APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Emory Pegram (“Decedent”) was the President of Findley & Pegram Company, Inc. (“Employer”). He died as a result of a motorcycle accident. Approximately ten minutes before the accident, he had made a bank deposit for the business. He thereafter drove past his office and home. Employer had no active projects in the direction Decedent was traveling at the time of the accident. There was, however, a potential future project in that direction. Decedent had not informed any co-workers or employees where he was going or for what purpose. He was carrying business documents, a business cell phone, and a tool. The trial court concluded that he was a traveling employee at the time of the accident, and awarded workers’ compensation death benefits to his widow. The trial court also awarded post-judgment interest for the five-month period between the announcement of the court’s decision and entry of the judgment. Employer has appealed. We conclude that Decedent was not a traveling employee, but was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident. We further conclude that the workers’ compensation statute does not authorize an award of interest prior to entry of the judgment. The judgment is modified to remove the award of post-judgment interest. It is otherwise affirmed.

The Defendant, Joshua Bryant McClain, pleaded guilty to vandalism of cemetery monuments in an amount over $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant to five years; after the service of 150 days in jail, his sentence was to be suspended for a six-year period. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution to the cemetery association. The defendant now appeals, challenging the denial of judicial diversion, the length of his sentence, and the restitution award. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that she sustained a repetitive motion injury to her chest and back. Her employer denied liability. Three doctors testified concerning the issues of causation and permanency. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury, and awarded 16% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding any benefits. The employee contends that the award is inadequate. We agree with the employee and increase the award to 30% PPD to the body as a whole and otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between an employee and his employer regarding whether the employer agreed to pay off the employee's student loans as part of his employment compensation package. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that no valid contract existed, and it dismissed the employee's complaint. The employee appeals. We affirm.

Claiborne Hauling, LLC, contracted with Wisteria Park, LLC, to perform the excavating and grading, including installation of storm sewers and sanitary sewers, for a residential subdivision Wisteria was developing. The contract calls for Claiborne Hauling to commence work on November 6, 2006, with a substantial completion date of April 5, 2007. The contract further provides that Claiborne Hauling will receive a bonus of $500 per day for early completion but will pay a $500 per day "penalty" if completion extends past May 31, 2007. Claiborne did not finish by May 31, 2007. Wisteria "fired" Claiborne Hauling during a heated exchange in August 2007, and confirmed termination of the contract in a letter from counsel. The ground stated for termination is failure to complete the project by May 31, 2007. However, Wisteria did not secure approval of its plans for construction of the sewer system until June 8, 2007. When Wisteria did not pay the invoices and change orders outstanding at the time of the termination, Claiborne Hauling first sent a "prompt pay notice" and then filed this action alleging breach of contract against Wisteria. Wisteria answered and filed a counterclaim asserting, among other things, that it was entitled to recover $500 per day from May 31, 2007, until substantial completion, as liquidated damages. After a bench trial, the court found that Wisteria was guilty of the first material breach and awarded Claiborne Hauling a judgment in the amount of $301,430.62, which included attorney fees under the Prompt Pay Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 66-34-602 (2004). Wisteria appeals. We affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case involving res ipsa loquitur. The defendant physician performed surgery on the plaintiff's husband. Sponges were used in the patient's abdomen during the procedure. Nurses in the operating room counted the sponges used in the surgery. The nurses erred in counting the sponges, and the defendant physician closed the surgical incision with a sponge remaining inside. The retained sponge was later discovered and removed in a second surgery. The plaintiff's husband subsequently died of causes unrelated to the retained sponge. The widow sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice, asserting that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, as well as the common knowledge exception to the requirement of expert medical proof. The physician filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as to liability. The defendant physician filed two medical expert affidavits, both of which stated that the defendant physician had complied with the applicable standard of care by relying on the nurses' sponge count. Initially, the plaintiff filed an expert affidavit stating that the defendant physician did not comply with the applicable standard of care, but later filed a notice stating that she intended to proceed to trial with no expert proof to support her medical malpractice claim. The trial court determined that neither res ipsa loquitur nor the common knowledge exception applied, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician, and affirm the denial of the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. We find that, under both the common knowledge exception and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff was not required to submit expert proof to rebut the physician's expert testimony that he was not negligent by relying on the nurses' sponge count. However, application of neither res ipsa loquitur nor the common knowledge exception results in a conclusive presumption of negligence by the defendant physician. Therefore, a fact issue as to the physician's negligence remains for trial.

