APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Father’s request for a continuance and proceeding with the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights. I reach my decision based on two factors: (1) the decision to grant a continuance or to proceed with the trial was within the discretion of the trial court, a decision that will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made; and (2) the fact that Father was arrested three weeks prior to trial and knew he would be unable to attend, yet he did not inform his attorney until the night before trial.
I

Petitioner, Grady Wayne Mealer, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was denied the right to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Party A obtained a default judgment in general sessions court against Party B. The general sessions court subsequently granted Party B's motion to set aside the default judgment. Party A appealed to circuit court. The circuit court reversed the general sessions court's decision to set aside the default judgment. Party B appeals to this court. We affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiff brought this action, charging defendant utility breached its contract with plaintiff to construct a line and deliver electricity to his property. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial judge held that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and defendant was not obligated to construct a line to deliver electricity to plaintiff's dwelling. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, a Class D felony, three counts of attempted burglary, a Class E felony, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, six counts of vandalism, a Class E felony, two counts of vandalism, a Class D felony, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of theft, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft, a Class D felony, in case nos. 02-0844, 02-0875, 02-0876, 02-0888, and 02-0291. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to ten years for each Class D felony conviction, five years for each Class E felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court imposed a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of one hundred years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Duane Michael Coleman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

I agree with the majority that the absence of any evidence of the requirements of the permanency plan[s] sounds the “death knell” for the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with those requirements. If we do not know what the requirements were – and we clearly do not – we cannot intelligently determine whether those requirements were satisfied or not. I completely concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the extent that decision is based upon a finding that she failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the plan(s).

This parental rights termination case was filed by Christopher W. ("Father") and Sara R. ("Stepmother") seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linsie K. ("Mother") to her daughter Tristyn K. ("the Child"). Stepmother also seeks to adopt the Child, who currently is four years old. Following a trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding various grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, we vacate the trial court's judgment finding grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights, and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Petitioner, Mark C. Noles, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of both a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Petitioner was convicted in Rutherford County of attempted aggravated arson in 2004 and sentenced to serve seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the form of a pro se petition. See State v. Mark C. Noles, No. M2006-015340CCA0R30CD, 2007 WL 3274422, at *1-7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 6, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2008). Counsel was appointed and an amended petition for post-conviction relief and petition for writ of error coram nobis were filed. Among other things, Petitioner sought relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he recently discovered new evidence indicating that one of the main witnesses at trial had recanted his testimony. After a hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis as time-barred and denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when trial counsel failed to advise Petitioner of the right to allocution, failed to subpoena a witness, and failed on appeal to contest the jury instructions; (2) whether the post-conviction court improperly refused to recuse itself from the post-conviction proceedings; (3) whether the post-conviction court improperly refused to allow Petitioner to present two witnesses at the post-conviction hearing; and (4) whether the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a thorough review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Further, we determine that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to recuse itself; that the post-conviction court did not deny Petitioner the right to present witnesses at the post-conviction hearing; and that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Courtney Hunt-Guy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and evading arrest and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to an effective term of three years, six months in the county workhouse. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by not applying the mental health mitigating factor to his felony theft conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Wayne L. Holt, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of first degree felony murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Wayne L. Holt, No. M2001-00945-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31465263, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 5, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003). At trial, a motion for judgment of acquittal was granted by the trial court as to the count of first degree felony murder and to the count of especially aggravated robbery. On the remaining charge of first degree murder, the jury convicted petitioner of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. He received a thirty-year sentence. A direct appeal was unsuccessful. Id. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the basis that, inter alia, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied the petition for relief. After a thorough review on appeal, we determine petitioner has failed to prove he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Tony Alton Pitts, was convicted of vehicular assault, a Class D felony, as well as violations of the financial responsibility law and the vehicle registration law, both Class C misdemeanors. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying him full probation and a restricted license. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

In three separate cases, the Defendant, Floyd Rodriquez Johnson, pled guilty to two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and one count of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The defendant agreed to allow the trial court to sentence him and agreed he was a Range II offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Defendant, Daniel Leon McCaig, appeals from the order of Dyer County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In May 2007, the Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual battery and received a five-year sentence. He was placed on probation. Thereafter, on July 22, 2008, he pleaded guilty to a violation of the sex offender registry law and theft under $500. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of two years for these new convictions, said sentence to be suspended and served on probation. This new sentence was to be served consecutively to the five-year sentence, resulting in an effective seven-year sentence on probation. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. The violation report was later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probationary sentence and ordered that his original seven-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence does not support full revocation of his probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the Defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Nicholas Shane Brewer, pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, in May 2006, receiving a negotiated sentence of six years, as a Range I standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He did not seek a direct appeal or post-conviction relief. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief on September 23, 2009. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court erred by summarily dismissing his petition, arguing that (1) the original judgment against him was void because it did not reflect the mandatory imposition of a sentence of community supervision for life, and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend the judgment; (2) he entered his guilty plea involuntarily and unknowingly; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. I believe the record contains final orders addressing all issues in the trial court, and I do not believe the failure to place all of the orders in a single judgment document bars our reviewing the restitution issue in this appeal.

After the parties were divorced for two years, the father sought to reduce his child support obligation and change the custody of the child which had been agreed upon at the time of the divorce. The trial court heard evidence and modified the visitation schedule, but vested the mother with primary custody all based on Tenn. Code Ann. _36-6-101(a)(2)(C). He also increased the child support obligation of the father, and the father has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael D. Hurst, has appealed the Blount County Circuit Court's September 4, 2009 revocation of his community corrections placement which resulted in his serving the balance of his 2004 eight-year, guilty pleaded sentence for drug possession. The State has moved the court to summarily affirm the circuit court's revocation order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record supports the State's motion, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

The defendant, Rodney Northern, pleaded guilty to one count of theft in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served as 50 days' incarceration with the remainder on supervised probation. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would later determine the amount of restitution, and after a hearing the trial court ordered $10,500 in restitution to the victim, Melvin Hance. On appeal, the defendant challenges the amount of restitution. After review of the record, we hold that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the trial court failed to enter a final judgment.