APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this capital case, the defendant, Joel Richard Schmeiderer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder in connection with the strangling death of a fellow inmate. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on two aggravating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a second continuance; 2) whether this denial of a continuance violated the defendant's constitutional right to present mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase; 3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence and argue a non-statutory aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase; 4) whether the prosecutor's closing argument during the sentencing phase constituted plain error mandating reversal; and 5) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that none of the errors alleged by the defendant warrant relief. With respect to issues not herein specifically addressed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The petitioner, Robert Allen Crawford, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief and claims that his convictions of first degree murder, criminally negligent homicide, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment were the results of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's timely petition for post-conviction relief, the criminal court denied relief. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the order of the criminal court.

This is an administrative appeal arising from the suspension of a doctor's medical license by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The appellant's medical license was suspended by the Board following its finding that he violated four provisions of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act, three state regulations, and one provision of the United States Code. The violations related to his use of chelation therapy and intravenous hydrogen peroxide therapy, and his use of methadone to treat patients. Following the Board's decision, the appellant filed a petition for judicial review before the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Board. The appellant raises numerous issues on appeal, inter alia, that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the finding that Dr. Rich was in violation of subsections (1), (4) and (12) of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-214(b) because the Board did not articulate the applicable standard of care, as required by Tenn. Code Ann._ 63-6-214(g), to demonstrate his violations of that standard. We affirm the chancery court on all other issues including the findings that Dr. Rich violated of subsection (14) of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-214(b), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880-2-.14(6)(c), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs._ 0880-2-.14(6)(e)(3)(ii) and 21 U.S.C.A _ 823(g)(1). Due to our reversal of the Board's finding on three of the seven charges against Dr. Rich, we remand this action for the reconsideration of the sanctions against him.

The petitioner, Robert Clay Priest, who pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to multiple offenses and was sentenced to 29 years' confinement, appeals from that court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he claims that he was mentally incompetent to enter into a plea agreement, that the trial court failed to ask him to enter a guilty plea, and that the post-conviction court erroneously excluded his expert witness. We discern no error and affirm the order of the circuit court.

The Defendant, Charles Reginald Underwood, Jr., pled guilty to three counts of third offense driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seat belt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. __ 55-50- 504 (Supp. 2009); 55-9-603(2008); 55-8-302 (2008). The defendant also entered a best interest guily plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to facilitation of a false report of child abuse, a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. _ 37-1-413 (2005). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years, eleven months, and twenty-five days, to be served on split confinement involving six months of jail service followed by probation conditioned upon community corrections participation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing confinement and in denying his motion to reduce his sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this capital case, the defendant, Joel Richard Schmeiderer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder in connection with the strangling death of a fellow inmate. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on two aggravating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a second continuance; 2) whether this denial of a continuance violated the defendant's constitutional right to present mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase; 3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence and argue a non-statutory aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase; 4) whether the prosecutor's closing argument during the sentencing phase constituted plain error mandating reversal; and 5) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that none of the errors alleged by the defendant warrant relief. With respect to issues not herein specifically addressed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiffs asked the trial court to declare null and void certain restrictive covenants in their employment contracts with defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the action and enforce the arbitration agreement contained in the employment contract between the parties. The trial court refused to order arbitration and ruled that in the interest of judicial economy, the Court should decide the issues raised in the declaratory judgment action. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's refusal to order arbitration and remand, directing the Court to stay the proceeding and order the parties to arbitrate the issues arising from the contracts of employment.

Brothers Ako Hassan Nejad and Aso Hassan Nejad were found guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, and each received a twenty-five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Ako Nejad was also found guilty of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and received an additional consecutive sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the defendants claim that: the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; their indictments were insufficient; a mistrial should have been declared after a witness testified that one of the brothers was a gang member; certain inculpatory evidence was improperly admitted; newly discovered evidence discredits the State's theory of motive; and their sentences were excessive. We reject each of these claims and affirm their convictions and sentences.

The defendant, James Edward Farrar, Jr., appeals the revocation of his probation, alleging that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish that he violated the terms of his probationary sentence. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony DeWayne Hood, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Union County Criminal Court for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court denied his right to a fair trial when it responded in the jury's presence to the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal that the burden had been met, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper character evidence, (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct because the State misstated the evidence during opening statement and closing argument and commented on the credibility of a witness, and (5) his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor and denied alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it stated in the jury's presence that the State's burden of proof had been met. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Evetta Mai McGee, pled guilty to rape, and the trial court sentenced her to eleven years. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence beyond the statutory minimum without explanation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Patrick Joseph Rigger, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his general sessions court guilty-pleaded convictions of misdemeanor evading arrest and misdemeanor possession of a weapon. Although the postconviction court determined that the Knox County General Sessions Court's procedure of communicating to defendants en masse the litany of constitutional rights prior to accepting pleas of guilty did not satisfy the rigors of due process principles, the post-conviction court denied relief to the petitioner. The petitioner appeals and claims that the lower court erred in failing to find that his guilty pleas were involuntary, unknowing, and/or unintelligent. He also claims that the warrant alleging his illegal possession of a weapon inadequately charged an offense and that his actual innocence of that charge entitled him to post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the post-conviction court's order, we affirm.

