APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se petitioner, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or his sentences illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, who was extradited from Mexico to face charges for aggravated child abuse
and felony murder by aggravated child abuse, was convicted for each offense. The trial court imposed sentences of twenty-two years and life, respectively, to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction for aggravated child abuse, finding the evidence to be insufficient, but upheld the felony murder conviction. This Court granted applications for permission to appeal by both the State and the defendant. Because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for both aggravated child abuse and felony murder, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. More specifically, the conviction for felony murder is affirmed, and the conviction for aggravated child abuse is reinstated. No other issues warrant the grant of a new trial on either offense. The sentences imposed by the trial court for each of the two offenses are affirmed.

This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client’s standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented  her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client’s complaint for lack of standing  but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial  court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the client’s complaint.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellant, Heather Richardson, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order denying her relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. The State concedes that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying the application. Upon review, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the trial court to order the prosecutor to grant the Appellant pretrial diversion.

The defendant, Chuncy Lesolue Hollis, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a timely appeal to this court, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by issuing an expanded jury instruction on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that the defendant premeditated the killing, the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Robert A. Cantrell, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to sixteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial following a bomb threat and ensuing building evacuation that took place during voir dire; (2) whether his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury was prejudiced by the jurors’ exposure to the bomb threat and publicity surrounding the case; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Gerry Tallant, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on criminal responsibility, and that the State’s closing argument was improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Trestan Lemark Yarbrough, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence for his convictions for facilitation of aggravated assault and two counts of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was more severe than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in the sentencing guidelines. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating his original sentence.

A Blount County jury convicted the petitioner, Douglas Jordan, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the state suppressed evidence but that the evidence was not material to the defense. On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) the state withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the post-conviction court erred by applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard to the materiality prong of the Brady test; (3) the state’s suppression of evidence violated Article 1, sections 1 and 2, of the Tennessee Constitution; and (4) in the alternative, the petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the case. Following our thorough review, we conclude that the state failed to disclose evidence that was both favorable and material to the defense in violation of the petitioner’s right to due process. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for a new trial.

The defendant was indicted separately for two different criminal episodes, one involving an aggravated robbery and the other involving a homicide and an especially aggravated robbery. On the State’s motion but over the defendant’s objection, and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court consolidated the indictments for a single trial. The jury convicted the defendant of all offenses charged, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in consolidating the offenses. We hold that the trial court erred both as to methodology and as to result in consolidating the indictments. When a defendant objects to the State’s pretrial motion to consolidate offenses, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the motion under the severance provisions of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), not the provisions of Rule 8(b). We also hold that a prosecutor should refrain from seeking the consolidation of offenses over a defendant’s objection unless the prosecutor has a good faith basis for arguing that the requirements of Rule 14(b)(1) will be met. The trial court’s error in ordering consolidation requires that we reverse the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and remand for a new trial on that charge. The trial court’s error was harmless as to the defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and we affirm those convictions.

The defendant, Thomas Milton Carver, III, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury with a flight instruction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. Following review of the record, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mr. Gonzalez filed a petition to alter his final divorce decree, alleging that the decree violates federal law by allowing the wife to receive more than 50% of his military retirement. The trial court denied relief. Mr. Gonzalez appealed. We affirm, holding that federal law does not limit Tennessee trial courts to awarding a maximum of 50% of a former service member’s retirement to the ex-spouse.

Petitioner, Ricky Lynn Hill, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner pled guilty to vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”) fifth offense, attempted tampering with evidence, and leaving the scene of an accident.¹ Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced 1 to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days and released to intensive probation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he argued that his guilty pleas were involuntary, that his convictions violated double jeopardy, and that his sentence was excessive. The habeas corpus court denied relief for failure to comply with the habeas corpus statute and for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Darrin Mosby, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to two counts of carjacking, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent ten-year sentences, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposed sentences, specifically contending that: (1) the term of ten years is excessive in light of the trial court’s misapplication of an enhancement factor and failure to consider mitigating factors; and (2) the court erred in ordering the sentences be served in confinement. Following a review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration based upon this opinion.

In this interlocutory appeal, the appellant, Mark Patton, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a three-count indictment against him. The appellant claims that he is immune from prosecution pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-47-107 because the State compelled him to testify about matters related to the indictment at a proceeding to oust him as Roane County Constable. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the order of the trial court and dismiss the indictment.

Taxpayer is a Delaware limited partnership that produces, sells, and distributes ice cream in Tennessee and elsewhere. At issue in this appeal is the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s excise tax assessment on capital gains from a one-time stock transaction between Taxpayer and its holding company. Taxpayer sought a refund in chancery court, challenging the validity of the tax assessment on statutory and federal constitutional grounds. Both Taxpayer and the Department moved for summary judgment. The chancery court granted summary judgment to Taxpayer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Based on the uncontested facts in the record, we hold that Taxpayer’s capital gains were business earnings pursuant to the functional test provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-2004(1) (Supp. 2000) and therefore subject to the excise tax. Additionally, we hold that the tax assessment was constitutional pursuant to the unitary business principle. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter summary judgment for the Department. We remand to the trial court to determine the amount of excise tax related to Taxpayer’s capital gains.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Deadrick Eugene Garrett, of first degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Dyishun Foust, 1 and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Douglass Marshall Mathis, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction for first degree murder and accompanying life sentence. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were not void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jason Michael Fint, of one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Finding that the defendant qualified as a career offender, the trial court imposed the maximum Class D felony sentence of 12 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Daniel Buck, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13- 502(b), -504(b). This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Daniel Buck, No. M2005-02818-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3831390 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 12, 2006), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2007). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue that his convictions were barred by the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The defendant, Michael Clark, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing evidence to be presented concerning his prior conviction for aggravated assault. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Appellant, Wade Tyler, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for one count of rape, one count of incest, and one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. Appellant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to eight years for the rape conviction, four years for the incest conviction, and four years for the statutory rape by an authority figure conviction. The sentences for rape and incest were ordered to be served concurrently. The sentence for statutory rape by an authority figure was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence for rape, for a total effective sentence of twelve years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim about specific instances of conduct; (3) whether the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing; and (4) whether the indictment was defective. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. Further, we determine that the trial court properly refused to allow cross-examination of the victim about specific instances of conduct and that the indictment was sufficient to inform Appellant of the charges against him. However, because we have identified several discrepancies in the record, we remand the matter for correction of the judgment form for statutory rape by an authority figure. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed and the matter is remanded.

Petitioner, Christopher Michael Flake, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions were reversed on the basis that the jury improperly rejected the proof at trial that established Petitioner was insane at the time of the offenses. State v. Christopher Flake, No. W2001-00568-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1298733 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 12, 2002), rev’d on appeal by State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of this Court on appeal. State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, among other things, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Lawrence J. Brozik, was charged with ten counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1005(c) (2003). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of ten counts of facilitation of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403(b) (2003). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each count and ordered that five of his sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him; (2) the State failed to disclose promises made to, or agreements with, the minor victim’s husband; (3) the trial court erred when it found that he was the leader in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors; (4) the disparity between the Defendant’s sentence and the minor victim’s husband’s sentence violated the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989; (5) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; and (6) the trial court erred when it found that evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing was not sufficient to support a new trial. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but modify his sentences to be served concurrently.