APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Cocke County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, David Lynn Sisk, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and theft of property valued at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court determined that the defendant was a career offender and imposed a total effective sentence of 27 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the indictments charging theft are multiplicitous, argues that the trial court erred in its jury charge, and contends that the trial court erroneously declared him a career offender. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's convictions, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges in this case. To facilitate any further appellate review, we also conclude that the theft indictments were impermissibly multiplicitous, necessitating the dismissal of the defendant's conviction of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and that the trial court erroneously classified the defendant as a career offender.

Parents appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights. Because we find that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had made reasonable efforts to address the problems preventing the reunification of the children with their parents, we reverse.

This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent landowners over boundary lines with respect to a fence and ownership of property constituting a substantial portion of a concrete driveway to one neighbor's house. Glynda Shealy ("Plaintiff") sued Chuong C. Williams and Nickie Ann Dunker ("Defendants") for trespass and malicious encroachment, claiming that Defendants' concrete driveway and backyard fence encroached upon Plaintiff's adjoining properties. In response, both Defendants asserted a defense of adverse possession. Upon conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the concrete driveway intruded on Plaintiff's property but that Defendant Dunker had a prescriptive easement in a gravel driveway for ingress and egress. Additionally, the trial court ordered Defendant Dunker to remove her backyard fence to the legally established boundary lines and awarded Plaintiff $50 in nominal damages. After the trial court dismissed Defendant Williams from this lawsuit, Defendant Dunker filed a motion to amend her answer to add a defensive claim of easement by prescription. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to change the primary residential parent or in the alternative to increase his parenting time. Because Father did not demonstrate that a material change of circumstances has occurred, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Billy Earl McIllwain, Jr., was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of an offense. He received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant's only challenge is to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the registration of a foreign order. In 1991, the parents of a minor child were divorced in Texas, and the father was ordered to pay child support. Soon thereafter, the mother moved with the child to Kentucky and began receiving public assistance on behalf of the child. Because the mother was receiving public assistance, the father's child support obligation was assigned to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In 2006, the father moved to Tennessee. Thereafter, Kentucky registered the Texas child support order in Tennessee and sought to enforce it. The father contested the registration of the child support order. The trial court rejected the father's challenges and ordered that the child support order be registered for enforcement in Tennessee. The father now appeals. We affirm.

The employee, Paul Douthit, sustained a compensable injury to his left knee, which resulted in an anatomical impairment of 2% of the leg. He was able to return to his prior employment, and his claim was settled for 3% permanent partial disability to the leg, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). He subsequently had a second injury. A committee composed of his peers determined that both injuries were preventable, which led to his termination for violation of a company rule. He filed this petition for reconsideration in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 241(d)(1)(B)(ii). The trial court found that Mr. Douthit’s termination was not the result of intentional misconduct, that his conduct did not rise to the level of ordinary negligence, and that he was eligible for reconsideration. The trial court awarded an additional 9% permanent partial disability to the leg. The employer, Griffin Industries, has appealed, contending that “intentional misconduct” is an incorrect standard, that the findings of the peer committee are not reviewable, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in reconsidering the settlement. We agree that the “intentional misconduct” standard is not in conformity with existing case law, but affirm the trial court’s determination that the employee was eligible to seek reconsideration.

The Defendant-Appellant, Charles Haywood, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery by use or display of a deadly weapon, and one count of possessing a firearm in the commission of attempted second degree murder. He entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, as a Range I, standard offender, and the Shelby County Criminal Court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haywood argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Petitioner, Walter Himes, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the Retailers' Sales Tax Act. The plaintiff taxpayer is a dry-cleaning business. The taxpayer did not pay Tennessee sales tax for the sale of dry-cleaning and laundering services to a formalwear rental business. After an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue concluded that the taxpayer's sales of these services did not qualify as "sales for resale" that were exempt from taxation under the Retailers' Sales Tax Act, and assessed unpaid sales taxes. The taxpayer filed this lawsuit challenging the assessment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the taxpayer's sales of dry-cleaning and laundering services qualified for the "sale for resale" exemption and abated the assessment. The Commissioner of the Department of Revenue appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia, that the sales do not fall within the "sale for resale" exemption from taxation under the Retailers' Sales Tax Act because dry-cleaning and laundering garments does not amount to "processing" under the Act.

