APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kenneth Gregory Allen, was convicted of two counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base and two counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base, both Class C felonies; and sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine base, delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine base, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the delivery convictions with the convictions for the sale of cocaine. The defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years at sixty percent for the conviction for sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine and for the possession with the intent to sell. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years at sixty percent for the two convictions for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but to run consecutively to case 16510, also a drug conviction, and "any unexpired sentence." This resulted in an aggregate forty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court imposed an improper sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The Defendant, James Arthur Johnson, was charged with two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of aggravated robbery for events that occurred on the evening of June 18, 2006. Co-defendant Rodney Lenier Williams was also charged in all five counts, but his case was severed from the defendant's case before trial. A jury sitting in the Criminal Court for Davidson County found the defendant not guilty of the two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, guilty of the two counts of felony murder, and guilty of the count of aggravated robbery. The defendant was given concurrent life sentences for the felony murder convictions. For the aggravated robbery conviction, the defendant was given an eleven year sentence to run consecutively to the two life sentences. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing a non-expert witness to give his opinion, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dallas R. Myers, Jr., appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He alleges that his sentence is illegal because the trial court sentenced him above the presumptive minimum sentence absent a finding of enhancement factors. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Frank Deangelo Taylor, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery. He received a life sentence for the first degree felony murder and a concurrent term of eight years imprisonment for the attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Taylor claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and (2) the insufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Raymond Douglas Myers, was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated arson, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. See State v. Raymond Douglas Myers, Sr., No. M2003-01099-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 911280, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 20, 2004), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004). The trial court merged the felony murder convictions and the conspiracy to commit murder conviction with the three convictions for first degree murder. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, and a consecutive twenty-four year sentence for the aggravated arson conviction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id. at *7. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in a lengthy pro se petition. Counsel was appointed. After a hearing on the petition for relief, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner has appealed the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that the postconviction court should have determined that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Defendant, Joel Adam Alexander, was indicted for possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with the intent to sell, possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with intent to deliver, possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell, possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On June 16, 2008, defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with intent to sell, with an agreed sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the trial court's determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served by incarceration. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ricky Mayes (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his spine. His claim against Peebles, Inc. (“Employer”) was settled in accordance with the workers’ compensation statute. His authorized treating physician subsequently recommended a surgical procedure. Employer’s medical utilization review provider declined to approve the procedure. After an initial administrative appeal was denied, Employee filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to compel Employer to authorize the procedure. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded attorney’s fees to Employee. On appeal, Employer argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, because Employee did not exhaust his administrative appeals, and that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment.

This action was brought to determine whether a roadway that serves the plaintiff and certain of the defendants is a public or private road. The trial court, after hearing the evidence, declared the road to be a private road. On appeal, we affirm.

Petitioner, Javonte Demontez Terrell, was indicted for first degree murder. He entered a best interest plea to second degree murder in exchange for a twenty-year sentence. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After an amended petition was filed, the post-conviction court held a hearing. The petition was dismissed by the post-conviction court. Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. This Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Petitioner challenges the dismissal of the petition. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove that his guilty plea was involuntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jermaine Smith, appeals the trial court's order revoking Defendant's probation in various sentences and ordering Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. It appears from the record that as of the probation violation hearing on February 9, 2009, a "fourth amended" probation violation warrant was pending against Defendant. This warrant alleged that Defendant had violated various terms and conditions of his probation in Montgomery County cases numbered 40300037, 40600256, and 40601232. In this appeal, Defendant acknowledges that the evidence showed he violated the terms of his probation. However, he argues that the trial court should have reinstated probation rather than order service of the sentence by incarceration. After full review we affirm the orders of the trial court.

A group of Sevier County residents identifying themselves as "Public Spirited Citizens" ("Plaintiffs") filed a set of quo warranto lawsuits against Sevier County, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), and Larry Waters, the County Mayor of Sevier County ("Mayor") (collectively "Defendants"). The trial court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm.

A group of Sevier County residents identifying themselves as "Public Spirited Citizens" ("Plaintiffs") filed a set of quo warranto lawsuits against Sevier County, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), and Larry Waters, the County Mayor of Sevier County ("Mayor") (collectively "Defendants"). The trial court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Veric Dean Osgood, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He received a total effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff hospital filed a lawsuit against defendant patient for unpaid medical expenses. Defendant patient filed a third party complaint against defendant insurance company alleging that the insurance company was responsible for the unpaid medical expenses pursuant to a health insurance policy. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the insurance contract was ambiguous and construed it against the defendant insurance company. Defendant insurance company appeals. After reviewing the record and the health insurance policy, we conclude that the policy was not ambiguous and the insurance contract specifically excluded coverage of patient's pre-existing condition. Accordingly, we reverse.

Appellant filed petitions seeking increased library access as well as his release from incarceration. Because Appellant has been unconditionally released from prison, we find his appeal moot and affirm the trial court's dismissal of his claims.

The trial court in this matter granted a motion to dismiss and entered a default judgment for the plaintiff, American Legion Post 212 ("Post 212"). The defendant, Hollis F. Summers ("Mr. Summers"), who was not present at the hearing, had removed the action to federal court days earlier. Under 28 U.S.C. _ 1446(d), once a case is removed to federal court, a state court has no authority to take further action in the matter. Accordingly, because the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, we must summarily reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This case concerns the priority of lienholders' respective interests in real property. The plaintiffs/appellees, Trustmark National Bank and FirstBank, filed this joint action as amended for declaratory judgment against the defendants/appellants, Long Beach Mortgage Company, Sonya R. Thomas, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, and for enforcement of their liens through judicial sale of the property. The plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted that Trustmark and FirstBank held judgment liens against the property that were valid, enforceable, and superior to the defendants' interests. The defendants responded in pertinent part that they were entitled to priority under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, even if the plaintiffs held prior-recorded judgment liens against the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the plaintiffs' liens were enforceable and superior to the defendants' later-recorded deeds of trust and that the defendants were not entitled to equitable subrogation. The defendants appealed, challenging only whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the question of equitable subrogation. Because the plaintiffs failed to negate an essential element of equitable subrogation or show that the defendants cannot establish an essential element of equitable subrogation at trial, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in part and remand.

The petitioner, Phedrek T. Davis, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily denying his petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Herman Majors, Jr., appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence for his conviction of aggravated assault, alleging that the trial court erred in not returning him to community corrections or placing him on probation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Gary Wayne Armstrong, appeals from his Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of assault and aggravated assault. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erroneously sentenced him. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This case involves the award of attorney's fees and costs against the Appellant City of Memphis for its alleged failure to comply with the appellee's document request, made under the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _10-7-501 et seq. The trial court awarded fees and costs against the city under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 10-7-505(g), which requires a finding of knowledge and willful failure to comply with the public records act. Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) the trial court made no specific finding concerning the city's alleged willful failure to comply, and (2) the record does not support a finding of willful failure to comply on the part of the city. Reversed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of one count of conspiracy to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, see T.C.A. __ 39-17-417(a)(3), (j)(5); 39-12-103 (2003), and one count of possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, see id. _ 39-17- 417(a)(4), (j)(5). The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of conspiracy to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this action plaintiff asked the Court to declare that he had an interest in property which he inherited by will, and for a partition and sale of the land. The trial court determined that plaintiff was judicially estopped to claim an interest in the land and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

An inmate appeals a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice and 42 U.S.C._ 1983 claims against the correctional facility's psychiatrist. Since the defendant's doctor negated essential elements of both claims with her expert affidavit and plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's award of summary judgment to defendant attorney in an action alleging professional malpractice, fraud, and violation of the consumer protection act. We affirm.