APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Bobby Joe Rollins, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-eight years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 (aggravated robbery defined). This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Bobby Joe Rollins, No. M2008-00284-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 5427733 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 31, 2008) (mem.), perm. to appeal dismissed, (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2009). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because: (1) Trial Counsel misadvised the Petitioner with respect to whether he should testify at his trial; (2) Trial Counsel failed to undertake any meaningful trial preparations with the Petitioner; and (3) Trial Counsel failed to object and request a mistrial when a witness stated that the Petitioner had been in “the pen.” After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Mark Alan Deakins, appeals pro se the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that the judgment was not void and by dismissing his petition without an  evidentiary hearing and without appointment of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The order from which the appellant Donna Angela Ross seeks to appeal was entered on Monday, August 2, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Friday, September 3, 2010, the 32nd day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

This is a direct appeal from a guilty plea pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Defendant, James F. Mason, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. As part of his plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence. Because the Defendant has failed to properly certify his issue for review, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Scotty Mack Griffith, pled guilty to promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and to possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-433, 39-17-418 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ confinement for the promotion conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement for the possession conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of full confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Alan Steele, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that because of newly discovered DNA evidence, his convictions should be vacated and/or he should be granted a new trial to present evidence of a third-party perpetrator. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without a hearing and that it applied the wrong standard in making its ruling. We agree that the trial court used the wrong standard; nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Parties who pled guilty to violation of a Nolensville ordinance argued that the costs assessed in their cases violated Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Nolensville municipal court found against the parties. On appeal, the circuit court also found against the parties. On further appeal, we affirm the lower courts’ decisions against one party and affirm in part and reverse in part the lower courts’ decisions against the other party.

The defendant, Eddie H. Pittman, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued between $500-$1000, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the value of the stolen goods. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion. I respectfully express my view that the trial court’s “ would not have changed the results” formulation does not necessarily equate to the application of a wrong standard. As the majority opinion notes, Mixon and Vasques formulate the standard for establishing entitlement to coram nobis relief as when the petitioner shows that the new evidence “may have” resulted in a different judgment. See State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.3d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999). One might view the trial court’s formulation in the present case as merely stating the correct standard in the negative. Certainly, the more precise formulation of the opposite of “may have” is “could not have” or “cannot have,” but still the court may have correctly determined that no possibility existed that the result of trial may have been different with the new evidence at play. Obviously, the use of the Mixon-Vasques language would be preferable.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant obtained a credit card from Appellee’s predecessor in interest, and defaulted on payment of the debt. Appellee brought suit to recover the debt, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that there is a dispute of fact as to whether Appellee is a lawful successor in interest, and also asserting that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s  request to have certain documents included in the record. Affirmed.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions, and upon finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

Plaintiff sued Haywood County and a Haywood County sheriff’s deputy after she was sexually harassed by the deputy. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff against Haywood County and against the deputy. Haywood County appeals, challenging the finding of liability and the amount of damages awarded against it.  We affirm.

