APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, John C. Howard, was indicted for three counts of aggravated child abuse. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in an open, best interest plea. After a sentencing hearing, a five-year split confinement sentence was imposed. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve one hundred twenty days in incarceration for each offense, followed by five years of probation, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court further denied judicial diversion. Appellant seeks a review of the trial court’s denial of diversion. Because we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Wendell Wayne Sweeton, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 150 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s rulings regarding purported discovery and Brady violations, the denial of appellant’s suppression motion, and the admissibility of the appellant’s prior DUI convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendants, Timothy Washington Lyons and Antonio Lamont Scales, of the attempted second degree murder of Teresa Crenshaw and the reckless aggravated assault of Quanita Robinson. The trial court sentenced each defendant to 22 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s failure to provide the “missing witness” instruction, and the propriety of the sentences imposed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the convictions. Because the trial court mistakenly believed it was imposing sentences for Class C felony aggravated assault rather than Class D felony aggravated assault, utilized improper enhancement factors, and imposed consecutive sentences without making required findings of fact, the sentences imposed are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. In addition, new judgment forms for the aggravated assault convictions must be entered to reflect that the defendants were convicted of Class D felony aggravated assault.

The Petitioner, Douglass Marshall Mathis, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction for first degree murder and accompanying life sentence. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were not void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Father filed a petition to relocate with the parties’ minor child, and the trial court denied his petition. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court made evidentiary and procedural errors necessitating vacating its decision, that the trial court’s decision denying his petition to relocate was erroneous, and that the trial court erred in declining to award him his attorney fees in defending against  Mother’s petition for dependency and neglect. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

Plaintiff filed this medical battery suit on behalf of his deceased mother and named as defendants the nephrologist who ordered an allegedly unauthorized hemodialysis procedure, another treating physician, and the hospital where she was treated. The trial court granted summary judgment to the treating physician who did not order the procedure and to the hospital. Plaintiff appeals. We find that both of these defendants were entitled to summary judgment and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Petitioner, James A. Burgess, of two counts of second degree murder, two counts of felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment for each of the felony murder convictions. The Petitioner appealed the convictions, and this Court remanded the case for  modification of the Petitioner’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and affirmed in all other respects. State v. Burgess, M2009-00897-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3025524 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Aug 4, 2010). In May 2010, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to raise the existence of newly discovered evidence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court’s denial was in error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Marquise Harris, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his transfer to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute for a forensic evaluation was illegally accomplished in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial by jury. Additionally, Petitioner complained that neither the general sessions court nor the criminal court had jurisdiction because of the illegal transfer. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Plaintiff, a railroad employee, filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that his left ankle injury was caused by his working conditions. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but subsequently granted the railroad’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the railroad’s application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for summary judgment.

The Defendant, Dwayne Thomas Hooten, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the previously imposed sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Innocent S. Nzamubereka, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury in count one of domestic aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and in counts two and three of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to six years for each count and ordered counts one and two served concurrently with one another but consecutively to count three, for an effective sentence of twelve years. The court ordered Nzamubereka to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and allowed him to serve the remaining six years on probation. On appeal, Nzamubereka argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding that one of the victims was unavailable; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in ruling on three evidentiary issues; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the State to make an improper comment during voir dire; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kenneth Thompson Anderson, Jr., was convicted of eight counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and sentenced to an effective sentence of nine years. In this direct appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for review: 1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow testimony regarding the victim’s past sexual behavior and preference for older men; and 2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, we granted the request of Jason Patrick Shaw (“Father”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal on three issues: (1) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to grant his request for access to his older daughter’s counseling records with a licensed clinical social worker; (2) whether the Trial Court properly prohibited Father from taking this daughter’s deposition, and (3) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused Father visitation with any of the parties’ three children. As to the first issue, we remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether furnishing the social worker’s records would be against the daughter’s best interest, as discussed more fully in this Opinion. We vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father to depose the daughter. Finally, we vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father any meaningful visitation and remand for the Trial Court to determine an appropriate supervised visitation schedule.

The Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Ann Marie Shannon, for four counts including one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), second offense. On June 19, 2009, Petitioner entered a negotiated plea agreement to DUI, first offense. Pursuant to the agreement, she was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in the Swaim Center 1 and serve eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court.  Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Rolly William Whitford, pled guilty to sexual battery and rape and agreed for the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years for the sexual battery conviction and ten years for the rape conviction, and it ordered that the sentences run consecutively for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it: (1) enhanced his sentences; (2) ordered consecutive sentencing; (3) denied him an alternative sentence; and (4) admitted into evidence his 1984 psychosexual evaluation over his objection. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pursuant to a lease agreement, Defendant was allowed to place a billboard on Plaintiff’s building. After the billboard allegedly caused damage to Plaintiff’s building, Plaintiff notified Defendant. Defendant then sent a letter to Plaintiff terminating the lease, but Plaintiff claims Defendant later agreed to remove the billboard and make repairs to his building. When such repair and complete removal were not made, Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and we affirm.

In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court denied the petitions of both parents to modify the parenting time but granted the mother’s petition to modify child support. We affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to parenting time but reverse and remand for a proper determination regarding modification of child support.

The Petitioner, Eddie Lee Murphy, Sr., appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for felony murder and resulting life sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2003) (amended 2005, 2007). He contends that the trial court erred in denying him relief because (1) he did not understand the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his guilty plea, (2) he was not adequately informed of his right against  self-incrimination, (3) trial counsel was ineffective, and (4) his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Calvin Fleming, appeals from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a mental evaluation and in failing to inform the trial court of the absence of the mental evaluation at trial. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s introduction of the victim’s medical records on the basis that they violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the confrontation issue on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Henry Springer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a standard offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Springer claims the evidence was insufficient because it did not identify him as the perpetrator. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee’s truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee. On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a  comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.

The Petitioner, Russell Nolan Quarles, pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his claims. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On January 12, 2009, the Defendant, Paul Jay Vassallo, pleaded guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of theft of property valued under $500. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of two years at 30% for each forgery conviction, a sentence of four years at 30% for the aggravated burglary conviction, and a sentence of eleven-months and twenty-nine days at 75% for the theft conviction. These sentences were concurrent terms, resulting in an effective four-year sentence at 30%. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the motion was denied. The Defendant now appeals, contending that his guilty plea was made based upon a gross misrepresentation by the prosecutor. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the Sevier County Circuit Court.

The appellant, Dexter Dodd, appeals the denial of his petition to remove the oath of secrecy with respect to two grand jury proceedings. Mr. Dodd is pursuing discrimination and tort claims against certain individuals who allegedly instigated these criminal proceedings against him, and he alleges that removal of the traditional grand jury oath of secrecy is necessary for him to effectively pursue these claims. After careful review, we conclude that the appellant’s appeal is not properly before this court, and we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Broderick Joseph Smith, was convicted of two counts of carjacking, a Class B felony; three counts of attempted robbery, a Class D felony; one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and one count of attempted carjacking, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 20 years on each of the carjacking convictions, eight years for each of the attempted robbery convictions, 11 months and 29 days for the assault conviction, 15 years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and ten years for the attempted carjacking conviction. The trial court ruled that the sentences for all but the assault conviction should run consecutively for an effective sentence of 89 years. The trial court also ruled that the sentence should run consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in federal court for two related armed bank robbery convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the aggravated robbery count from the remainder of the indictment; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence that the Defendant committed the two related armed bank robberies; and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences and by imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.