APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Antonio Bigsbee, was convicted by a Robertson County Circuit Court Jury of especially aggravated kidnapping and reckless endangerment. He received a total effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present the testimony of a rebuttal witness, that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Robert Wayne Bell regarding a gun purchased by the appellant, and that the State's closing argument was improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ricky Flamingo Brown, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking his judgment of conviction of aggravated rape and resulting life sentence. See T.C.A. _ 39-2-603 (1986). Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Tommy F. Poe, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentences he negotiated in exchange for his guilty pleas to aggravated kidnapping are illegal because they were ordered to be served at 35% release eligibility instead of the 100% required by law. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Steven D. Skinner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that counsel's representation was ineffective because counsel failed to investigate and prepare for his case. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The defendant, David William Cosgrif, III, was convicted by a Roane County jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and theft over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to an effective term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. He raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his second degree murder conviction; (2) whether the trial court erroneously admitted scientific testimony that did not meet sufficient indicia of reliability; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence for the murder conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but modify the defendant's sentence to fifteen years.

After a plant closure, employee sought reconsideration of a prior workers’ compensation settlement for right shoulder and elbow injuries in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 241(a)(2) (2008). Employer denied that he was entitled to reconsideration of the elbow injury because it was a separate injury to a scheduled member. Id. § 50-6-241(a)(1). The trial court found that the two injuries were concurrent and that employee was entitled to receive reconsideration as to both. It further found that employee had proven three of the four factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a) (2008) by clear and convincing evidence and was therefore not limited by the six times impairment cap. The trial court awarded 57.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, employer contends that the trial court erred by finding the injuries to be concurrent and by finding that employee had satisfied the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We affirm the holding that the injuries were concurrent but find that employee did not satisfy his burden of proof under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We modify the judgment accordingly.

Plaintiff insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine which of the two policies issued to defendants insured and their corporation, covered a van which had been involved in an accident. Plaintiff named the insureds as defendants, as well as the third party who had filed a tort action against the insureds for personal injuries. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the insureds had told the agency plaintiff to keep the van in dispute on the commercial policy, but it had transferred the van to the insureds' personal policy. The court further ruled that a notice of the transfer was sent to the insureds by plaintiff, and plaintiff sent at least five bills to the insureds that reflected the van was then insured under the personal policy and not the commercial policy. The court concluded that the insureds ratified the change and ruled that the van was insured under the insureds personal policy. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss the action.

The defendant, James Adam Conard, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation in one case and the denial of alternative sentencing in a second case. The result of the trial court's actions is a nine-year effective sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. Upon review, we affirm the order and judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a vicarious liability claim against a hospital based on the conduct of an emergency room physician. A patient and her husband filed a medical malpractice suit in the Circuit Court for Shelby County against a hospital and two physicians, one of whom had treated the patient in the hospital's emergency room. Among other things, the complaint broadly alleged that the hospital was vicariously liable for the conduct of its agents. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against both physicians for the second time, the hospital sought the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims against its apparent agent, the emergency room physician, were barred by operation of law. The trial court granted the hospital's motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims against the hospital. Abshure v. Upshaw, No. W2008-01486-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 690804, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2009). We granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed by the patient and her husband to determine whether their vicarious liability claims against the hospital should be dismissed under the facts of this case. We have determined that the lower courts erred by dismissing the vicarious liability claims against the hospital.

The defendant, Andra Dennis, appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he violated the terms of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this medical negligence case, we review a jury verdict against a hospital based on the hospital's failure to enforce its policies and procedures in patient care. Tennessee law has long recognized that a hospital has a duty to its patients to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence used by hospitals generally in its community. After reviewing the record, we hold that material evidence supports the jury's determination that the hospital was 100% at fault for the patient's death. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the verdict of the jury.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ronald Woods, Jr., appeals pro se from multiple convictions in the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He pled guilty to intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class D felony, driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, a Class E felony, reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Woods received a an effective sentence of six years to be served consecutively to another unrelated sentence. On appeal, Woods claims: (1) he was denied his right to a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; and (2) his conviction for reckless driving and intentionally evading arrest violated principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we conclude that Woods's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and double jeopardy have been waived. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Sequna Copeland, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to one count of facilitation of second degree murder, a Class B felony. The agreement provided for an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentence as imposed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services, has filed a motion to dismiss based upon its assertion that the Court "lacks jurisdiction to consider [the appellant's] appeal." We agree with the appellee. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant, Mark J.T.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded 100% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the left arm and 18% PPD to the right arm. The employer contends the trial court erred in awarding compensation to both arms, rather than the left thumb only. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We agreed to hear this extraordinary appeal in order to decide whether the proper venue for a case involving the breach of a construction contract is in the county named in the forum selection clause of the contract, or in the county where the realty is located upon which the construction took place. We hold that the forum selection clause determines the proper venue, because the underlying action cannot fairly be characterized as an action for injury to real property and is, thus, a transitory action.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services concedes that it did not prove the grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. We likewise find that procedural errors were committed by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is vacated.

The Dickson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Victoria Spicer, for one count of theft of property worth more than $500 but less than $1,000 and one count of criminal trespass. At the conclusion of the State's proof, the State conceded that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for criminal trespass. At the end of trial, the jury convicted Appellant for one count of facilitation of theft, for property worth $500 or less. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six months in the county jail. On appeal, Appellant argues that her conviction cannot stand because theft of property worth $500 or less is a misdemeanor and the crime of facilitation under the statute applies only to felonies. The State concedes that facilitation of a misdemeanor is not a crime under the Tennessee statutory scheme. After a review of the record and the statute, we conclude that facilitation of a misdemeanor is not a crime under the statutes of Tennessee. Therefore, Appellant's conviction must be reversed and dismissed.

The Petitioner, Timothy Ray Gentry, pled guilty to multiple theft, forgery, and drug offenses and received a total effective sentence of eighteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. The Petitioner acknowledged that his petition was untimely but asserted that due process required the statute of limitations be tolled. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. We reverse the ruling of the post-conviction court and remand for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations.

The Defendant, Joseph W. Denton, pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional, both Class E felonies. Under the terms of the plea agreement, he received concurrent terms of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's request for judicial diversion. He challenges that ruling on appeal. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the Putnam County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Brandon Williamson, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Luis D. Vidales Romero, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petition.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for an unpaid debt. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted plaintiff's summary judgment and denied defendant's summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Plaintiff insurer of insured brought this action as a subrogee of the insureds, who had been paid under plaintiff's policy for a fire loss to their home. The insureds had employed a roofer to replace their roof, whose subcontractor caused the fire which destroyed the home. Plaintiff brought this action to recover from defendant roofer who filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court ruled defendant could not be held liable in tort for the negligent acts of his subcontractor under the facts of this case, and plaintiff could not recover under the theory of contract, because plaintiff could not show that the loss was caused by the contractual services or foreseeable. On appeal, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate, because under contract law the defendant had a non-delegable duty to see that the work he was contractually obligated to perform was done in a careful, skillful and workmanlike manner. The case is remanded with instructions to proceed in accordance with this Opinion.