APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Bobby Ervin, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Marshall County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Ricky Lane McKnight, for violation of the Habitual Motor Offender Act and driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of three and one-half years. On appeal, the dDefendant argues that the trial court's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Defendant, Jerry Len Angus, was indicted in a seventeen-count indictment by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of official misconduct in violation of Tenn. Code Ann._ 39-16-402, nine counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-527, four counts of statutory rape in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13- 506, and one count of rape in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-503. Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of official misconduct, one count of attempt to commit sexual battery, a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of sexual battery, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of attempt to commit statutory rape, a lesser-included offense of statutory rape. The jury did not consider eight counts of the indictment as the trial court granted judgments of acquittal at the close of the State's proof, and defendant was acquitted by the jury of the remaining two counts. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, and following a hearing, the trial court vacated his conviction for official misconduct in Count 1 of the indictment for insufficiency of the evidence. The court granted a mistrial as to defendant's conviction for attempted sexual battery in Count 4, his conviction for official misconduct in Count 8, and his conviction for sexual battery in Count 11. In an amended order, the trial court also vacated defendant's conviction for official misconduct in Count 3 of the indictment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court's polling of the jury was improper and that he is entitled to a new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The former attorney for the plaintiff, who is seeking to recover a contingency fee pursuant to an attorney's lien she filed after her services were terminated, filed this appeal challenging the trial court's finding that the parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement and the involuntary dismissal of the underlying personal injury action. The action was dismissed because the pro se plaintiff did not comply with orders of the court. The plaintiff's former attorney claims she has the independent right to enforce a settlement she negotiated, but which her client rejected, in order to recover a fee. The pro se plaintiff also seeks to set aside the involuntary dismissal of his case. Finding no merit to the arguments asserted on appeal, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Linda F. Cathey, of one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-104, -105(4) (2006). The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years' probation and ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $27,000. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, by imposing the maximum sentence of six years, and by ordering restitution without properly considering her ability to pay. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff home buyers filed suit against two home inspectors and a home inspection company after discovering defects in the home that were not mentioned in the inspection report. The court found that the defendants were negligent and granted the plaintiffs a judgment for damages against the home inspectors and the inspection company, individually, jointly and severally. The defendants argue on appeal that the judgment was not supported by the evidence and that in holding them individually liable, the court pierced the corporate veil without the proof of the extraordinary circumstances normally required for a court to do so. We affirm the finding of liability and the judgment for damages, but we vacate the judgment as to one of the individual defendants, because the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that he was in partnership with the other individual defendant.

River Park Hospital has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider its opinion filed on October 20, 2010. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and appellate briefs, from all of which we conclude that our opinion addressed and considered all issues raised by River Park in its appeal. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is respectfully denied and the costs of this petition are taxed to River Park Hospital, Inc., d/b/a River Park Hospital, for which execution may issue if necessary.

The Petitioner, Robert J. Skillen, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rokisha Lashia Alderson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, she argues that the statute of limitations was tolled because she was misled by prison officials about her minority status. After our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the petition.

Father appeals the trial court's decision to allow Mother to relocate to California with the parties' minor child. Mother and Father lived separately in California when their only child was born. Mother moved with the minor child to Tennessee in April 2008; Father also moved to Tennessee to be near the child. A year later, Father filed a Petition to Register a Foreign Decree and Modify and Enforce Visitation in the Williamson County Juvenile Court. In June 2009, Mother notified Father she intended to return to California with their child and sought court permission to do so. When the juvenile court referee denied the relocation, Mother sought a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge. Following a full hearing, the juvenile court judge granted Mother's request to relocate finding that Father, who did not have substantially equal parenting time, failed to carry his burden under the parental relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-108(d)(1). We affirm the trial court's findings that Father did not prove that Mother's move is not for a reasonable purpose, poses a specific or serious threat of harm to the child, or is vindictive. We also affirm the trial court's decision denying Mother's request for attorney's fees and deny her request for attorney's fees on appeal.

