APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Edward Thompson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition to suspend his sentence to probation. The defendant pled guilty to attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and received an agreed sentence of ten years. However, as part of the agreement, he reserved the right to request that the trial court sentence him to probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in its decision by "not appropriately bas[ing] the denial of probation upon the sentencing considerations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated 40-35-103." Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the petition.

The defendant, Brandon Taylor Fisher, stands convicted of robbery and kidnapping, both Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to five years for robbery and four years for kidnapping and ordered him to serve the sentences consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court failed to make findings sufficient to justify consecutive sentences under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) and remand for a new sentencing hearing solely on the issue of whether consecutive sentences are appropriate in this case.

The Petitioner, Kardius Wilkes, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder. This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and his application for permission to appeal was denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Kardius Wilkes, No. W2001-02172-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 818255 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 26, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 7, 2002). He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because his trial counsel failed to: (1) impeach a particular witness using transcripts of the Petitioner's first trial, which ended in a mistrial; (2) adequately meet with the Petitioner before his second trial; (3) call the Petitioner's brother as a witness; and (4) adequately investigate and interview potential witnesses. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Defendant, Jonathon C. Hood, appeals the dismissal of his motion to discharge fines. More specifically, he contends that because his sentence was expired, the trial court erred in dismissing the motion. The State argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure does not provide for an appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to discharge fines. We agree. Additionally, the record is incomplete. Therefore, Defendant's appeal is dismissed.

In this appeal, the defendant claims that his due process rights were violated because the judge presiding over his probation revocation had previously served as a member of his drug court team and had received ex parte information regarding the defendant's conduct at issue by virtue of his prior involvement. After due consideration, we agree that the Due Process Clause requires that a defendant's probation revocation be adjudicated by a judge who has not previously reviewed the same or related subject matter as part of the defendant's drug court team. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below and remand the defendant's case for a new hearing in front of a different judge.

Purchasers of real estate brought suit against the sellers as well as against the appraiser, the sellers' real estate agent, the agent's managing broker and brokerage firm alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of duty to disclose adverse facts related to the property purchased. Upon their motions for summary judgment, the appraiser, real estate agent, the agent's managing broker and brokerage firm were dismissed as defendants; the purchasers appeal the dismissal of the real estate agent, the managing broker and the brokerage firm. Finding no error, we affirm.

The employee filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer for back pain resulting from the aggravation and advancement of her degenerative disc disease, which she claimed had occurred from her injury while working on a brake line assembly. The trial court found that the employee had not carried her burden of proof, and the employee appealed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the trial court, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, sitting in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, affirms the judgment.

In this workers’ compensation action, employee sought benefits for injuries to his hips, shoulders, and feet. The trial court awarded benefits for injuries to his shoulders and feet but found that he failed to give timely notice of his bilateral hip injuries to his employer and dismissed those claims. Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that he did not provide timely notice of his hip injuries and that the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. He requests that temporary disability, medical, and permanent disability benefits be awarded for those claims. Employer argues that the trial court erred in its calculation of the amount to be set off for social security retirement benefits. We conclude that the employee gave sufficient notice of his hip injuries to satisfy the requirements of the workers’ compensation statute. However, we find that those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant-Appellant, Carlos Kennedy, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Chester County of rape of a child, a Class A felony, attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for rape of a child, ten years for attempted rape of a child, eleven months and twenty-nine days for assault, and four years for coercion of a witness. The trial court ordered the sentence for attempted rape of a child to be served consecutively with the sentence for rape of a child. It also ordered the sentences for assault and coercion of a witness to run concurrently with the conviction for rape of a child. Thus, Kennedy received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Kennedy claims: (1) that the conviction for rape of a child is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning the victim and her mother about a prior allegation of sexual abuse made by the victim; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In the Shelby County Criminal Court, the Defendant-Appellant, Mario Chambers, entered guilty pleas to four Class E felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. Specifically, Chambers pled guilty to possession of Morphine with intent to sell, possession of Hydrocodone with intent to sell, possession of Alprazolam with intent to sell and possession of marijuana. As a part of his plea agreement, Chambers received concurrent two-year sentences for each of the felony convictions to be served in the county workhouse and a concurrent thirty-four day sentence to be served in the county jail for the misdemeanor conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Chambers argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The petitioner, William Patrick Robinson, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court of Carroll County's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and a concurrent term of twenty-five years imprisonment, respectively. The State filed a motion requesting this court to affirm the post-conviction court's order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The owner and operator of a tractor-trailer filed a workers' compensation claim against a common carrier for injuries that he incurred while attempting to verify a load to transport to another location. The trial court ruled that the owner/operator, while an independent contractor, was entitled to workers' compensation benefits by virtue of a written contract between the parties extending coverage, as permitted by statute. The trial court reserved judgment on the award and permitted an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and referred it to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the disposition of the remaining issues.