The Defendants, Nelson Aguilar Gomez and Florinda Lopez, were charged with: Count One, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse; Count Two, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect; Counts Three and Four, aggravated child abuse occurring on or about March 3, 2007; and Count Five, aggravated child abuse occurring in February 2007. Aggravated child abuse is a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-15-402(b). The defendants were tried jointly before a jury. Defendant Gomez was convicted of both counts of felony murder, Count One merging into Count Two, and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. He was also convicted of all three counts of aggravated child abuse and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction. The trial court ordered him to serve his Count Three and Count Four aggravated child abuse sentences concurrently with each other and his life sentence, and ordered him to serve his Count Five aggravated child abuse sentence consecutively to his other sentences, for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On her felony murder charges, Defendant Lopez was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-11-403, -13-204(a). Count One was merged into Count Two. Defendant Lopez was also convicted of aggravated child abuse under Counts Three and Four. She was acquitted of aggravated child abuse as charged in Count Five. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for her facilitation of first degree murder conviction and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of her two aggravated child abuse convictions. The trial court ordered her to serve these sentences concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, Defendant Gomez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain prior bad acts, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Lopez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her pre-trial motion to include non-citizens on the jury; (2) the trial court erred in preventing her from introducing an entire statement she made to police after the State impeached her using part of that statement; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant Gomez's prior bad acts; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for each of her convictions. After our review, we reverse and dismiss Defendant Gomez's Count Five conviction of aggravated child abuse. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Deshay Peoples, Jr., was charged with one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-403(b), -402(b), -304(b)(1). One count of aggravated robbery was "nol prossed" by the State prior to the defendant's trial. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of all four remaining offenses as charged. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony regarding the count of aggravated robbery that was "nol prossed" prior to the defendant's trial. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Because the plaintiff did not file a timely notice of appeal from the order of dismissal, we dismiss the appeal.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Harlen Roy Lamont Zirker, of two counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to a total, effective sentence of seventy-two years to be served at 100%. The petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Harlen Roy L. Zirker, aka Anthony Lamont Zirker, No. M2003-02546-CCA-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1122646 at *1, *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005). Subsequently the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and two amended petitions thereafter, which he then voluntarily dismissed. Shortly after the dismissal, the petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, which the post conviction court summarily dismissed because it was the petitioner's second such petition and because it was untimely. The petitioner now appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, William Comfort, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of an eight-year sentence and the denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joe Clark Mitchell, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Perry County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Darrell John Penner, for two counts of rape of a child. The Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The postconviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Dawn Fox Newhouse, pleaded guilty to theft of services over $10,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-105(4). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and six months and was placed on probation. The trial court subsequently found that the Defendant violated her probation and sentenced her to serve 180 days in the Robertson County Jail. The trial court later modified its order and allowed the Defendant to serve her 180 days on weekends. Several months later, the Board of Probation and Parole alleged that the Defendant violated her probation again by incurring a new arrest. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated her probation a second time and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the Defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald A. Barker, appeals from the habeas corpus court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Chris Jones, appeals his denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of sale of cocaine in an amount more than .5 grams, a Class B felony, and one count of sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner received sentences of 12 years for each of the Class B felonies and 6 years for the Class C felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a ten-year sentence imposed in a separate case. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Patrick M. Lonie, was charged by presentment with twelve counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and ten counts of aggravated sexual battery. In an open plea, he pled guilty to four counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I offender to one term of eleven years and three terms of ten years, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 115 to the Tennessee Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1990, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-1001, et seq., and that, as a result, he should not have received consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the conviction offenses as especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor.

This appeal involves the registration of a foreign order. In 1991, the parents of a minor child were divorced in Texas, and the father was ordered to pay child support. Soon thereafter, the mother moved with the child to Kentucky and began receiving public assistance on behalf of the child. Because the mother was receiving public assistance, the father's child support obligation was assigned to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In 2006, the father moved to Tennessee. Thereafter, Kentucky registered the Texas child support order in Tennessee and sought to enforce it. The father contested the registration of the child support order. The trial court rejected the father's challenges and ordered that the child support order be registered for enforcement in Tennessee. The father now appeals. We affirm.