APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Timothy Neal James, pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and one count of incest, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Claude David Merritt, entered an "open" guilty plea to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-218(d). The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Jackie L. Dozier, of three counts of sexual battery, three counts of incest, and one count of attempted sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of nine years, ordering the defendant to serve two years of his sentence in jail and the rest on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal; (2) imposed consecutive sentencing; and (3) imposed a period of confinement in excess of one year as part of a sentence of split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the evidence supports the defendant's convictions, but the trial court erred when it sentenced the defendant. As such, we affirm the defendant's convictions, but we reverse the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing and order the defendant's sentences to be served concurrently.

The Petitioner, James Hall, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence for his conviction of possession with intent to distribute 0.5 grams of a schedule II controlled substance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The question before this Court is whether the grandfather clause of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b)(1) protects the owner of newly annexed city property from the enforcement of a citywide ordinance prohibiting the sale and storage of fireworks. Interpreting section 13-7-208(b)(1) strictly against the landowner, we hold that the grandfather clause does not apply because the ordinance is not a "zoning" restriction or regulation, i.e., the ordinance does not regulate the use of property within distinct districts or zones pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan. Accepting the facts alleged in the landowner's amended complaint as true, the landowner is not entitled to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against its preexisting fireworks business. We accordingly affirm the dismissal of the landowner's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Petitioner, Travis R. Morris, appeals the Rhea County Circuit Court's denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, for which he received a ten-year sentence to be served as fifteen years of probation as a Range I offender. See T.C.A. _ 39-17-1003 (2006). The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea, and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was mentally impaired by the effects of a prescription drug. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Prestige Land Company ("Developer") owned land upon which it intended to build a commercial shopping center. An estimate to complete the project was obtained. Thereafter, the project was opened up for bidding. Brian Mullins Excavating Contractors, Inc. ("Contractor") bid on the project. Although contractor's bid was significantly lower than the next lowest bid, it was only 10% lower than the estimated costs of construction. Contractor was unaware that it had made a unilateral mistake in its bid. Contractor was awarded the project. Eventually, contractor was unable to complete the project because it ran out of money due to its unilateral bidding mistake. Developer sued for breach of contract, and contractor filed a counterclaim for fraud and other claims. The trial court awarded contractor a judgment for $101,357.05. Finding no clear and convincing evidence of fraud by developer, we vacate the judgment for contractor and enter a judgment for developer in the amount of $128,326.56.

The defendant, Russell Lenox Hamblin, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years for each of the first two convictions and to twelve years for the third conviction. All the sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the sale and purchase of automobiles; the trial court abused its discretion in allowing his credibility to be impeached; and he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This is an appeal from a finding of dependency and neglect. An off-duty employee of the petitioner Tennessee Department of Children's Services witnessed the respondent mother hitting the subject child in the parking lot of a retail store. After an investigation, the State filed a petition for dependency and neglect, alleging abuse based on the parking lot incident. The juvenile court determined that the child had been abused and held that the child was dependent and neglected. The mother appealed to the circuit court, which conducted a two day trial de novo. After hearing the evidence, the circuit court below entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child had been abused and declaring the child to be dependent and neglected. The mother now appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Jason E. McLean, was charged with first degree murder after he shot and killed eighteen-year-old Sean Powell. At trial, the jury found appellant not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of reckless homicide, a lesser-included offense. The trial court denied appellant's request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to the four-year maximum sentence. It then suspended all but ninety days and ordered appellant to serve eleven years and two-hundred and seventy-five days on probation. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying judicial diversion; (2) sentencing appellant to the maximum sentence in the applicable range; and (3) ordering a lengthy probationary period. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Young Bok Song, of seven counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to serve sixty-five years at 100%. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court dismissed. On appeal, the petitioner raises a number of issues related to the trial court's determination that he was not entitled to relief based upon newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This is the second time this case, filed by John P. Konvalinka ("the Petitioner") to force disclosure of public documents, has been before us. In the trial court's order that generated the first appeal, the court held that the records the petitioner requested from Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("the Hospital" or "Erlanger") were exempt from disclosure under state law, and pretermitted the question of whether they were exempt from disclosure under federal law. On appeal, we held that the records were not protected from disclosure by state law and remanded for a determination of whether they were protected from disclosure by federal law. The Hospital attempted on remand to assert additional state law defenses to disclosure. The trial court held that the new state law defenses were outside the scope of the remand. It also held that federal law did not protect the documents at issue from disclosure. Accordingly, it ordered the Hospital to produce the documents. The Hospital appeals challenging both aspects of the trial court's judgment. We affirm.

