APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this medical malpractice case, we are asked to determine whether various employees of a medical corporation were agents properly authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation and/or one of its physician employees. We hold that none of the individuals who accepted service in this case were agents authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of either the corporation or the individual physician. With specific reference to the attempted service of the amended complaint, we hold that the authority to sign for and receive certified mail does not, on its own, confer the authority to accept service of process. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51 for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lori Turner (“Employee”) sought reconsideration of her prior workers’ compensation settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Her claim had been settled for 14% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole, based upon a 7% anatomical impairment. Upon reconsideration, the trial court awarded an additional 21% PPD, for a total of 35% PPD to the body as a whole. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. (“Employer”) has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the amount of the award. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This matter was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for a frivolous appeal. Appellant challenges only the award itself and not the amount decided by the trial court. The party awarded the fees argued that the trial court erred in the amount awarded. Finding no error, the trial court is affirmed.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to three children, asserting that the findings of the juvenile court that he had abandoned his children by failure to support and that the conditions which led to the children's removal persisted were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father also asserts that the court erred in finding that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jose Holmes, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that the judgment is void because the State failed to file a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment at least ten days before the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Terry Lynn Craft, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-213(b)(2). In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court violated the hearsay rule in admitting a recording of a 911 call. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donnie Edward Braddam, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering him to serve the balance of his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.

This appeal involves a termination of rights proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113 (Supp. 2009) with regard to five children between the ages of twelve and seventeen. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services removed the children from the custody of their biological mother and the person thought to be their biological father and entered into a series of permanency plans with them for the next three and one-half years. Shortly after discovering that the putative father was not the biological father of two of the children, the Department filed a termination petition in the Shelby County Juvenile Court. The juvenile court entered an order on October 31, 2008, terminating both the biological mother's and the putative father's parental rights. The putative father appealed the juvenile court's decision to terminate his parental rights based on both Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi). While the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's finding that grounds for termination of the putative father's rights existed, the court reversed the judgment terminating the putative father's rights based on the majority's conclusion that the Department had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to address the causes for termination under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3). The majority also reversed the termination of the father's rights under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi) because the Department had failed to aid the putative father in establishing paternity. State, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Tina T. (In re B.T.), No. W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3681884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009). We granted the Department's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that the Department used reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to establish his parentage and to regain custody of his biological and legal children and that the juvenile court properly terminated the putative father's rights with regard to all five children.

Plaintiff, individually and as the guardian of her minor child, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claims that she and her child were harmed by the defendants' disclosure of their private health information. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

I concur with the result reached by the majority; however, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding the proferred opinion testimony of two lay witnesses, Lisa Poe, a registered nurse, and Jimmy Brock, a surgical technician.

The Petitioner, Gary Thomas Russell, pleaded nolo contendere to one count of aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief; following a hearing, the Circuit Court of Madison County denied his petition. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in holding that petitioner's trial counsel rendered effective assistance. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in this medical malpractice action. On appeal, the plaintiff assigns error to various decisions made by the trial court concerning the admission of evidence and arguments and to the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of negligent retention. While the trial court erred in several respects, we consider the errors to be harmless and affirm the judgment based on the jury verdict.

Appellant, Patrick Pope, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in March of 2007 for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven years. After a hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The trial court denied the remainder of the motion for new trial, and Appellant has appealed. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated; (3) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record, we determine that the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated by direct and circumstantial evidence, that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eleven years. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome while employed as a factory worker by Johnson Controls, Inc. (“JCI”). After employee gave notice of her injury and received some treatment, Manufacturers Industrial Group (“MIG”) bought the factory and became her employer. She had surgery on both arms and returned to work, but was then permanently laid off. Employee brought an action against both JCI and MIG for workers’ compensation benefits due to injuries sustained to her right and left hands and wrists. JCI and MIG each argued that the other should be liable for her workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court found that MIG was liable and awarded 48% permanent partial disability to both arms. MIG appealed. It contends that the trial court erred by assigning liability to it  and by adopting theimpairment rating of a physician chosen through the Medical Impairment Registry. MIG further argues that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his left arm. His employer denied the claim, contending that the injury was not caused by the employment, and also that the employee had failed to provide notice of his injury as required by the workers’ compensation statute. The trial court found that the injury was work-related, and awarded 60% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the left arm. On appeal, the employer argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on these issues, and that the trial court erred by failing to apply the missing witness rule as to the potential testimony of the treating physicians. We find no error, and affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Shari Harp, filed this action to recover personal property and for an injunction related to her deceased mother's estate. Respondent, Darryelle E. Mills, is surviving spouse of the decedent. The trial court entered a partial default judgment in Ms. Harp's favor after Mr. Mills failed to answer the complaint or otherwise plead _ despite ample notice of the consequences of failing to answer. Upon appeal, this court entered a show cause order directing Mr. Mills, acting pro se, to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, among other things. Mr. Mills has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time allotted. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal because it is premature and because Mr. Mills has neglected to file a cost bond and has not paid the litigation tax associated with the appeal.

