APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Michael Lynn Stanton, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the denial pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief in which petitioner alleged that his guilty plea was based on a coerced confession, he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and newly discovered evidence of perjury by a State witness requires a reversal of his guilty plea. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Charles O. Rogers, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to attempted robbery, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years. The trial court imposed a sentence of split confinement, ordering the defendant to serve sixty days, on consecutive weekends, in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Following the filing of a violation warrant and a finding that the defendant violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerry Phillip Haley, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sixty year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony from the victim; and (2) the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process in violation of State v. Anthony and State v. Dixon. Initial review of the record reveals that the defendant has waived both issues based upon his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Further review leads us to the conclusion that neither issue rises to the level of plain error. As such, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged that it delivered materials and provided labor for the installation of a fire protection system on the property of defendant and defendant had failed to pay money still owed under the contract. Plaintiff sought a materialmen's lien to enforce any judgment obtained against defendant for the amount of monies owed under the contract. Defendants answered, filed a counter-complaint and raised multiple defenses. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled in plaintiff's favor, holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover monetary damages and the materialmen's lien would be enforced. Defendants have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Emanuel Oliver, appeals from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt to unlawfully possess a controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served at thirty percent in the Shelby County Correction Center. On appeal, he argues that the statute of limitations for prosecution has run and that he should not be held responsible for his plea agreement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, George T. Haynie, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2007 guilty-pleaded convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and failure to appear. Discerning no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Larry D. Guthrie, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and he received a sentence of six years and one month in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court's denial of his request for two special jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On January 17, 2007, Petitioner, Joshua Jacobs, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to one count of first degree murder, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated rape. On October 7, 2009, the post-conviction court received and filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief for Petitioner. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner argues that the postconviction court erred because applying the statute of limitations to his case is a denial of due process. We have reviewed the record on appeal and find that there is no violation of Petitioner's due process rights in the dismissal of his time-barred petition. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

David Mathews and Tommy Baker ("Plaintiffs") sued the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga, and EPB Telecom ("Defendants") for inverse condemnation. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. After a 1 hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the claim for inverse condemnation was barred by the statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 29-16-124. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We hold that the claim for inverse condemnation fails because no taking occurred, and summary judgment was properly granted to Defendants. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Marico Finnie, appeals from the post-conviction court's order granting him partial post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal from his multiple aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of aggravated rape convictions. He argues that because his successful post-conviction claim was based on appellate counsel's ineffective assistance in not raising meritorious issues in his direct appeal, and he never requested a delayed appeal, the court instead should have vacated his convictions and remanded for new trials. The State agrees that a delayed appeal is not the appropriate avenue of relief but contends that appellate counsel's deficiency resulted in prejudice only with respect to the consecutive sentencing imposed and in two of the aggravated rape convictions where the State failed to make a proper election of offenses. The State, therefore, argues that the petitioner should be afforded new trials for the two aggravated rape convictions as well as a new sentencing hearing for all the convictions. We agree with the State that a delayed appeal is not the appropriate relief but disagree with its contention that the petitioner suffered prejudice in only two of his rape cases as a result of counsel's deficient performance in failing to raise the election issue on appeal. We further disagree with both the petitioner's and the State's position that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentencing or that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court in part, vacate the petitioner's convictions in indictment numbers 00-10546, 00-10542, 00-10554, and 00-10545, and remand for new trials for those offenses.

Petitioner, Gary C. Bullington, was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI"), felony evading arrest, driving on a revoked license, and two counts of vehicular assault. State v. Bullington, No. M2005-02227-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1816325, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 27, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2006). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court initially determined that the petition was not time-barred because Petitioner did not receive notice of the denial of permission to appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that counsel was ineffective in two areas but denied post-conviction relief on the basis that Petitioner did not suffer prejudice as a result of the deficiency. Petitioner now appeals the denial of postconviction relief. After a review of the record, we determine Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Paris Johnson, appeals his convictions by a jury in the Campbell County Criminal Court for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in prison for the aggravated assault and to thirty days' incarceration for the public intoxication, to be served concurrently. The Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Range III, persistent offender; and (3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We hold that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but we remand the case for resentencing for the aggravated assault conviction.

Cecilia and Charles Owensby had a homeowners insurance policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"). After their house burned down, the Owensbys filed a claim pursuant to the policy. State Farm eventually denied the claim, asserting that Cecilia Owensby had made four material misrepresentations when applying for the insurance and that each of these misrepresentations increased State Farm's risk of loss. The plaintiffs asserted that any inaccurate information contained on the application was the fault of the insurance agent who filled out the application on Cecilia Owensby's behalf. The plaintiffs sued both State Farm and Darius Miller ("Miller"), the insurance agent. State Farm and Miller filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and, as modified, affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tony E.Cannon, Jr., of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. State v. Tony E. Cannon, Jr., No. M2007-00557- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2448341, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 18, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues on appeal pertain to a nonconforming, grandfathered billboard that was destroyed by a natural disaster in 1998. The original billboard, which was erected prior to the enactment of the Billboard Regulation and Control Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 54-21-101, et seq., was allowed to remain as a nonconforming, grandfathered device. After the nonconforming billboard was destroyed by a natural disaster, TDOT authorized Appellants to rebuild the billboard provided that it was rebuilt to the original size "using like materials" pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.04(2) (1998). The original billboard stood on two wooden posts and had a metal facing. When Appellants rebuilt the billboard by erecting it on a steel monopole instead of two wooden poles, TDOT filed a Notice of Charges stating the new billboard failed to comply with the regulation because it was not rebuilt with "like materials." Following a hearing, the administrative judge concluded that the billboard was in violation of the regulation, which decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of TDOT and the chancery court. Appellants contend on appeal that the billboard is in compliance with the regulation and that the removal of the billboard constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. We affirm the finding that the billboard was not in compliance with the regulation as it was not rebuilt using "like materials."

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Bobby Reed Aldridge, pled guilty to one count of attempted second degree murder and one count of theft over $1000, and the trial court sentenced him to fourteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a three-year sentence the Defendant received in a collateral proceeding for violating his probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Oscar C. Wells, was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. The petitioner now appeals, and, following careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Brandy Lea Birdwell, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in January of 2008 for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery for her involvement in a shooting at a liquor store. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges. She was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant filed an untimely motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court after a hearing. Subsequently, Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. This Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant, Havin Hameed, was indicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court for two counts of aggravated child abuse and two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, that were associated with leg and wrist fractures sustained by Hameed's tenmonth- old daughter from September 1, 2004, to October 1, 2004. Prior to Hameed's indictment, the Davidson County Juvenile Court made a factual finding in a dependent and neglect hearing that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Hameed perpetrated the aforementioned injuries against her daughter. Hameed filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in criminal court, which was denied. The criminal court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal and this court subsequently granted Hameed's application to appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, Hameed argues that the criminal court erred in failing to dismiss her indictment based on the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and double jeopardy after identical allegations between the same parties were dismissed following a trial in juvenile court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying Hameed's motion to dismiss her indictment.

On March 6, 2009, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Aulton Cody Barnes, for indecent exposure. On May 28, 2009, Petitioner entered an open plea to the charge. On September 22, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Petitioner to six months with thirty days to be served in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation or, in the alternative, grant him judicial diversion. We have reviewed the record presented on appeal and conclude that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Robert C. Taylor, was indicted by the Coffee County Grand Jury for aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant sought an appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the Appellant was denied the right to a speedy trial; (3) whether Appellant's due process rights were violated by the State's six-year delay in producing laboratory results and loss of evidence. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant was not denied a speedy trial and that Appellant's due process rights were not violated where there was no prejudice to Appellant. Further, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.