This is an annexation case. The defendant city decided to annex twelve square miles of land to its northwest. The territory to be annexed was divided into forty-nine subareas. Some of the subareas immediately adjoin the city's existing boundary; all are contiguous to one another. The city prepared a plan to provide services for each of the subareas. The plans of service stated that, upon annexation, the city would deliver services immediately with existing resources. The city simultaneously enacted forty-nine ordinances annexing each of the subareas. Afterward, the plaintiff residents filed the instant quo warranto lawsuit challenging the annexation, arguing inter alia that the city could not annex land that did not adjoin its existing boundary and that the plans of service were fatally deficient under the annexation statutes. After a trial, the lower court concluded that the city could annex all of the subareas and had complied with the statutory requirements for annexation. The residents appeal. We reverse the trial court's decision that the city could annex the subareas that did not immediately adjoin the city's existing boundary, affirm the decision that the city complied with the statutory requirements for annexation with respect to the remaining subareas, and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns the ownership of real property. The decedent acquired the subject property while he was married to the defendant surviving spouse. Years later, the decedent quitclaimed his interest in the property to his grandson. Subsequently, the decedent and the grandson disputed ownership of the property and an ancillary lawsuit ensued. Before the litigation was resolved, the decedent died and his estate was substituted as a party. The surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the grandson, asserting he caused the decedent's death. The grandson settled both lawsuits; the settlement of each involved a transfer of the subject real property. Thereafter, the executrix of the decedent's estate filed the instant lawsuit against the surviving spouse seeking a determination as to the ownership of the property. The surviving spouse counterclaimed, asserting various theories of ownership. On the estate's motion, the trial court entered an order dismissing the surviving spouse's counterclaim to the extent that it sought fee simple ownership. The surviving spouse now appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal concerns sovereign immunity. A subdivision in the defendant county had restrictive covenants that, inter alia, required the payment of an annual assessment by all lot owners to the subdivision trustees. In the wake of delinquent taxes, pursuant to statutes, the county took title to lots in the subdivision after delinquent tax sales failed to yield sufficient bids. The county held the lots for several years, and declined to pay the trustees the annual assessments on the properties. Residents of the subdivision sued the trustees, and crossclaims against the county were asserted for the past-due assessments. The county contended that it was immune from liability for the lot assessments under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. After a trial, the trial court held that the county was entitled to sovereign immunity insofar as it had complied with the pertinent statutes on delinquent tax sales, and granted a partial judgment against the county on the assessment claims. The trustees appeal, arguing that the county was not entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense to the contract claims under the restrictive covenants. We agree, and affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Alton Tappan was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. He was given an effective sentence of 14 years incarceration. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We conclude that appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of the trial court's failure to charge circumstantial evidence was deficient performance and that the failure was prejudicial. We therefore remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on the theft conviction. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in all other respects.

Defendant, John Wayne Wright, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for his felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. Both sentences were to be suspended and Defendant placed on probation after serving forty-five days in confinement. As a condition of his guilty pleas, Defendant properly reserved two certified questions of law concerning the stop and search of his vehicle and the subsequent search of his home. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Three tenants of the Gallatin Housing Authority were indicted under the theft of services statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-104, for failing to report to the housing authority earnings that would have increased their rent. On the tenants' motion, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Applying the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, we hold that the definition of services in section 39-11-106(a)(35) does not include public housing. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We accepted this case to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16- 503(a)(1), the proof required to convict the defendant of tampering with evidence is sufficient where the "thing" destroyed during the course of an investigation is not specifically identified. On the facts of this case, we hold that the evidence is sufficient. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nader Daqqaq, was found guilty of driving under the influence ("DUI"). The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven months, twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve nine months in confinement before being eligible for work release or trusty status. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bryan Williams, was convicted of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; and one count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to twenty-three years for the Class A felony, ten years for the Class B felony, and two years for the Class E felony. All sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial following the testimony of one witness. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between a buyer and seller of lumber. The seller filed suit against the buyer alleging a right to recover in breach of contract, quantum meruit, and/or quantum valebant for an outstanding balance owed on several shipments of lumber. The trial court determined that the buyer accepted approximately half of the disputed shipments due to its failure to timely reject the initial deliveries but was not liable for additional shipments that it timely rejected. The trial court, however, did not address whether the buyer revoked its acceptance of the initial shipments or whether the buyer was entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in an attempt to salvage the rejected shipments. Because the parties tried these issues by consent, the order appealed is not a final judgment and the appeal must be dismissed.

The defendant, David Henry Hammon, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of domestic assault and child abuse, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion without considering and weighing all the appropriate factors. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of judicial diversion but remand for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the child abuse conviction and six months for the domestic assault conviction as stated in the trial court's sentencing order.

The defendant, Randy Clayton Norman, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court did not perform its duty as the thirteenth juror; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the defendant's conviction but modify the defendant's sentence to fifteen years.

The petitioner, David Bankston, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the two-year sentence imposed for his 2007 conviction of ninth offense driving under the influence has expired. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his sentence has, in fact, expired, or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a foreign judgment entered by a Mississippi court against a Tennessee corporation. The Tennessee corporation moved to dismiss, contending that service of process was improper in the Mississippi action. The trial court found that the Tennessee corporation was not properly served, and it dismissed the petition. The judgment creditor appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.