I concur in the decision to vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. I agree that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) controls the outcome of this appeal. I further agree that the issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs intentionally caused the delay in the prompt service of the summons. I further agree that the record before us shows that Plaintiffs did make at least some attempts to serve Defendant. This being so, I agree that Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that Plaintiffs intentionally delayed service of the summons.

This case was precipitated when defendants blocked plaintiffs' use of an existing driveway. Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to use the driveway and that defendants would be required to restore the driveway as well as the excavations damaging plaintiffs' lots. On appeal, we affirm.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a gravel drive running through their property is a private easement rather than a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the drive is a public road. Finding this case inappropriate for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.

Carter County -Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., and Bonnie K. Hakey (collectively "the plaintiffs") filed suit against Jennifer L. Lund ("the defendant") seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a April 22, 2005, multiple-vehicle accident in Carter County. With her answer, the defendant coupled a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 "on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process." Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice finding "that the plaintiffs have not provided to the Court any valid reason for the delay in obtaining prompt service of process upon the defendant." Plaintiffs appeal. We (1) vacate the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and (2) remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner John Anthony Bailey filed the present petition for post-conviction relief in 2009 seeking relief from convictions entered in 1995 and 1996. Petitioner acknowledged that his petition was not filed within the one year statute of limitations; however, he asserted that due process required tolling of the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a primary care physician's alleged negligent and tortious treatment of a longtime patient. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, questioning the credibility of the patient's allegations and holding in part that the physician's alleged conduct could not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We reverse and remand.

The pro se petitioner, Steven Ray Kennedy, appeals the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the court should have given him fifteen days to file an amended petition that conformed to the statutory requirements or appointed counsel to assist in presenting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition by the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Dexter F. Johnson, appeals from the post-conviction court's order denying his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court's order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Doyle Benton, pled guilty and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years' confinement for criminal conspiracy to sell schedule II cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, a Class D felony; to five years' confinement for sale and delivery of schedule II cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, a Class C felony; and to three years' confinement for sale and delivery of schedule III narcotics, a Class D felony; all to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of five years' confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentences are excessive in length and that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I agree with so much of the majority opinion as affirms the trial court’s judgment against Allstate Building System, LLC. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s decision (1) to reverse the judgment in favor of 84 Lumber Company against R. Bryan Smith and (2) to grant summary judgment to Mr. Smith.

This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, which he filed after he was convicted by the prison disciplinary board of participating In security threat group activity. after reviewing the record, the trial court dismissed his petition. We affirm.

The personal representative of a decedent's estate filed This action to rescind twelve deeds, all of which were executed by the decedent's attorney-In-fact without the decedent's knowledge and for which the decedent received no consideration, or alternatively for damages. the attorney-In-fact conveyed the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter. the personal representative alleges that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty In making the transfers. the trial court agreed, and rescinded the conveyances for property still owned by the attorney-In-fact and awarded monetary damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of property subsequently conveyed to innocent third parties. the attorney-In-fact appeals claiming, inter alia, the personal representative lacks standing to bring a claim on behalf of the estate involving real property, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the trial court erred In finding that the durable power of attorney did not authorize him to transfer the property. We have determined the personal representative has standing to maintain This action and the action was timely filed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty by conveying the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter for no consideration to the decedent. We also affirm the rescission of the deeds to property the attorney-In-fact still owns and the award of damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of the real property that has since been conveyed to innocent third parties.