APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The order that is the subject of this appeal purports to amend the division of marital property as stated in the final judgment. It was entered in response to a motion filed more than a year after the entry of the final judgment. We have determined the motion was untimely because it did not qualify as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion; therefore, the order that purports to amend the division of marital property as stated in the final judgment is void. We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate the order that purports to amend the final judgment.

The Petitioner, Scott M. Craig, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State's motion is well-taken, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is the second appeal by two former police officers who sought retirement gifts provided for by Metro ordinance and police department policies. The officers requested the gifts and were denied based on lacking good standing at the time they retired, as required by the ordinance. The officers filed a declaratory judgment action as well as civil rights claims, which the trial court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to state a claim, respectively. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action and remanded. On remand, the trial court found that, because the officers were under investigation for misconduct at the time of their retirement, they were not in good standing as required by the ordinance and, thus, not entitled to the retirement gifts. The officers appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Latroy Lee Robertson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he attacks his sentences for three counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and three counts of the sale of twenty-six grams or more of cocaine. The petitioner seeks a delayed appeal of the sentence, alleging that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal of the sentences. The postconviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and, after careful review, we reverse the post-conviction court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an appeal in a conservatorship case. The notice of appeal was mailed via overnight delivery. Had the notice of appeal been delivered the next day, it would have been timely. Unfortunately, the notice of appeal was not delivered the next day and, therefore, was not timely filed. Because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty (30) days of entry of the final judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and this appeal must be dismissed.

Property was purchased in Mr. Byrd's name alone, but Ms. Wyatt contends that partnership/joint venture profits were used to secure the purchase, such that she is entitled to an interest in the property. We find that, to the extent that partnership profits were used towards earnest money and closing costs, Ms. Wyatt is presumed to have an interest in the property. We vacate the trial court's dismissal order and we remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether R & J Remodeling profits were expended towards earnest money and closing costs, and to allow Mr. Byrd an opportunity to rebut the presumption of partnership property.

The pro se petitioner, Johnny B. Ewing, II, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Husband challenges various rulings of the trial court in this second appeal of the post-divorce proceedings. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiffs' action sought the removal of twelve Knox County office holders who had been appointed by the Knox County Commission in violation of the Open Meetings Act, according to plaintiffs' complaint. Another action, independent of plaintiffs' action, sought removal of the office holders on the grounds that the office holders had been appointed in violation of the Open Meetings Act. Plaintiffs were allowed to intervene in the independent case which, following trial, resulted in a finding that the Commission had violated the Open Meetings Act, and the office holders were removed from office. In this case, the trial court held that since plaintiffs had obtained the results that they sought in their action as a result of their intervention that the continuation of this action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs sought and were granted several amendments with their complaint seeking relief on other grounds, but the trial court denied any further relief to plaintiffs' bid. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff buyer of land, concluding that defendant seller was liable for rollback taxes pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 67-5-1008(f). We affirm.

The Petitioner, Arthur L. Armstrong, was convicted in 1978 of robbery, rape, kidnapping, and two counts of crime against nature and was sentenced to two life sentences, a twentyyear term, and two indeterminate terms of not less than ten years nor more than fifteen years, all of which the trial court ordered to be served consecutively. In March 2005, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged newly discovered evidence, and the trial court dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal was an unconstitutional denial of his right to due process. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Gary Lee Hunt, pled guilty to driving under the influence ("DUI"), second offense, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, forty-five days of which he was ordered to serve in incarceration with the remainder to be served on probation. In accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the stop of his vehicle, which led to his indictment and guilty plea, was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was constitutional. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

After the parties' brief marriage, the trial court awarded Wife $25,000.00 for equity allegedly accrued in the marital residence during the marriage. Finding no contributions by Wife to support a transmutation from separate to marital property, we reverse.