On the evening of May 25, 2007, Appellant, Edward Lee Adkins, was arrested at the hospital for driving under the influence ("DUI"). This arrest occurred after Trooper Brandon Hunt was called to the scene of an accident where he found a truck registered to Appellant upside down in a ditch. When Trooper Hunt arrived at the hospital, he smelled alcohol and ordered a blood alcohol test. Appellant's blood alcohol level was found to be 0.19 percent by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") Crime Laboratory. The Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for two counts of DUI, one count of DUI, third offense, one count of reckless driving, and one count of violation of the registration law. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of both counts of DUI, reckless driving, and violation of the registration law. The trial court held a bench trial and determined that Appellant was guilty of DUI, third offense. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with one hundred and twenty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the two convictions used to support his conviction for DUI, third offense because they were not self-authenticating. Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for DUI, third offense and reckless driving. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that both issues are without merit. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Charles Laten Howell, III, was convicted of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-433(e). In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting blister packs of pseudoephedrine caplets because the State failed to establish a chain of custody. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of the charge of driving under the influence ("DUI") against Appellee, Stephen James Thompson. The trial court dismissed the charge after finding that the statute of limitations had expired before the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Appellee. On appeal, we determine that the trial court improperly dismissed the charges because Appellee waived his preliminary hearing and agreed to allow the case to be bound over to the grand jury prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the indictment against Appellee for DUI.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Derek Alton Badger, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). In this appeal, he contends that the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the employee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203, because the employee had not filed a request for benefit review conference within one year of the date of injury. The employee, Joe Lynn Hughes, has appealed, contending that the statute was tolled by his timely filing of a request for assistance. We agree, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the trial court

The parents of the two children at issue appeal the termination of their parental rights. The issues on appeal pertain to the trial court's findings that both parents were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and that termination was in the children's best interests. Also at issue is whether the requirements of the Permanency Plans were not reasonable, related and relevant to the stated goals. We find the requirements of the Permanency Plans were appropriate and that the efforts of the Department of Children's Services constituted reasonable attempts to reunify the family. We also find the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings that the parents failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans and that termination of their parental rights is in the best interests of the children. We, therefore, affirm the termination of the parental rights of both parents.

After seven years of marriage, Maryam Ghorashi-Bajestani ("Wife") sued Masoud Bajestani ("Husband") for divorce. After a trial, the trial court entered its order, inter alia, awarding wife a divorce, dividing the marital property, setting husband's child support obligation, awarding wife transitional alimony for nine years, awarding wife alimony in futuro to begin after the termination of the transitional alimony, and awarding wife attorney's fees. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of marital property and the awards of alimony, among others. Wife raises issues regarding child support, and also requests that this Court take notice of a post-judicial fact, and award her attorney's fees on appeal. We modify as to the award of transitional alimony, vacate the award of alimony in futuro, affirm as to the child support and division of property, decline to award attorney's fees on appeal, and decline to take notice of the post-judicial fact.

This is a dispute to quiet title to 5 acres between the owners of adjacent tracts. Both parties claim ownership of the disputed property along their common boundary by color of title. At issue is whether the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated _ 28-2- 105 for quieting title to lands under color of title by establishing the deed had been recorded for at least 30 years and the property at issue had been adversely possessed by the plaintiff or his predecessors in title for at least 7 years. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff finding that the plaintiff and his predecessors had adversely possessed the disputed property for more than 7 years and that the plaintiff's claim derived from a metes and bounds description in a 1961 deed, which was of record for more than 30 years. Finding the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's ruling, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal was initially referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). After oral argument was conducted before the Panel, but before the Panel filed its opinion, the case was transferred to the full Court in order to consider a request under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to set aside a judgment approving a settlement. The trial court found no basis for setting aside the settlement under Rule 60.02. Neither do we. The judgment of the trial court upholding the parties’ settlement is affirmed.