Mother appeals the trial court's change of custody of the parties' minor child to Father, challenging the court's best interest determination. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the father on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The father appeals, arguing that the Department of Children's Services did not clearly and convincingly show that it made reasonable efforts to help him address his addiction to methamphetamine, clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination, or clearly and convincingly demonstrate that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Because DCS did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with his children, we reverse.

The trial court granted the employee’s post-judgment motion to compel his employer to provide certain medical treatment. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the proposed treatment was related to the work injury. We affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Joshua Shane Hayes, was convicted of possession with intent to deliver three-hundred grams or more of cocaine (count one), manufacturing twenty or more marijuana plants (count two), and possession with intent to deliver more than ten pounds but less than seventy pounds of marijuana (count three). The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a sentence of twenty-four years for count one, five years for count two, and four years for count three. The court ordered counts one and two to run consecutively to each other and concurrently to count three for an effective twenty-nine year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized from the residence at Deer Valley Trail; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of seventeen firearms, ammunition, and photographs of multiple firearms at trial; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant to an effective twenty-nine year sentence. Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court because the warrant does not comply with the requirements of Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In this action the School Board brought an action to dismiss plaintiff, a tenured teacher. Following a hearing, the Board of Education voted to suspend plaintiff without pay from November 27, 2007 to May 23, 2008, and required other sensitivity training and a probationary period. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Chancery Court, and the Chancellor affirmed the suspension on the grounds that plaintiff was guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the teaching profession. On appeal we affirm the trial court's Judgment and remand with direction that the plaintiff be reinstated as a teacher with back pay from the time the appeal to Chancery Court ended.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Telly Savalas Johnson, of five counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of seventy-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove identity and premeditation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Deshawn Gail Leiger, appeals from the revocation of her community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the return of seized property. In the course of a criminal investigation, the respondents seized personal property from the petitioner. After a year passed with no forfeiture proceeding, the petitioner filed a petition for the return of his seized property, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 39-11-709. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting that they no longer had possession of the property. The trial court granted the motion. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse and remand, finding that the petition was correctly filed in the county in which the property was seized, that it correctly named as the respondents the parties who seized the property, and that the respondents were not entitled to dismissal of the petition on the basis that the respondents had transferred possession of the property.

The Defendant, David Lynn Harrison, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of unauthorized use of a vehicle and attempted theft, and (3) that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury on the defenses of duress and necessity. Because the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Emory Pegram (“Decedent”) was the President of Findley & Pegram Company, Inc. (“Employer”). He died as a result of a motorcycle accident. Approximately ten minutes before the accident, he had made a bank deposit for the business. He thereafter drove past his office and home. Employer had no active projects in the direction Decedent was traveling at the time of the accident. There was, however, a potential future project in that direction. Decedent had not informed any co-workers or employees where he was going or for what purpose. He was carrying business documents, a business cell phone, and a tool. The trial court concluded that he was a traveling employee at the time of the accident, and awarded workers’ compensation death benefits to his widow. The trial court also awarded post-judgment interest for the five-month period between the announcement of the court’s decision and entry of the judgment. Employer has appealed. We conclude that Decedent was not a traveling employee, but was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident. We further conclude that the workers’ compensation statute does not authorize an award of interest prior to entry of the judgment. The judgment is modified to remove the award of post-judgment interest. It is otherwise affirmed.

The Defendant, Joshua Bryant McClain, pleaded guilty to vandalism of cemetery monuments in an amount over $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant to five years; after the service of 150 days in jail, his sentence was to be suspended for a six-year period. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution to the cemetery association. The defendant now appeals, challenging the denial of judicial diversion, the length of his sentence, and the restitution award. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lance Burton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a mitigated offender to eight years in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee alleged that he sustained hearing loss as a result of his work for employer. He filed a civil action 94 days after an impasse was reached at a benefit review conference. The trial court granted employer’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the 90-day statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-203(g)(1) (2008). On appeal, employee contends that the report of the benefit review conference was never “filed with the commissioner” of Labor and Workforce Development as required by the statute and that the 90-day limitation period therefore never began to run. We affirm the judgment.