The defendant, Walter Jude Dec, pled guilty to 41 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, as follows: 25 counts of possessing in excess of 100 images of a minor, a Class B felony; one count of possession between 50 and 100 images of a minor, a Class C felony; and 15 counts of possessing less than 50 images, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to twelve years for each of the Class B felonies and as a Range I, standard offender to six years for the Class C felony and four years for each of the Class D felonies, with all sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in not merging the 41 counts into a single count. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Elmi Abdulahi Abdi, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, E. Louis Thomas, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of felony murder. The convictions were merged, and the appellant received a sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Husband appeals the trial court's decision that Wife's payment of taxes, insurance and association dues on houses titled jointly were contributions of separate property to the homes which, under a premarital agreement, entitled her to a credit before Husband could recover appreciation on those homes. The agreement provides for the treatment of a party's contributions of separate property to jointly held property, and we share the trial court's interpretation of those provisions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Ryan Smith, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to amend the judgment in his statutory rape case to eliminate the requirement that he register as a sex offender, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 39-202(20)(A)(ii), which defines when a statutory rape conviction triggers sex offender registry requirements. Based on our review, we agree that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and that the defendant's conviction does not require his registration as a sex offender. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for the court to amend the defendant's judgment to remove the defendant's placement on the sex offender registry.

The petitioner, Damien Tolson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree premeditated murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, Don Birdwell, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of vandalism of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent sentences of three years, six months for his aggravated assault conviction, and two years, six months, for his vandalism conviction, for an effective sentence of three years, six months. The trial court ordered defendant to serve ninety days in confinement, after which the sentence was suspended and defendant placed on probation. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated assault and vandalism; (2) the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Vicky Benson (“Employee”) developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in 2002, as a result of her work for New Gray Cemetery (“Employer”). Her claim was accepted. She had surgery on her right arm in 2004 and returned to work. After her return, she was terminated for reasons not related to her injury. She continued to receive conservative medical treatment from time to time. She found new employment in 2006. In September 2007, her treating physician recommended surgery for her left arm. Employer denied the claim, contending that her subsequent employer was liable for the condition and its effects. The trial court ruled that Employee’s condition had been worsened by her later employment, and dismissed the claim. On appeal, Employee contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

In June of 2008, Kelly D. McAlister ("Wife") filed a Petition to Enforce Final Decree against Robert A. McAlister ("Husband") seeking, among other things, to enforce the parties' final decree of divorce entered in June of 2000. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 2, 2009 finding and holding, inter alia, that the house at issue shall be sold and the net proceeds divided by the percentages stated in the divorce decree, and that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce using a fraction with the denominator being the number of months worked by Husband when he retires and the numerator being the number of months of the seventeen year marriage with Wife to receive one- half of the calculated amount. Wife appeals to this Court. We affirm as to the division of the house, reverse as to the calculation of the pension based upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce, and order that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon the amount of the pension at the time Husband retires based upon the formula stated in the divorce decree.

On April 10, 2000, William D. Chapman, II ("the Deceased") was involved in a motor vehicle accident. As a result of his injuries, he was admitted to Holston Valley Hospital and Medical Center in Kingsport where he came under the care of trauma surgeons, the defendants, James V. Lewis, M.D., and George M. Testerman, Jr., M.D., as well as other physicians and medical personnel. The plaintiff, Cathy L. Chapman, brought this wrongful death action against the defendants based upon her allegation that they were guilty of medical malpractice in the treatment of her husband; she claims that their malpractice caused the death of the Deceased on April 15, 2000. Following eight days of a jury trial in July 2008, counsel for the parties made their closing arguments. During the defense's argument, counsel for the plaintiff objected when counsel for Dr. Testerman projected on a video screen what purported to be the Q. and A. trial testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Philip Witorsch. The trial court overruled the objection and thereafter the jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants. Later, the trial court, acting on the plaintiff's motion, reversed itself and held that the defendants failed to lay a proper foundation for the use of the projected testimony. The court also pointed out that the defendants failed to give the plaintiff prior notice of their intention to use portions of the trial transcript in closing argument. As a consequence, the court granted the plaintiff a new trial. The defendants appeal. We reverse the trial court's grant of a new trial and reinstate the court's judgment in favor of the defendants.

Employee sued her employer under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, alleging that she was denied a promotion because of her race. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. We reverse the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Barry Brown, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions of three counts of aggravated robbery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress his statement, in preparing for trial, and in failing to present any mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.