Defendant, Duantez Cornell Jenkins, was indicted for possession, within a school zone, and with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. In the same indictment, Robert Lee Archibald, Jr. (Archibald), was indicted for the same offense, in addition to two other charges. All charges were the result of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized which forms the basis of the charges against him. The trial court entered an order granting the motion and dismissed the charges against defendant. The State appeals. Based upon the record and briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Mary Cathleena Blindt, for three counts of prescription fraud, two counts of forgery, and one count each of theft, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, and failure to appear. Following guilty pleas and a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing, ordered consecutive sentencing, and imposed the maximum sentence within the range for three of the defendant's convictions. The defendant also correctly notes an error on the judgment forms. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments in part and remand the case for correction of an error on one of the judgment forms.

The defendant, Steven Cornell Gray, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but upon our review of the case, we affirm this conviction.

The pro se petitioner, Henry Johnson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. He was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated burglary and was sentenced to life imprisonment on August 19, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: the indictment against him was defective; the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or appointment of counsel; and he was subject to double jeopardy as a result of the indictment. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Matthew R. Hakoda, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a divorce appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction. The parties, the parents of one minor child, resided in Tennessee when divorce proceedings were initiated in the Tennessee trial court. The trial court entered a pendente lite order designating the father as the child's primary residential parent and setting the mother's child support obligation. Before the trial, a special master made a recommendation on the mother's child support obligation. In May 2008, after a trial, the Tennessee trial court entered an order declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as primary residential parent, but did not rule on child support. By the time of the divorce order, both parties had moved to Kentucky. Almost immediately afterward, the mother filed an objection regarding the amount of her child support obligation, and the Tennessee trial court entered an order temporarily modifying her child support. In February 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. The Tennessee trial court conducted a hearing on the mother's objection to the amount of child support and her petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. It declined to change the designation of primary residential parent, and also held that the mother owed no back child support arrearage. Both parties appeal. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's request for modification of child support. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's orders modifying the parenting plan and modifying child support.

This is an appeal of two unlawful detainer actions consolidated below. New South Federal Savings Bank ("New South") filed separate detainer warrants against Brenda Pugh seeking possession of two non-adjacent properties conveyed to New South at a foreclosure sale instituted after Pugh defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust on the 1 properties. The general sessions court dismissed the actions. On appeal, the trial court rejected Pugh's challenge to the foreclosure. The court held in favor of New South and ordered that it be restored to possession of the properties. Pugh appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the application of the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-203(g (2)(B) (2008) to a suit for workers' compensation benefits. An employee who sustained a compensable injury and who received authorized medical treatment filed a civil action in the Chancery Court for Giles County more than one year after the last payment of medical benefits. Her employer filed a "special motion to dismiss" on the ground that the suit was time-barred. The trial court, relying on the discovery rule, denied the motion on the ground that the limitations period did not begin to run until the employee's attorney received a letter from her treating physician stating [*2] that her injury was work-related. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the employer permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and referred the appeal to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51 for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We have determined that the statute of limitations bars the  employee's complaint and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The parties, owners of a tract of land, ultimately agreed to the sale of the property by a Special Master appointed by the Court. The sale was held and the Master ultimately reported the purchase and asked that the sale be confirmed. Before the Court acted on the Master's Report, the plaintiff moved for a dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 41, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed the case. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court was required to act on the Master's Report before entertaining any motion to dismiss the case, and reinstate the action and remand for further proceedings.

The General Sessions Court awarded the plaintiffs an $8,500 judgment for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The pro se defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Circuit Court, but failed to have the case docketed within 45 days after filing the notice of appeal, as is required by Davidson County Local Rule 20(b). The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of untimeliness and to enforce the order of the General Sessions Court. The defendant did not respond to the motion, nor did she appear for the motion hearing. The Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and made the judgment of the General Sessions Court the judgment of the Circuit Court. The defendant then retained counsel, who filed a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment eight months after it was rendered. The Circuit Court denied the motion. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Terry B. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and resulting 15-year sentence. The Petitioner contends (1) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) he was denied a "full and fair hearing" on his petition due to the ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel; and (3) he was denied a "full and fair hearing" on his petition because the judge presiding over his post-conviction proceedings also presided over the original trial proceedings. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William Collier, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus wherein he challenged his November 2008 convictions of possession of heroin with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief via a sentence illegality. Discerning no error, we affirm the habeas corpus court's summary dismissal of the petition.