The appellant, Douglas Boruff, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to discharge a fine that the trial court imposed as part of his punishment for a prior conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, the appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Dimecos Ichad Jones, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Gerald Deon Jenkins, entered a best-interest guilty plea to one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of theft over $500, a Class E felony; one count of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, and one count of setting fire to personal property, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(b), -14-103, -14-105(2)-(3), -14-303(b) (2003). The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for the second degree murder conviction, two years for the theft over $500 conviction, four years for the theft over $1,000 conviction, and two years for the setting fire to personal property conviction. The court ordered that the terms run concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner presents the following issues for review: (1) The post-conviction court erred when it found that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel; (2) The post-conviction court
“commit[ted] error in finding that the sentence of maximum punishment was correct”; and (3) The trial court committed plain error when it considered the convictions contained in the presentence report, failed to consider “lingering doubt or innocence,” and incorrectly applied enhancement factors. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Chris Jones, was charged with one count of first degree murder with respect to victim Donald Munsey; two counts of attempted first degree murder with respect to victims Justin Smith and David Eagan; one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of one count of second degree murder; one count of attempted second degree murder with respect to Mr. Smith; one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter with respect to Mr. Eagan; one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions on the first three counts; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded testimony of Mr. Munsey’s prior violent acts; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence regarding the Defendant’s recent divorce; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to rehabilitate a witness with his prior consistent statement; and (5) that the Defendant’s rights to trial by jury and due process were violated by the use of sequential jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a work-related injury in September 2007, but medical treatment was not offered by the employer at that time. He continued to work for several months despite his injury. In March 2008, his employer sent him to a physician. He was diagnosed with a significant spinal injury, which required surgical treatment and resulted in severe disability. His employer had changed its workers’ compensation insurer in November 2007. Employee’s claim was settled, but the two insurers disagreed as to which was liable. The trial court found that the insurer at the time of the original injury was liable. That insurer has appealed, contending that the later insurer should be liable due to the gradual worsening of the employee’s condition after November 2007.  We affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Frederick Lamont Moore, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; first degree murder committed while in the perpetration of a felony (felony murder); aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and two counts of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and ordered a sentence of life imprisonment for the resulting conviction. As to the remaining counts, the trial court ordered a sentence of 20 years for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and concurrent sentences of 10 years for each of the tampering with evidence convictions. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve his 20-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping consecutively to his life imprisonment sentence for the first degree murder conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Physician appeals Chancery Court decision affirming his summary suspension of his license to practice medicine on the basis of his conviction in the State of Kentucky for facilitation to traffic in controlled substances. We affirm the Chancery Court judgment and the summary suspension of the physician’s license.

In this conservatorship case, a daughter filed a petition asking the court to appoint her as the conservator of her father, who had experienced cognitive decline after a stroke and required full-time care in an inpatient facility. The father’s spouse protested the appointment of the daughter as the conservator and requested that a neutral third party be appointed instead. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the daughter was the appropriate person to serve as conservator, and specifically enumerated the power to file for divorce on behalf of the ward to the conservator. The spouse appeals. We affirm. Our first opinion in this case originally was filed on January 21, 2011. Appellant thereafter filed a petition to rehear. The petition to rehear contained a meritorious assertion. Accordingly, we granted the petition, withdrew our original opinion and now submit this substitute opinion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Orlando M. Reames, entered an “open” guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the State dismissed one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(e)(1), -16-609(e). The trial court  sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately prepare for the Petitioner’s trial, resulting in the Petitioner feeling coerced to accept the State’s plea offer. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.DAVID H. WELLES,

Following a change of venue, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant of voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his request for a continuance to secure a material witness to the case; (2) denied his request for a jury instruction on ignorance and mistake of fact; and (3) sentenced him as a Persistent, Range III offender. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a dependency and neglect appeal from a finding of severe child abuse. The respondent mother gave birth to premature twins. Before the hospital released the premature infants to the mother’s care, she was given extensive instructions on their feeding. Two weeks later, one twin was hospitalized, near death from severe malnutrition and dehydration. Days later, the other twin was hospitalized, also severely malnourished and dehydrated. The twins were taken into State protective custody, and a petition for dependency and neglect was filed, alleging severe child abuse. The mother stipulated to dependency and neglect, but denied severe child abuse. The juvenile court held that the first twin had been subjected to severe child abuse, but not the second twin. The mother appealed this finding to the circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court held that both twins had been subjected to “severe child abuse” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(23)(A) and (B). The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding, inter alia, that subsection (B) of the statute does not require proof that the mother’s conduct was “knowing” in order to find severe child abuse.

The Defendant, Randy Lynn Shelby, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of two counts of aggravated burglary and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sixty-year sentence to be served at 100%. In this direct appeal, the Defendant’s only challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, arguing that the short period of confinement was incidental to the burglary and did not substantially interfere with the victim’s liberty. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought reconsideration of his earlier workers’ compensation settlement, which had been “capped” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that he had been terminated for cause, and was therefore not eligible for reconsideration. The trial court found for the employee and awarded additional benefits. We affirm the judgment.