APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a post-judgment motion. The petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the respondent department of correction. The petitioner inmate filed a complaint for declaratory judgment regarding the department of correction's denial of his request for a parole hearing. The department answered the complaint, and no action was taken on the case by either party in the two years that followed. The trial court entered a case management order, requiring the petitioner inmate to set a date for a final hearing within a given time. After the petitioner inmate failed to do so, the trial court dismissed the petitioner's complaint without prejudice. Nearly a year later, the petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion because it was filed after the order of dismissal became final. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

The employer discharged the employee three days after he rejected an offer to settle his workers' compensation claim, and the employee brought a retaliatory discharge action against the employer. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Derrick Johnson ("Johnson"), of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to life with the possibility of parole and a six-year consecutive term of imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Johnson argues: (1) the insufficiency of the convicting evidence as to the first degree premeditated murder; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeremy Trent Keeton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally agreed to plead guilty to the sale of a Schedule II drug (methamphetamine), a Class C felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to twelve years, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to two other cases for a total effective sentence of thirty-nine years. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that he had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective and in ruling that his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

I concur in part II of the majority opinion, holding that the reporting of an illegal activity is not an essential element of an employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge for refusing to participate in an illegal activity, and, as I explain subsequently, I ultimately concur in the judgment denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision in part I to dispense with the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), at the summary judgment stage in all employment discrimination and retaliation cases.

The defendants have appealed from a judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of certain real property and awarding the plaintiffs a judgment for the negligent cutting of timber. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Christopher Metcalf, pled guilty to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and agreed to a nine-year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. At sentencing, the defendant requested an alternative sentence, but the trial court ordered the defendant to serve his entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee brought an action for common law retaliatory discharge against his employer for refusal to participate in an allegedly illegal activity. The employer moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence of a legitimate reason for the employee's discharge pursuant to the framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The employer also argued that summary judgment was warranted pursuant to Collins v. AmSouth Bank, 241 S.W.3d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), because the undisputed facts showed that the employee did not report the alleged illegality. The trial court granted summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable at the summary judgment stage because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence. We also hold that an employee alleging retaliatory discharge for refusal to participate in an illegal activity need not report the illegality. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals because genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment for the employer. I write separately to reiterate my belief, set forth in my partial concurrence and dissent in Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., No. M2007-02530-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. 2010), that the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), need not be abrogated because it is compatible with the summary judgment procedures as set forth in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). As the facts of this case illustrate, the McDonnell Douglas framework applied along with Hannan at the summary judgment phase enables an orderly evaluation of the evidence.

The defendants have appealed from a judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of certain real property and awarding the plaintiffs a judgment for the negligent cutting of timber. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shannon Jones, was convicted by a jury in Lauderdale County of facilitation of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than 0.5 grams, a Class D felony, and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years for facilitation and to six years for delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to another unrelated case. On appeal, Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrence Woods, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to request an independent mental health evaluation to determine if mental health defenses were available. He also contends that he was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to enter his guilty plea because of trial counsels' failure to perform this independent mental evaluation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Originally charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault, the defendant, Leo Mays, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated criminal trespass and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding sufficient evidence to support the verdicts of the jury, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted testimony about items in the Defendant's possession when he was arrested; (2) the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request for Community Corrections. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Plaintiff motorist filed suit against defendant motorist and her employer, seeking damages she sustained in a motor vehicle accident in which defendant motorist rear-ended her vehicle. Defendants appeal a jury award asserting there is no material evidence to support the award. Finding the verdict of the jury to be supported by the evidence, we affirm the judgment.

An Anderson County jury found Appellant Michael J. Bell guilty of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, appellant claims that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted an inculpatory statement he made to police; (2) there was insufficient evidence for a finding of premeditation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted an autopsy report; (4) the trial court erred in giving the jury a "sequential" determination jury instruction; (5) the trial court improperly reiterated the sequential determination jury instruction in its verdict forms; and (6) the trial court improperly characterized appellant's statement to the police as a "confession" in its instructions to the jury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Adam Clyde Braseel, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to fifteen years for each Class A felony conviction, three years for his Class C felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for murder, especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault and argues that the pre-trial identification processes were unduly suggestive. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that defendant's convictions of the attempted first degree premeditated murder of Rebecca Hill in count four of the indictment and the aggravated assault of Ms. Hill in count five violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge defendant's conviction of aggravated assault into hisc conviction of attempted first degree murder. We also find that the trial court's judgments of conviction for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder do not clearly reflect the trial court's merger of the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgments as to defendant's convictions of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and assault, and his effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. We remand solely for the correction and entry of appropriate judgments consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Alphanza Dale Pitts, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-403; -103 (2006). The trial court sentenced the defendant as a persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the prosecutor made improper comments during opening and closing arguments, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term of fifteen years for aggravated burglary. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Tennessee Claims Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the State of Tennessee arising from the death of a young child who had been removed from his mother's home and placed in the custody of the mother's aunt by order of the juvenile court. The child and his two brothers were removed from their mother's care because of her use of cocaine. At the mother's request and after an investigation, the Department of Children's Services recommended to the juvenile court that custody of the children be awarded to the mother's aunt. Less than a month after the court entered the order of custody, the mother reported concerns about the children's well-being to the Department. A case worker investigated the aunt's home and found no basis to remove the children. Ten days later, one of the children, a five-year-old boy, died from extensive injuries allegedly inflicted by the aunt's nineteen-year-old daughter who lived in the home. The child's mother filed a wrongful death claim against the State alleging negligence on the part of the Department. The Claims Commissioner denied the claim, finding that the Claims Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (1999 & Supp. 2009) and that, in any event, the mother had failed to prove negligence by the Department. We hold that the Claims Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim because the child was not in the care, custody, and control of the State.

The Defendant, David Freeman Clay, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and three counts of assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for each sexual battery conviction and six months for each assault conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of nine years and six months in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to fulfill its duties to approve the jury verdict under Rule 33 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Lynn Stanton, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the denial pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.