APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a foreign judgment entered by a Mississippi court against a Tennessee corporation. The Tennessee corporation moved to dismiss, contending that service of process was improper in the Mississippi action. The trial court found that the Tennessee corporation was not properly served, and it dismissed the petition. The judgment creditor appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, George Vincent Ware, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court in two separate cases on September 27, 2007. In Case Number 262379, the defendant pled guilty to introduction of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to seven years, suspended to "intensive probation." In Case Number 262471, the defendant pled guilty to theft of property, a Class D felony; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to three years, six months, and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively, for the convictions in Case Number 262471. The trial court ordered the sentences in Case Number 262471 to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case Number 262379. Thus, the defendant received a total effective sentence of ten years. Following the filing of a probation violation warrant and a finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probationary sentence, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the dDefendant to serve his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff served as the trustee of two trusts for several years. After he was informed that his services were no longer needed, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to compensation in the form of trustee's fees for his service. The trial court ruled, on a motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff had waived his right to trustee's fees and that he was equitably estopped from claiming such fees. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a divorce case. The plaintiff husband is a successful physician and the defendant wife is a stay-at-home mother. They have one minor child. After twelve years of marriage, the husband left the marital home and filed for divorce. The wife counter-claimed for divorce, and protracted and contentious litigation ensued. The initial trial judge appointed a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem. After several trial judges recused themselves, a senior judge was assigned. After nearly three years of dispute, the case proceeded to trial. The trial court granted a divorce to the wife; it found that she was economically disadvantaged but capable of partial rehabilitation, and that the husband had the ability to pay spousal support. The wife was awarded alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, attorney fees as alimony in solido, and discretionary costs. The husband appeals the award of alimony, attorney fees, and costs. We affirm, finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion under the circumstances.

The defendant, Lisa Christina Simpson Tuttle, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of her suspended sentence. Because the defendant failed to file a proper notice of appeal and because the interests of justice do not require that this court excuse the failure to file the notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The Shelby County Healthcare Corporation (“The Med”) has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider our opinion in Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 2539644 (Tenn. 2010). In that opinion, we found that the application of the Act of May 21, 2003, ch. 321, 2003 Tenn. Pub. Acts 650 (“2003 Act”) to the claims of the estate of Joyce Bell and her infant son, Jonathan Bell, violated Article I, Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. We have determined that the arguments advanced by The Med in its petition do not merit a reconsideration of our earlier opinion.

With the approval of the trial court, a divorced father of four children moved with the children from Tennessee to Arkansas. Four years later, the mother, who remained in Tennessee, fell behind in her child support payments and filed a petition for modification of child support. Father responded by filing a motion for contempt against the mother in the Arkansas court, and he entered a limited appearance in Tennessee for the purpose of transferring the entire cause to Arkansas. After a hearing, the Tennessee court declared Arkansas to be the children's home state, and it transferred all custody and visitation issues to that state, while retaining jurisdiction of child support matters. The court also denied Mother's petition for modification of child support. Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in relinquishing its jurisdiction over custody because the children still have a"significant connection" to Tennessee. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gerome J. Smith, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In May 2008, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition based upon the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends the dismissal was an unconstitutional denial of his right to due process. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This appeal involves the application of the one-year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann._ 29-16-124 (2000) to a temporary regulatory taking claim. The developer of a residential subdivision in Wilson County filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County against the City of Lebanon and others alleging that the city's planning commission had denied it all economically beneficial use of its property by wrongfully refusing to approve the final plans for two phases of its subdivision. The City moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 29-16-124 had expired before the developer filed suit. The developer responded that the limitations period was tolled while it sought judicial review of the planning commission's decision. The trial court held that the developer's lawsuit was timely because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the entry of the Court of Appeals' opinion invalidating the planning commission's action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals granted the City's application for an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the trial court and determined that the developer's lawsuit was not timely because the statute of limitations began to run when the planning commission declined to approve the final subdivision plans. B & B Enters. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, No. M2008- 00572-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 130188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009). We granted the developer's application for permission to appeal and now affirm the Court of Appeals.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Mario A. Reed, of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, and theft under $500, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the juvenile court erred when it transferred his case to the circuit court for him to be tried as an adult; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on aggravated rape; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal involves the application of a decision by the United States Supreme Court to legal issues in a matter pending before a state trial court after being remanded by a state appellate court. In 1998, a group of commercial waste haulers filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the validity of a flow control ordinance enacted by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The trial court granted the Metropolitan Government's motion for summary judgment. However, in 2002, the Court of Appeals, relying on a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversed the trial court with regard to part of the application of the ordinance and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., 122 S.W.3d 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). While the case was pending in the trial court, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision relied upon by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The trial court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision. The Court of Appeals, relying on the law of the case doctrine and equitable principles, affirmed. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., No. M2007-00528-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 454183 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009). We granted the Metropolitan Government's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that Tennessee's courts are not free to disregard applicable intervening changes in federal constitutional law announced by the United States Supreme Court while a case is pending on remand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Defendant, Marty Ray Harris, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. He received a four-year sentence, to be served in split confinement of two months and the balance on probation. At issue in this appeal is the amount of restitution for damages caused by his crime. We reverse the portion of the judgment awarding restitution to Christopher Edwards, and we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the proper amount of restitution for the named victim, John Witherspoon.

