APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the transfer of a case from the chancery court to the circuit court. The plaintiff was terminated from her employment with the defendant municipality. She filed this lawsuit against the municipality for wrongful termination, seeking only unliquidated damages. The municipality filed a motion to transfer the case to circuit court, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act and also based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-11-102, which addresses the chancery court’s jurisdiction over claims for unliquidated damages. The chancery court denied the motion to transfer. The municipality now appeals. We reverse, concluding that once an objection to jurisdiction was made under Section 16-11-102, the chancery court was required to transfer the case to the circuit court.

The employee alleged that he injured his back in the course of his employment. His employers denied the claim based upon failure to give timely notice of the injury. The employee saw two medical doctors and a chiropractor shortly after his injury. Their records contained no reference to a work injury; one stated that the injury had happened at home. The trial court found that the employee did not provide timely notice of his alleged injury and, alternatively, that he failed to sustain his burden of proof concerning causation. The employee has appealed from those findings. We affirm the judgment.

Employee filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits against her former employer alleging that her work for her former employer advanced pre-existing arthritis in both knees and required her to have joint replacement surgery on her right knee. The employer denied her claim, contending that her condition was unrelated to her employment. The trial court found that she had sustained a compensable aggravation of her arthritis and that she had not had a meaningful return to work. It awarded 78% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. The employer appealed,¹ contending that the trial court erred by finding the award was not subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). We agree with employer that employee is entitled to an award of one and one-half times her impairment rating and decrease the award to 39% PPD to the body as a whole. We affirm the judgment as modified.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryant C. Overton, of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, but we reverse them in part based upon a sentencing error.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Derrick D. Crutcher, of simple possession of cocaine, in this case a Class E felony, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (e) (2006), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, see id. § 39-17- 425(a)(1). In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert J. Montville, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for simple assault and reckless driving and his resulting effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as twenty-four hours in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging medical malpractice against numerous healthcare providers on May 26, 2009. They alleged that they had given the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121(a) prior to April 8, 2009 to the defendants. The defendants filed several motions, including motions for summary judgment, stating that plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121. The record establishes that plaintiffs did not give the requisite notice, "at least 60 days before the filing of their Complaint". In response to the motions for summary judgment the Trial Court excused compliance with the code section and defendants appealed. On appeal, we reverse the holding of the Trial Court on the grounds that non-compliance with the code section could only be excused upon the showing of extraordinary cause.

The defendant, Bobby Hughlett, appeals from the trial court’s denial of any form of alternative sentencing, including probation. The defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated robbery and robbery, both Class C felonies. The defendant was given an agreed sentence of ten years for each count, to run concurrently, as a persistentoffender, with a 45% release eligibility date. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying him an alternative sentence, including probation, and erred in finding the defendant was on probation at the time of committing these offenses. After review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

In September of 2009, Judy Dotson McConnell and Jerry Dotson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Pat Fuller, John Fuller, and Lela Dotson Gravett (“Defendants”) alleging, in relevant part, that the Last Will and Testament of Clarence E. Dotson, which was offered for probate in May of 2003, was a fraudulent will. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted alleging that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ claim. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on February 16, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not filed within the statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs failed to “allege facts which would bring into play fraudulent concealment,” which would have tolled the statute of limitations. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

The appellant, Deborah N. Cotter, was convicted by a jury in the Hamblen County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, particularly because no witness identified her in court as the robber. She also contends that the trial court erred in arriving at her sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Douglas Wayne Young, of aggravated rape and sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) admitting the appellant’s nine millimeter handgun into evidence; (2) admitting scientific evidence from a DNA and serology expert; (3) finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; (4) giving the jury an instruction concerning flight; and (5) imposing a sentence of twenty-two years. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A woman who failed to have her paternity determined while her putative father was living filed a complaint seeking to establish her right to inherit a part of his estate. Tennessee Code Annotated §31-2-105 requires paternity to be established by clear and convincing evidence if paternity is sought to be established after the putative father’s death. Prior to the trial, the woman moved the chancery court to order the deceased’s family to provide her with DNA samples in an effort to prove the deceased was her father. The trial court denied this motion, finding the rules of civil procedure do not require nonparties to provide DNA samples. Following a bench trial, the court concluded the woman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased was her father. The woman appealed. We affirm the trial court in all respects because, first, nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the deceased’s family members to provide DNA samples to assist the woman in proving she was the deceased’s daughter. Second, the positive and negative evidence rule does not apply to the testimony in this case because there was no conflicting testimony by eyewitnesses to the woman’s conception. Third, the missing evidence and missing witness rule applies to jury trials, whereas this trial was a bench trial, and there was no evidence that the purportedly missing evidence or missing witnesses were under the estate’s control.

