APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Courtney Means, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) the search of his car and seizure of a gun was unconstitutional; (2) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the victim's identification; (3) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to police; and (4) the introduction of a gun into evidence with a different serial number than the gun that was found in his vehicle violated his due process rights. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An Anderson County jury convicted the defendant, Jerry Orlando Weaver, of two counts of facilitation of possession of less than one-half gram of cocaine for sale or delivery, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to twelve years for each count, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender and in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that the defendant failed to timely file his notice of appeal and that his claims do not warrant consideration in the "interest of justice." Therefore, we dismiss his appeal.

The Petitioner, Craig E. Shears, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction of first degree murder on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to effectively argue a motion to suppress his statement and in preparing for trial. The Petitioner also contends that co-counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance when co-counsel was hired to assist trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Defendant, Craig O. Majors, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of twenty years as a Range I offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and to six years each as a Range II offender for the attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse African-Americans from the jury pool resulted in a systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury, (2) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process, (3) there is insufficient evidence of his identity as the perpetrator, and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mickey Earl Brown, appeals his conviction upon a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court for aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing and in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Montgomery Count Grand Jury indicted Appellant for aggravated robbery and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty as charged. Appellant was sentenced to two, concurrent twelve-year sentences to be served at 35% as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Daniel Livingston, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Danny Lee Greene, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that the trial court improperly denied him a jury instruction concerning voluntary intoxication. After careful review, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Petitioner, Ivan Moreno, a/k/a Fernando Fileto a/k/a/ Roberto Lepe-Cervantes, pled guilty to felony murder, aggravated rape, and especially aggravated robbery. Petitioner received an effective sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary guilty plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner seeks a review of the post-conviction court's decision. Because Petitioner has failed to prove that his guilty plea was involuntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Court to terminate the parental rights of both parents to the minor children. Following trial, the trial judge ruled that grounds to terminate the parental rights by clear and convincing evidence existed, as well as clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the parents. The parents have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the standard of care that applies to a physician assistant in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff sued for injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of physician assistant Michael Maddox's failure to diagnose her condition accurately. The plaintiff did not sue Maddox, but sued the clinic which he owned and in which he practiced and Dr. Austin Adams, Maddox's supervising physician. The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment, supported by their testimony that (1) Maddox did not violate the standard of care applicable to physician assistants and (2) Dr. Adams did not violate the standard of care applicable to physicians. The plaintiff responded with her cardiologist's testimony that Maddox violated the standard of care applicable to primary care physicians. The cardiologist testified that he was not familiar with physician assistants or their supervision. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to establish that Maddox violated the professional standard of care applicable to him. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the standard of care applicable to physician assistants is the same as that applicable to physicians. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the standard of care applicable to physician assistants is distinct from that applicable to physicians. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants is reinstated, and the case is dismissed.

The Defendant, Donovan Michael Munroe, appeals from his jury convictions in the Sullivan County Criminal Court for attempted second degree murder, possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, both Class B felonies, possession of oxycodone with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, and maintaining a dwelling where drugs are sold, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of twelve years, eight years, three years, and two years, respectively; the trial court also ordered the sentences for the drug-related offenses to be served concurrently with one another and on supervised probation, but consecutively to the twelve-year sentence of incarceration for attempted second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized in Virginia, (3) the trial court improperly limited the examination of witnesses, (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments, (5) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of due process and a fair trial. Following our review, we conclude that the fines imposed were excessive and order them modified consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded.

In this divorce case following a twenty-one year marriage, the trial court designated Barbara Covington ("Wife") as primary residential parent, distributed the marital property, and awarded Wife transitional alimony. Robert Covington ("Husband") appeals claiming the trial court incorrectly determined that the entire amount of each party's pension was separate property. Husband also appeals the award of transitional alimony, claiming that both the amount and the length of time he was ordered to make payments were excessive. Wife claims she should have been awarded rehabilitative alimony after the transitional alimony ended. We hold that the trial court incorrectly classified as separate property those portions of the parties' pensions earned during the marriage. We also conclude, however, that the overall property division nevertheless was equitable, and so we find the error to be harmless. We agree with Husband that the amount of transitional alimony awarded was excessive and modify the award. As so modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

These workers’ compensation appeals were consolidated for hearing and disposition by order dated May 27, 2009. The employee, Larry Beshires, settled a claim for work-related injuries to his left knee and right shoulder, based upon the two and one-half times impairment cap in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). The settlement was approved by the Chancery Court of Fayette County. Mr. Beshires subsequently sustained a second injury, or aggravation of the previous injury, to his shoulder. He returned to work for a time, but then retired. He filed suit in the Chester County Chancery Court, seeking benefits for the new injury or, alternatively, reconsideration of his prior settlement. The reconsideration action was transferred to the Chancery Court of Fayette County. After a hearing on the merits, the Fayette County court declined to award additional benefits. The Chester County court awarded 48% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the later injury. Both sides have appealed, and the appeals have been consolidated by order of the Supreme Court. Mr. Beshires contends that 1 the Fayette County court erred by failing to award additional 1 Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, they were then referred to the Special Workers’ (continued...) benefits. The employer contends that the Chester County court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, because the benefit review conference process had not been exhausted. We affirm both judgments.

The Defendant, Bobby Dwaine England, pled guilty in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty-four years as a Range I, standard offender, for a total effective sentence of forty-eight years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence both in length and manner of service. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

TN Claims Commission - This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Commission dismissed the appellant's claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b) for failure to prosecute. In its order, the Commission also denied a motion to transfer the claim to the Wayne County Circuit Court for consolidation with a companion case. We affirm.

The petitioner, Eric P. Lumpkin, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of appellate counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This case involves a contract for the sale of real property and a subsequent verbal agreement. The trial court found that the seller breached the contract. We reverse and remand.

The petitioner, Joe Marvin Ellison, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

After the appellant, Lonnie L. Cross, led police on a high-speed chase, a Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted him on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, felony evading arrest with risk to others, driving on a revoked license, and speeding. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years in custody. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support two of his convictions: the evading arrest conviction and one of the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant also challenges the trial court's reliance on two sentencing enhancement factors. Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the appellant's convictions. We also conclude that, although the trial court erred in its application of one of the enhancement factors, the error was harmless. However, our review of the record reveals that the trial court committed plain error. The appellant's conviction on the reckless endangerment in count three violates constitutional double jeopardy protections. We therefore affirm the judgements of the trial court as to count one, reckless endangerment, and count two, evading arrest. The judgment of conviction in count three is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the conviction in count three with the evading arrest conviction in count two.

This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. A surgeon performed a procedure on the plaintiff at the defendant hospital. The defendant hospitalist physician monitored the plaintiff's post-surgery recovery. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting that the defendant hospitalist was negligent in releasing her from the hospital prematurely. The defendant hospitalist filed a motion for summary judgment, as did the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment to both. We affirm.