Petitioner Robert M. Linder was convicted of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor following a bench trial in the Blount County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced him to 12 years, and on appeal this Court modified his sentence to 11 years. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief and, due to irreconcilable differences with his appointed counsel, has proceeded through the post-conviction process pro se. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner now appeals, alleging numerous errors in his conviction and subsequent appeals as well as ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel. Although we conclude that the trial court enhanced Petitioner's sentence in violation of the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), that violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not provide the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Similarly, none of Petitioner's other claims afford a basis for post-conviction relief. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate's petition for common law writ of certiorari. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole arbitrarily and illegally denied the inmate's request for parole. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather than issue the writ and order the filing of the certified record, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The inmate appealed. We affirm.

I concur in the court’s opinion and express the view that the pivot upon which
the appeal in this case teeters is very finely pointed.

Plaintiff's action sought to reopen a divorce case which became final in 1982, to obtain part of her former husband's military pension. The Trial Court held the action was not filed within a reasonable time after the divorce and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm.

The Defendant, George Washington Matthews, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced as a career offender and received an effective sentence of fifteen years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his case; (2) the trial court erred in approving the jury's verdict as the thirteenth juror; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of facilitation of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a career offender. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court because the trial court failed to fulfill its role as the thirteenth juror. We remand the defendant's case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Ronald Jerome Gleaves, was indicted following the execution of a search warrant that led to the discovery and seizure of narcotics. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant was unconstitutionally issued. The trial court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the charge against the defendant. The State appeals, contending the warrant was valid, and the evidence was admissible. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the order suppressing the drugs found during the execution of the search warrant. We vacate the order dismissing the indictment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case arises from an alleged breach of an agreement to train horses belonging to the Appellant herein. The trial court found that the appellee training facility performed the agreed upon services, and that the appellant did not meet his burden to show either breach of contract or damages arising therefrom. Judgment was entered in favor of the appellee, and the appellant's case against appellee was dismissed with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I concur in the majority opinion, but concur separately only to elaborate on establishing the similarity of medical communities for the purpose of qualifying a medical expert witness.

Defendant appeals the award of summary judgment to plaintiff in this action for specific performance of an option to purchase real property which plaintiff asserts is contained in a lease agreement. Finding a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the authenticity of the option to purchase, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This lawsuit was filed by Charles Beard ("Plaintiff") against Jepco, Inc. ("Jepco"), and Mike Phillips (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff rented a storage unit from Jepco. Mike Phillips is a manager for Jepco. Plaintiff essentially claims that Jepco raised the rent on the storage unit he rented in violation of the rental agreement. Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit in the Hamilton County General Session Court. He appealed the unfavorable sessions court judgment to the circuit court. Thereafter, defendants filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's response to that summary judgment motion failed to create any genuine issue of material fact and, accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the trial court's disqualification of her expert witness and grant of the defendant/appellee's motion for directed verdict. Finding that the appellant failed to show that her expert was familiar with the standard of care in a community similar to the defendant's community, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a prior order of dismissal. The trial court dismissed an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-805 and -807, which govern inmate lawsuits. Nearly two years later, the inmate filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion and the inmate appealed. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief, its ruling is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Terrance G. Motley, of attempted first degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court sentenced him to forty-four years in prison. We affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner now appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial court improperly refused to appoint him another attorney after he waived his right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

Father sought to become the primary residential parent due to the failure of Mother to comply with the parenting plan. The trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed. We affirm.

In 2001, the trial court found that Employee's coronary artery disease had been advanced by his employment. Medical benefits were awarded in accordance with the workers' compensation law. In 2007, a dispute arose between Employee and Employer as to whether certain medications and tests were related to the work injury. Employee filed a motion to compel Employer to provide the medications under the 2001 judgment. The trial court granted the motion, and ordered Employer to provide all of the medications at issue. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred by requiring Employer to provide medications for Employee's diabetes. We otherwise affirm the order.

Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed after she failed to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss and failed to appear at the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied her subsequent motion to set aside the order of dismissal, finding that she had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was not served with the motion to dismiss. We affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Jermaine Harris, of one count of aggravated arson. The trial court sentenced him to 19 years' incarceration to be served at 100 percent as a violent offender. The defendant appeals his conviction and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in failing to give a proper jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification, and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence on the basis of factors not determined by the jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

The petitioner, Kilven Neal, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that we dismiss the appeal based on the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of appeal, or, in the alternative, affirm the lower court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that there was no timely notice of appeal filed and that the petitioner's claims do not warrant that we waive the timely notice of appeal requirement in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Harold Gause, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He entered a plea of guilty to reckless driving on April 30, 2003, in exchange for a sentence of seventeen days, which he had already served. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 15, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: it was improper for the post-conviction court to summarily dismiss the petition; his allegations established a colorable claim for relief; the State failed to adequately answer the allegations contained in his petition; and this court should take judicial notice of the petitioner's complaint filed with the Board of Professional Responsibility regarding the representation of trial counsel. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal from the post-conviction court.