Former cohabitant brought this partition action with respect to real and personal property. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in dividing the real property and a mobile home, in finding the motor vehicles to be jointly-owned property, and in dividing the proceeds of a savings account equally between the parties. We have concluded that the trial court erred in dividing the savings account, which is titled in the defendant’s name alone. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for each first degree premeditated murder conviction, merged the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder convictions, and imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years’ incarceration for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently with the life sentences. On appeal, in addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a continuance, (2) allowing a juror to remain on the jury who expressed an opinion about the case, (3) admitting evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (4) admitting a taperecorded conversation between the defendant and a separately-tried co-defendant, and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. Because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial, all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing are waived. Furthermore, the untimely motion for new trial rendered the notice of appeal untimely. In the interest of justice, however, we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal and review the remaining issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of: (1) an oral motion for a continuance supported by her doctor’s affidavit; and (2) a motion to add, as necessary parties, two mortgagees of real estate alleged to be marital property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Alvin T. McGee, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted burglary and vandalism between $500 and $1000, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Mitzi Rollins, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to one count of initiating a false report under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502. The plea agreement provided that she would be sentenced to two years and ten months, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for alternative sentencing, citing her lengthy criminal history and the repeated unsuccessful attempts to use less restrictive sentencing. The appellant contends the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce case the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce, divided the marital property, and ordered transitional alimony to the wife until the husband pays the wife an amount ordered by the Court to render the property settlement equitable. The parties have appealed, and we modify the Judgment because the Trial Court inadvertently included an amount in the property division which he had found to be the separate property of the husband. We adjust the property division along the lines intended by the Trial Judge and set a definite time for the transitional alimony to comply with the statute.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brent Allen Blye, was convicted in Case Number S50,833 of possession with intent to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and two Class A misdemeanors and was sentenced by the trial court pursuant to an agreement by the parties. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant pled guilty to several felony and misdemeanor charges in three unrelated cases and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to an effective term of 30 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) his pro se motions should be considered as a motion for new trial in Case Number S50,833; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions in Case Number S50,833; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in Case Numbers S46,736, S48,639, and S51,239; (4) his right to a speedy trial was violated in Case Number S46,736; (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him; and (6) the trial judge who presided over the sentencing hearing for all four cases should have recused herself. Following our review, we affirm the convictions but remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion.

Inmate brought petition for writ of certiorari challenging his conviction of the prison disciplinary offense of conspiracy to violate state law. The trial court granted judgment on the record to the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). We have concluded that TDOC failed to follow the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, but that this departure did not affect the disposition of the case. We therefore affirm the chancellor’s decision.

The Defendant, Lloyd Andra Webb, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and to possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (2010); 39-17-418 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the possession with intent to sell conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor possession conviction, to be served concurrently. He was order to serve fifteen weekends in the Blount County Jail with the balance of his sentences on community corrections. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves an award of sanctions. We reverse because the moving party did not comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant, Patrick Rico Edwards, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for murder in the perpetration of a theft and first-degree premeditated murder, both in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. After a jury trial began on August 21, 2008, the trial court granted a mistrial. On March 19, 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing on May 12, 2009, Defendant was sentenced to serve 21 years in confinement at 100 percent. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s sentence is not excessive and affirm the judgment of the trial court.