three counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine weighing 300 grams or more, one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine weighing 300 grams or more with the intent to sell, one count of possession of marijuana weighing 70 pounds, one gram or more with intent to sell, one count of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to possess 300 pounds or more of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver in a school zone, and one count of possession of 300 pounds or more of marijuana  with intent to sell or deliver. Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine weighing 300 grams or more, one count of possession of more than 70 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, and one count of possession of more than 300 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. He received an effective sentence of twenty-eight years as a Range I, Standard Offender.  Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that his guilty plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that he received ineffective assistance of  counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Fabian Claxton, was convicted of four counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun while at a public place, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 22 years for each of the four attempted first degree murder convictions and a concurrent sentence of 11 months and 29 days for the unlawful possession of a handgun while at a public place conviction, for a total effective sentence of 88 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in instructing a witness to identify the Defendant; and (3) the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, State of Tennessee, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order granting the motion of the appellee, Jane Doe, to expunge a criminal indictment that was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Stewart, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, coercion of a witness, and misdemeanor evading arrest. After a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, coercion of a witness, and misdemeanor evading arrest. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Gary Dwayne Johnson, was convicted of one count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, one count of robbery, a Class C felony, one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, two counts of carjacking, Class B felonies, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and one count of felony escape, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101(b)(1), -13-103, -13-305(b)(1), -13-401(b), -13-404(b), -16-605(b)(2). The trial court found that the Defendant was a career offender and sentenced him to the following terms: six years for his reckless endangerment conviction, fifteen years for his robbery conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for his assault conviction, thirty years for each carjacking conviction, sixty years as a violent offender for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and six years for his felony escape conviction. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for reckless endangerment and robbery and ordered that all of his convictions, except the misdemeanor, run consecutively for a total effective sentence of 141 years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for review: (1) The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to sustain his convictions for reckless endangerment, robbery, assault, and carjacking; (2) The trial court erred when it sentenced him as a career offender and when it ordered that his sentences run consecutively; and (3) The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his Trial Counsel before the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Current owner of a life insurance policy filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, alleging that the life insurance company wrongfully terminated the policy after failing to notify the current owner of the impending lapse of the policy for nonpayment of premiums. The life insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, along with an affidavit and a copy of the policy, in an attempt to  demonstrate that it had provided notice in accordance with the policy terms. The current owner filed a response along with an affidavit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the life insurance company. We affirm.

The employee filed a motion to compel her employer to provide medical treatment pursuant to a court-approved settlement concerning a claim for an injury sustained in 2002. Her employer opposed the motion, contending that any medical treatment sought by the employee was due to a separate injury sustained in 2004. In the settlement of the 2004 claim, the employee had waived her right to future medical treatment. The trial court granted the employee’s motion, and her employer has appealed. We conclude that the employee’s claim for medical treatment is not ripe for judicial resolution, and vacate the trial court’s order.

The employee sustained a compensable injury to her left wrist. She alleged that she also sustained a neck injury as a result of the same incident. The employer denied the neck claim. The employee’s evaluating physician expressed somewhat contradictory opinions regarding the causal relationship between the work incident and her neck injury. The trial court held that the employee had a compensable neck injury in addition to her wrist injury and awarded benefits accordingly. The employer has appealed that finding. We affirm the judgment.

This is a breach of contract case. The trial court found two defendants liable for breaches of continuing guaranty agreements related to a construction loan and awarded judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court, however, did not adjudicate a pending cross-complaint. Although the court attempted to certify the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the court’s order did not make the express findings essential to certification. Because the trial court did not properly certify the judgment as final, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised before us. We dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, James Taylor, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and resulting sentences of life and forty years, respectively. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Terry Dwight Mooningham, Jr., was found guilty by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; evading arrest, a Class D felony; driving with a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (2006) (amended 2011), 39-16-603 (2010), 55-50-504 (2006), 55-10-406 (2006). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to four years’ confinement for the DUI conviction, eight years’ confinement for evading arrest, eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement for driving with a revoked license, and six months’ confinement for violation of the implied consent law. The DUI and evading arrest convictions were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction and that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Ray Bullard, pled guilty to evading arrest, a Class E felony, and four counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603, 39-14- 103, 39-14-105(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years, six months’ incarceration for the evading arrest conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ incarceration for each of the theft convictions, with all sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In summary, we conclude that the two judgments of conviction violate the principles of double jeopardy, and the sentence, as currently structured, violates the express provisions of the misdemeanor sentencing statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed, but the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the two convictions into a single offense for DUI and for imposition of a sentence compliant with our statutory guidelines. Costs are adjudged one-half to the State and one-half to the Defendant, for which execution may issue if necessary.

The Petitioner, Robert T. Henry, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1978 conviction for robbery. He claims his conviction is void because the law applicable at the time of his conviction has since been repealed and current law renders his indeterminate sentence illegal. The State has moved the court to affirm the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.