The petitioner, Dennis B. Reece, pled guilty to second degree murder in October 2005. In September 2008, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the convicting court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) ("Gomez II"), created a new constitutional rule entitled to retrospective application and that this court should deem the one-year statute of limitations period to extend from the publication of Gomez II. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Benny Taylor, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2008 Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiffs advanced monies for the creation and operation of a bonding company, in which plaintiffs were to be partners with the defendant. A dispute arose between them about the bonding operation, and plaintiff sued defendant for a percentage of the profits of the bonding company and defendant counter-sued for a monetary judgment as well. The trial court ruled that no partnership existed, but plaintiffs were entitled to recover $15,000.00 from defendant. Defendant's counter-action was dismissed. On appeal, we affirm.

The sole issue presented in this workers’ compensation claim is whether a corporate transaction involving the sale of the employer amounted to a loss of employment for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The trial court found that it did and awarded permanent disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The employee sustained two compensable injuries on the same day. Before he reached maximum medical improvement, all of the stock in his employer was sold to another corporation. The trial court held that this transaction caused a loss of employment for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d) and awarded 33% permanent partial disability to the left arm, an amount in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that a loss of employment occurred as a result of the change of ownership and that the award is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee, who suffered two separate injuries during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the employer, settled his first claim for workers' compensation and filed suit on the second. Shortly after being laid off because of an unexpected work shortage, the employee elected to retire in order to maintain medical insurance coverage rather than face an indefinite furlough without pay or benefits coverage. When the trial court reconsidered the settlement and awarded benefits in excess of the lower statutory cap on the second claim, resolving the issues in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, and the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. Because we have concluded that the employment relationship terminated when the employee was laid off, rather than when he subsequently retired, the employee was not meaningfully returned to work, and, therefore, qualifies for reconsideration of his first injury and is not subject to the lower cap on the second. The judgment of the Panel is reversed, and that of the trial court is reinstated.

A Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ron "Cotton" Seals, of one count of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine; one count of possession with intent to deliver dihydrocodeinone, a schedule II controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver alprazolam, a schedule IV controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half ounce or more of marijuana; one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, kept, or sold; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 20 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation. Therefore, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Joseph Shaw, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the sexual battery conviction into the rape conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim without issuing a limiting instruction and by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee suffered a compensable back injury in the course of his employment for the State of Tennessee. The Claims Commission found that he was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, the State contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment.

Richard P. Alexander, Regina Phillips, Gail Young and Judy Sprinkles ("Plaintiffs") filed this products liability suit against Antonio Zamperla, S.p.A. and Zamperla, Inc. ("Defendants"), as a result of June Alexander's death that occurred while riding an amusement park ride manufactured by defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendants summary judgment, finding the act of a third party constituted both a superseding cause of the death and an alteration of the product which relieved defendants of liability. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

E & J Construction Company ("Plaintiff") purchased a metal building from Liberty Building Systems, Inc. ("Defendant"). The metal building was purchased by plaintiff for one of its customers, Camel Manufacturing Company ("Camel"). Plaintiff constructed the metal building for Camel and connected it to an existing building. Almost from the outset, there was a problem with leaking. Plaintiff sued defendant raising various claims including, among others, breach of contract. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial on the few remaining claims. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the grant of a directed verdict on plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings. The judgment of the trial court otherwise is affirmed.

The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation of the defendants that the only notice of appeal received by the trial court clerk was a facsimile filed notice of appeal. As such is insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this court, the appeal is dismissed.